FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JULY 1944

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE GERMAN ARMY TODAY

Numbers, Disposition, Morale

By George Fielding Eliot

THE German Army has several tasks which it must fulfill simultaneously. It must resist the Anglo-American invasion. It must oppose the Russians in the east. It must keep the satellite states in line and control the captive peoples of occupied Europe. What are its capacities for dealing with these tasks? An attempt will be made here to estimate the strength and quality of the forces at the disposition of the German High Command and to indicate their distribution as the invasion begins.

I. FIGHTING STRENGTH

The best estimate is in terms of divisions. The division is the basic fighting team in all armies, and its size and fire power are roughly comparable so far as nominal establishments are concerned. True, there are various types of divisions — infantry divisions, armored divisions, mountain divisions, etc. But in estimating the fighting power of a large army, we may assume for purposes of comparison that the proportion of the various types is properly adjusted to the needs of the army. If we say that such-and-such an army has 100 divisions of all types, and that another army has 200 divisions, we have a basis for comparison which suggests that the second army is twice as strong in actual combat power as the first, other factors being equal. Some of the "other factors" will be further analyzed after we have examined the divisional strength of the German Army.

As of May 15, 1944, the German Army possessed about 320 divisions of all types. Of these, about 50 were "panzer" or "panzer grenadier" divisions; about 200 were "offensive" infantry divisions; and about 70 were "defensive" infantry divisions. The panzer division is an armored division, in which the basic element

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is the tank, though it includes infantry in armored troop-carriers, armored artillery, engineers and services. Each panzer division at full strength now has about 15,000 officers and men, with about 200 tanks (as compared with 400 at the beginning of the war). A panzer grenadier division is a motorized infantry division, plus a detachment of about 20 tanks. By the term motorized is meant a division in which motor transport is provided to move the entire division. The basic element of the panzer grenadier division is the same as that of the ordinary infantry division — the foot soldier. The average strength of panzer grenadier divisions may be taken as from 12,000 to 15,000 officers and men. The best types of recruits are used for the panzer and panzer grenadier divisions.

The bulk of the German Army is made up of infantry divisions. These vary in quality. In general, they are divided into two types which may be described as offensive divisions and defensive divisions. The offensive infantry division has enough rifle strength for a sustained offensive mission of normal type, and enough transport to enable it to move. The defensive infantry division is deficient (to a greater or less degree) in rifle strength, and is lacking in transport. Some divisions of the latter type have no transport at all and can be used only to hold fixed positions.

At the beginning of the war, the German infantry division had three regiments (9 battalions) of infantry, and two regiments (15 batteries) of field artillery, with engineers, services, and a reconnaissance unit. The majority of infantry divisions of the offensive type still have three infantry regiments, but the regiments have been reduced to two battalions each. The artillery component has not usually been reduced. Most German field artillery belonging to infantry divisions is still horse-drawn. It is the panzer and panzer grenadier divisions which have the motorized and self-propelled guns of which so much is heard, except when these are attached to infantry divisions for special missions. An offensive infantry division at full strength averages about 12,000 officers and men, as compared with 16,000 to 20,000 at the beginning of the war.

The defensive type of infantry division has fewer rifle companies in its battalions, or sometimes has machine-gun or mortar companies substituted for rifle companies. It usually has its full artillery component, but is likely to be deficient in transport. The average strength of these divisions may be estimated at from 8,000 to 10,000. In fire power they are not greatly inferior to the offensive divisions. What they lack is sustained striking power —

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which depends on a sufficient number of riflemen — and in many cases, mobility — which depends on sufficient transport.

In addition to the divisions, all armies have other units known as corps troops, army troops and general headquarters troops. These consist of special types of artillery (medium and heavy guns and howitzers, pack artillery, antiaircraft, etc.), engineer troops, signal troops, military police, medical and transport units and other specialized forces which are at the disposal of higher commanders and may be attached to divisions or other combat forces when necessary. For estimating an army at full strength (one, that is, which has not found it necessary to "scrape the bottom of the manpower barrel"), a good though rough rule-of-thumb is to estimate that the troops thus at the disposal of the higher commanders, plus the forces necessary to guard and operate the line of communications, will be about equal in strength to the divisional strength. Thus if we were to say that the United States Army today has 100 divisions of all types, and that the average strength of each division is 15,000, we ought to estimate the total strength in ground troops not at 1,500,000 but at 3,000,000. Behind these will be the replacement elements (recruits in training and men undergoing special courses of instruction) and the administrative and supply forces of the army in the home sector. The first are necessary to replace losses, the second to keep the army supplied with all it needs.

When we come to examine the German Army, however, we find first of all that we must cut the estimate of corps, army and GHQ troops to about 50 percent of the divisional strength. The German Army can no longer afford luxuries. It is down to rock bottom, and every special-type unit that is not absolutely necessary has been eliminated. As for its replacement and supply elements, we shall come to those a little later.

For the present, then, we may estimate the total manpower in the German Army as follows:

50 "panzer" and "panzer grenadier" divisions at 15,000 each...	750,000
200 infantry divisions ("offensive" type) at 12,000 each.....	2,400,000
70 infantry divisions ("defensive" type) at 10,000 each.....	700,000
	3,850,000
Less 15 percent average under-strength for about 200 divisions on the Russian front (say 1,800 each).....	360,000
Total manpower in divisions.....	3,490,000
Corps, Army and GHQ troops (50 percent of divisional strength)	1,745,000
Total manpower of German Army.....	5,235,000

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Let us leave these calculations for a moment and examine the German manpower situation on a somewhat broader basis.

II. TOTAL FIGHTING MANPOWER

Another rule-of-thumb which has proven itself sound ever since the railway made possible the mobilization of the great national armies of today is that a nation can put under arms a force equal to about 10 percent of its total population. If it exceeds this it weakens itself on the industrial, agricultural and transportation fronts more than it strengthens itself by the additional fighting power acquired.

The present population of Germany, including Austria and the Sudetenland, is about 80,000,000. This would give a mobilizable fighting strength of about 8,000,000 at any given time, assuming of course that young men keep coming in every year, and that older men keep going out by reason of developing defects, etc., in about the same proportion. From this total, we must deduct Germany's war losses, which (on the experience of earlier wars) will be almost altogether in the younger and tougher age-groups. The older men do not take so many chances nor are so many of them employed in front-line units.

As to war losses, there is considerable difference of opinion. Perhaps as good an estimate as any is that of the Czechoslovak chief of military intelligence, Colonel Moravec, who estimates the total German casualties (in killed, wounded and prisoners) at about 6,000,000. Taking normal figures of expectancy, as used in our own Army, we find that about 20 percent of these may be considered as killed in action. Probably about 500,000 Germans have been taken prisoner (chiefly at Stalingrad and in Tunisia, plus smaller captures in Russia, Sicily and Italy). This leaves 4,300,000 wounded. Of these, a good many will have recovered and rejoined the Army. Very high claims are made by our own medical services as to such recoveries, because of modern methods of evacuation and treatment. To grant the Germans every possible advantage, let us assume that only 20 percent of the wounded have been permanently disabled and that the rest are fit at least for limited service in clerical or hospital duties.

We may then tabulate the *permanent* German war losses thus:

Killed in action	1,200,000
Prisoners	500,000
Permanently disabled	860,000
Total permanent German losses	2,560,000

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Deducting this from the figure of 8,000,000 normally available fighting men, we find that something like 5,440,000 remain available for duty. This at first sight seems to compare well with the figure of 5,235,000 at which we had arrived for the strength of the German Army; but actually it makes no allowance for the Navy and Air Force, which together total about 1,500,000 officers and men.

However, we must apply a further adjustment to the total army figure. Not all the soldiers in the German Army are Germans — not by any means. Time and again, Allied front-line troops report the capture of Poles, Czechs, Alsatians, Danes, Slovenes, Ukrainians and men of other nationalities wearing German uniforms. In many cases these men have deserted to the Allied side when opportunity offered, or have thrown down their arms. Instances of German troops firing on deserters, or even on groups of prisoners already surrendered, may be explained by this circumstance. The Germans still keep a solid core of good tough German soldiers in each division, as far as they can; but in the supply and medical services, the transport columns, and even in some cases in lesser jobs in combat units, non-Germans now are used to fill in so as to release Germans for more crucial tasks. There are, of course, no exact statistics regarding the extent to which the German Army has been infiltrated by foreigners in this fashion. Probably the defensive divisions contain a higher proportion of them than the others. If we estimate at 25 percent the total of non-German men throughout the German Army we probably shall not be far wrong. The figures would then work out like this:

Total for German Army	5,235,000
Less 25 percent non-Germans	1,308,750
German soldiers	3,926,250
Plus Navy and Air Force (almost all Germans)	1,500,000
Total German fighting manpower	5,426,250

This compares almost exactly with the estimate based on Germany's mobilizable fighting strength.

There is still another angle from which we may approach the question of Germany's fighting manpower. In 1939, the last time when official statistics were published, there were in Germany about 18,000,000 males of fighting age (that is, 18 to 48 inclusive). War losses aside, this figure probably is accurate for 1944. At any

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one time, according to reasonably reliable estimates, we may assume that 8,000,000 men in these age-groups are deferred or barred from military service by reason of being government or party officials, indispensable industrial or agricultural workers, political prisoners, or because of physical defects. The estimate as to the last class is probably too low. Further deductions must be made for men assigned to the air-raid precaution services, fire-fighting and sanitary duties, and so forth, and to the air-raid spotting system; for the Germans (not the foreigners) in the Todt organization and other labor services; and for the police (not including the armed SS formations which can serve with the Army). The total of these comes to just under 2,000,000. An estimate made in this fashion leads us right back to the same figure of 8,000,000 mobilizable fighting men reached by the other methods.

One more estimate may be added, which tends to confirm the general accuracy of the results already reached. A United Press dispatch from Washington under date of May 20 gave it as the opinion of American and British military experts there that Germany "has about 3,000,000 front-line soldiers with which to meet the forthcoming Allied attacks from east, west, north or south." The statement continues: "This total does not include millions of supply, over-age and other troops of doubtful combat value, but . . . Germany's first-class, experienced fighting personnel."

Referring to the figures given in the first table above, the reader will note that the total number of German soldiers in the German Army is put at 3,926,250. Even after we eliminate the non-Germans in the supply and other services it is reasonable to suppose that about 25 percent of these Germans will be performing non-combat duties. Many of them will occupy supervisory positions in the supply and transport organizations, or on the lines of communication; others will be required for headquarters staffs, as clerks, orderlies and specialists — jobs which cannot be entrusted to non-Germans; still others will be "limited service" men who have returned to the army after being wounded or ill. The estimate of 3,000,000 "first class, experienced fighting personnel" seems to fit in pretty well with the figures we have been using. This is not, of course, to say that the other personnel are negligible. No army can fight unless its various services are efficiently manned. Ammunition and food must get up to the troops on time; weapons and motor transport must be repaired and serviced; animals must be cared for; the communications

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system and the administrative system must function; the sick and wounded must be evacuated and must be taken care of. Even in combat, some non-Germans will fight, and will kill Allied soldiers, as long as one German is behind each group of them with a machine-pistol in his hand.

These conclusions lead us to one further conclusion, and that is that the German Army has no replacement reserve. It does not even seem possible that enough men can be undergoing special training courses to keep up the Army's technical efficiency. Actually, there are probably a good many such courses in operation, but the men undergoing them are not replaced in their units; they represent a net drain on strength — and an important one, since the men chosen for special training are naturally men who have shown considerable aptitude in their organizations.

As to the replacement reserve, this can be maintained only by constantly combing over the industrial and agricultural pools of manpower, the air-raid services, police and so forth, by constantly lowering the physical standards, and by bringing in young men at an increasingly early age. Some replacement reserve is very likely kept up by these methods, the bulk of it probably formed by the young men who reach the age of 18 this year: some 450,000 of whom will pass the physical tests. But since there are constant calls for replacements from every unit of the army, and since the air force and navy must be taken care of, and since the SS Guards cannot be neglected lest the régime collapse for lack of internal support, this reserve cannot be considered as being at all adequate, and will be swallowed up in the first few weeks of serious two-front fighting.

III. DISTRIBUTION OF THE GERMAN ARMY

The German strategic plan for 1944 was determined and the distribution of men made after balancing all risks and advantages.

The Germans regarded the eastern, or Russian front, as holding their gravest risk. They regarded the chance of throwing the western invasion back into the sea as presenting their greatest opportunity. They distributed their army accordingly. Of 320 divisions of all types, almost 200 were assigned to the Russian front and 60 to France and the Low Countries. These remain the two main groupings. There is not likely to be any shift in them except under the pressure of events, for the reason that the Germans have obviously already cut their strength on the Russian front to the lowest figure they dare, while they appear to

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think that if 60 divisions cannot stop the western Allies from getting a lodgment on the Continent, they themselves will still, on that side, have the option of retiring to shorter lines — the old Hindenburg Line from Switzerland to the sea, or even the Siegfried Line defending the western frontier of Germany proper.

In detail, the German divisions were assigned approximately as follows:

Russian front (including 7 in Finland)	195
France, Belgium and the Netherlands	60
Italy	25
Hungary, Jugoslavia and Albania	15
Greece, Crete and the Aegean Islands	10
Norway	10
Denmark	5
Total number of divisions	320

If we divide the foregoing by types, we find that of the 50 panzer and panzer grenadier divisions, 8 to 10 were assigned to Italy, possibly as many as 15 to France and the Low Countries, 1 or 2 to Norway, and the remainder to the Russian front or the Balkans. The divisions in France and the Low Countries probably include as many as 30 of the defensive type infantry divisions, which are assigned to fixed defense areas and can be moved only with difficulty. The total number of divisions assigned to the front-line defense in France and the Low Countries was about 40, with 20 divisions constituting the mobile reserve. Of the total of 25 divisions assigned to Italy, at least five were destroyed in the fighting for Rome.

The German Army is divided into eight army groups, each consisting of two or more armies. As with us, each army includes two or more corps, and each corps two or more divisions. The army groups and their commanders are reported as follows:

North Russia, Colonel General Lindemann Central Russia, Field Marshal Busch	97
South Russia, Field Marshal von Modl Rumania, Colonel General Schorner	98
Balkans, Field Marshal von Weichs	25
Italy, Field Marshal von Kesselring	25
France and Low Countries, Field Marshal von Rundstedt	60
Norway and Denmark, Field Marshal von Falkenhorst	15
Total	320

It should be noted that these eight army groups include all the divisions of the German Army. Thus, not only is there no re-

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placement reserve; there is no central strategic reserve, no "mass of manœuvre" in Germany itself ready to be flung east or west as necessity may arise. The German Army is at full stretch. Each army group commander must meet any emergency which occurs on his front with his own resources.

It is barely possible, of course, that a strategic reserve might be built up by exchanging territory for time and troops. Thus there is a good deal of territory in north and central Russia still held by the Germans, plus the Baltic States and northeastern Poland, which could be abandoned without seriously compromising the German strategic position as a whole. This would bring the northern half of the eastern front into line with the southern half; it would shorten the front, enabling it to be held by fewer troops; and it would greatly shorten the lines of supply, effecting considerable economies in locomotives, railway cars, motor trucks, fuel and transport personnel.

But the southern Russian front (between the Pripet and the Carpathians) and the Rumanian front are already formed along lines which do not permit further retreat to be thought of. The Germans probably do not want the same conditions of strain along the whole eastern front. They do not want Russian air bases close to Germany all along that front. Nor can they be too confident of the result of a concentrated and full-power Russian attack against their shortened line. These are the reasons why, up to the present, we have seen no indication of a German withdrawal in northern and central Russia. A German withdrawal from Italy would save a certain number of troops. So would abandonment of the Balkans, and so also would the evacuation of Norway.

The basic fact is this: the Germans can reconstitute a strategic reserve now only by taking the risks of giving up outlying territory, bringing the Allies closer to the German heartland and standing on fronts which must be held at all costs. They will not do that until they have to. They seem to be saving a withdrawal in the east and south as a last resort, a measure to be considered only after they have taken their gamble in the west. If they can roll back our seaborne and airborne invasion, they may gain a breathing space; no doubt they even have dreams of a compromise peace. Meanwhile, the lines of their strategy, and consequently their troop distribution, are set for the present; and the lack of a central reserve is one of the risks they seem to be accepting, not because they want to but because they must.

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IV. THE SATELLITE ARMIES

The tendency among informed military observers is to discount the satellite armies altogether, with the possible exception of the Hungarians.

Probably the Hungarian Army will fight to resist a Russian invasion of Hungary. It consists of about 25 divisions, of which from 7 to 10 have been mobilized since the Germans took over Hungary. Like the other satellite peoples, the Hungarians are largely equipped with weapons and matériel captured by the Germans in their earlier campaigns; these are obsolescent, and some difficulties in supplying ammunition and spare parts may be anticipated.

The Finns may still resist a Russian thrust into their country, but the Germans know they are pretty well worn down and cannot be counted on. It is thought that the Bulgarians certainly will not fight the Russians, and may even withdraw their forces now occupying parts of Jugoslavia and Greece, leaving additional tasks for the Germans. The Rumanians probably have 18 or 20 divisions nominally in the field; but they are not fighting well, desertions are numerous, and they cannot be counted on for front-line duties. The Germans have mobilized a few Italian units, but these are more than balanced by Italians fighting on our side. The Slovaks are tired of the war. As for the Croat "ustashis," they perform some services for the Axis in Jugoslavia, but their numbers seem to be diminishing, and they are not equal to the Jugoslavs who are in arms against Germany.

Save for the Hungarians, then, the Germans will from now on be fighting more and more alone. They have no dependable allies, and their manpower resources can be bolstered only by forced labor drafts and by using non-German soldiers who have to be watched by Germans.

V. THE GERMAN SOLDIER IN 1944

It would be a mistake to suppose from all this that the German soldier himself is losing his fighting spirit. He is supported by the hope of a compromise peace, held out to him persistently by his own propagandists; by the desire to get revenge for the punishment inflicted on his homeland by Allied air attacks; and above all by a grim determination not to yield to the Allied demand for unconditional surrender, which he does not like at all. He has the idea that anything would be better than that. The propa-

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gandists have pictured a terrible fate in store for the German people if surrender is actually forced on Germany. Every soldier knows that Germany is full of foreign workers who hate everything German and that Germany is surrounded by a ring of hatred — the peoples who for so long have been enslaved and tortured. Above all, there is a deep-seated fear of Russian invasion in every German heart. These things sustain the German soldier and keep him fighting, far from his native land, in the hope of holding back the enemy from his frontiers and of keeping part of the terrible Allied air power at a distance from his home. Every yard of foreign territory that he is compelled to give up he regards, not so much as conquered land which he, the one-time conqueror, has been forced to relinquish, but as bringing his own home a yard nearer the Allied armies and air forces. On the other hand, examination of prisoners has shown paradoxically that many German soldiers feel somehow comforted as they fall back, because they are getting nearer to the Fatherland, it takes less time to go home on leave, and mail and parcels from home come more quickly.

The principal defect in the morale of the German soldier is a slowly developing sense of futility. What's the use of it all? Why must more blood be spilt, more men die, more days be spent in torment? Most German soldiers know now that Germany cannot win, at least not this time. They talk glibly, some of them, of "next time," counting on the fact that Germany has conserved her strength and has deliberately weakened the rest of Europe. But they know that this time they have lost. There are some despairing hearts and some fierce and unthinking fanatics; but these are the extremes, and the minority. The hopes of most center on putting up such a fight as shall win for Germany some sort of compromise peace, and a chance to try again. That, in general, is why most German soldiers now fight.

The hope of a compromise peace is largely based, in turn, on the hope of thrusting back the first wave of western invasion in bloody defeat. If this hope should be blasted; if the western allies should establish themselves firmly on the Continent; if Germany should be walled in by converging Allied armies on the east, the west and the south — then it is possible that the effect on the morale of the German soldier might be catastrophic, and suddenly so.

The German soldier's armament and equipment continue to be of high quality. The chief defect here is the lack of new models

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and new designs. The air offensive and the shortage of raw materials have pinched German production sufficiently so that there is no longer time, in most cases, to re-tool and switch over to production of entirely new designs. Instead, attempts are made to patch improvements on old models, which is never so satisfactory as a complete change to meet the needs discovered in actual practice. As to quantity, there is a distinct shortage in heavier types of equipment, notably tanks and self-propelled guns. This is due both to the air offensive and to the terrific losses of heavy equipment in Russia. There is reason to believe, however, that the Germans have a sufficient production of material to fight a defensive war throughout the remainder of this year, and that the quality of it will not fall sufficiently to make much actual difference in the result.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

To sum up: The Germans have about 320 divisions of all types, plus corps and army troops. They have no replacement reserve, and no strategic central reserve. They are fully committed on all fronts. They can create a reserve only by giving up territory, which they are reluctant to do. They are using non-Germans in every position where a non-German can be safely employed, but they have no reliable allies. Their strategy is pretty well set for this year. It consists of holding back the Russians while trying to defeat the invasion in the west. The morale of the German soldier is still good, and will remain so as long as the hope of defeating the invasion continues. But losses cannot be replaced, and defeats will have a cumulative effect, both moral and material.

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AMERICA AT WAR

The Crisis

By Hanson W. Baldwin

THE spring of 1944 has been a time of preparation. Now the preparations are to be put to the test. The invasion of western Europe, an operation of such size and peculiar complexity that there is probably no analogy to it in military history, is imminent as these lines are written. By the time they are published, the Allies may be engaged in the furious battles which will decide at the minimum the duration of the war, at the maximum its outcome. This article cannot do more than review the events of the final months of preparation and indicate the principal factors which the reader will want to keep in mind as the invasion unfolds.

I

The bulk of the Allied effort during the spring was concentrated on the transport of supplies and troops to Britain, and on an air offensive of ever-increasing intensity to soften up the Continent in preparation for the invasion. Britain was bursting with men and equipment. Thousand-plane raids upon western Europe became common. In one week in April, for example, RAF and United States bombers dumped almost 30,000 tons of bombs on enemy targets. In earlier months we strove particularly to knock out plants manufacturing fighter planes or their component parts and factories producing roller bearings. The attempt met with success, though probably not to the extent estimated by some of our most optimistic air officers. Gradually in April and May much of the weight of our air attack was shifted from industrial targets to enemy communication centers and enemy airfields. Railroad junctions such as Hamm and Cologne were hammered, and medium bombers and fighters of the Tactical Air Forces smashed at German airfields, at Luftwaffe maintenance and repair facilities, at the rocket-gun coast in the Pas-de-Calais area, and at German military positions along the coast.

Bombers of the Fifteenth United States Army Air Force, based in Italy, joined the two-way assault against "Fortress Europe" by striking at various Balkan points and at objectives in southern Germany and Austria. Their blows impeded the Ger-

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man communications which supplied and reënforced the Nazi armies facing the Russians in the Carpathians and in the neighborhood of the Galatz gap.

In the Pacific as in Europe the spring was plainly a period of preparation for a summer of larger operations. Our successful conquest in February of Kwajalein led gradually to the extension of our hold over nearly all of the Marshall group of islands. Four principal atolls were still in Japanese hands at the time of writing, but they were neutralized and "withering on the vine." Strong American carrier task forces raided Truk, the Marianas, and Palau and Yap, with no losses in ships. The opposition they encountered was slight. The highlights of the period were our consolidation of the positions we captured in the Marshalls and continuous bombing operations to soften up Truk, Ponape, Kusaie, and other Japanese Central Pacific positions.

The remaining Japanese forces in the northern Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago were virtually contained and neutralized by our moves into the Admiralty and Green Islands. General Douglas MacArthur was free to press westward along the New Guinea coast, and did so with greater naval support than in any previous operation he had undertaken. After heavy preliminary bombardments of Wewak, Hollandia and other points, strong amphibious forces landed late in April near Aitape and Hollandia, New Guinea — a westward jump of some 415 miles beyond our previous positions. This move was covered in part by an Allied raid on Sabang, in northwestern Sumatra, in which American carriers, British and French battleships and light Dutch naval units participated. Part of the Japanese Fleet has been based at Singapore, and this foray under the direction of the British Eastern Fleet, based in Ceylon, was probably intended to distract its attention while we were preparing our move in New Guinea.

With the coming of the monsoon rains in May the land operations in Burma drew to an end. Here as in Italy there was a virtual stalemate. The Japanese invasion of Manipur State in India was a limited success in that it forced Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten to divert forces from other fronts to oppose it; but it did not sever the vital Bengal-Assam railway, and the Japanese lost heavily. On the other hand, neither in northern Burma nor in Arakan did the Allies accomplish all that they had hoped when the fighting season started last fall. Lieutenant-General Joseph W. Stilwell had not forged a land route through Burma to China, and the British in Arakan were still far from Akyab. Our lack of

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success and the Japanese invasion of India focused a good deal of attention on this theater. Stung by criticism of defects both in command and supply, the British gradually began giving more attention to the area and concentrated more strength there. Probably the new plans will bear fruit when the monsoon rains end in the autumn.

The limited nature of our spring operations in the various theaters is explained, of course, by one simple fact: Allied efforts in men, shipping, supplies and air power were concentrated on preparations for the invasion of western Europe.

II

Our military purpose in undertaking an invasion is obvious — to defeat Germany. But it cannot be accomplished by the invasion alone; Allied strategy in Europe as a whole must be concerted. Four or more main offensives — either simultaneous, or nearly so — are therefore to be expected. The invasion of western Europe will be one. A Russian smash through Poland, possibly with the main effort in the direction of Lwow and Silesia, to the accompaniment of another drive toward Brest-Litovsk and Warsaw, will be another. This may be correlated with Russian drives into the Baltic States and at least a holding offensive in the Carpathian passes and the Galatz gap. The Allied operations in the Mediterranean area — secondary to the two great drives against Germany from east and west — seem likely, at this writing, to include some Commando raids or even landings in the Balkans; and renewed pressure on the German armies in Italy may be supplemented by an attack in southern France. Fourth, and finally, Germany will continue to be pounded from the air.

Those who are optimistic expect these hammer blows to bring about Germany's defeat by fall or winter; even pessimists believe that she will be unable to continue resistance for more than 12 or 18 months from the present time. Such hopes, of course, are predicated upon the success of the concerted strategy. And the success of this concerted strategy will largely depend, in turn, upon the success of our invasion of western Europe.

The enemy forces which we shall have to defeat in order to accomplish our mission in Europe are still large and are excellently trained, well equipped and formidable. The disposition of the German land forces today is about as follows: 10 to 12 divisions in Norway; 5 in Denmark; 50 to 60 in the Low Countries and France; 25 to 30 in Italy; some 200 divisions opposed to the

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Russians; the remainder in reserve or in the Balkans or garrisoning other conquered areas. Today the German Luftwaffe and the German Navy are the weakest elements of the German defense, which is why the battle for western Europe will start at the coast line and not far out at sea. The Luftwaffe is greatly outnumbered and is spread thin. Allied plane superiority is perhaps two or three to one in Russia; eight or ten to one in the Mediterranean; at least two to one and perhaps more in western Europe. But despite the Luftwaffe's numerical inferiority our invasion forces will find many planes in the air against them.

The size of Russia's land forces and the number of troops which the Allies have in the Mediterranean and in Britain ready for the invasion of western Europe is, of course, a closely guarded secret. The Red Army undoubtedly has at least a three to two superiority over the Germans in ground effectives, or possibly a two or three to one superiority. Up to the time of writing, only about two divisions of the French Army have been in action; yet last fall that Army was being organized, trained and equipped on the basis of 11 divisions. In Britain, the American and British divisions available for the job of invasion must presumably be ample, yet the public should not count upon their enjoying overwhelming numerical ground superiority in the west. Allied strength has been dispersed — for example, there are some 20 Allied divisions in the South Pacific area alone — and neither Britain nor the United States is able to muster in the British Isles the "hundreds" of divisions which are supported in Germany and Russia. In comparison with the Germans, moreover, we labor under one considerable disadvantage. Very few American divisions in Britain, and relatively few British units, are veteran troops, tested and tempered in combat. The bulk of the invading forces will be green. But those forces will have the advantage of more weapons and equipment than their enemies, as well as of air and of naval superiority.

What are the logical areas for invasion?

Since our over-all military objective is to defeat the enemy quickly and conclusively the invasion obviously must be launched against a section of the western coast near to Germany's heart. We are striving to strike a mortal blow. Adventures on the periphery of Germany's conquered territory will not accomplish our purpose. We can therefore rule out most or all of Norway as a main invasion area, though quite possibly it may be a theater of secondary operations. Denmark has only one good west-coast port and that is too small to support great invasion forces; the

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Germans could probably hold the neck of the Jutland peninsula indefinitely and the configuration of the Danish west coast is unfavorable to invaders. Germany's short strip of coast on the North Sea is highly fortified and lies behind Helgoland, sandbanks and other islands; the approaches to it are canalized through narrow channels which can readily be mined and defended. An invasion here would be a daring and dangerous move. Southwestern France is too far from the heart of Germany for a main effort and too far from Britain to enable us to supply a maximum of air support. The best area for an invasion that will accomplish our mission lies between Holland and the Brittany peninsula. It is precisely this area, moreover, which is closest to our bases in Britain, thus simplifying the problems of air support and of supply. And in this stretch of coast there are ports adequate to support an invading army.

The invasion possibilities of the various sectors of coast within this general area may be analyzed further, not in order to predict the points of attack but simply to suggest to the reader various aspects of our military problem which he will wish to keep in mind if the assault does come here.

Invasion forces landing in the Netherlands would not only find good ports at Amsterdam and Rotterdam, but would have the advantage that they might outflank some of the strongest Westwall fortifications. However, they would have to cope with the added hazard of flooding. The Belgian sea frontier is about 42 miles long, with many sloping beaches well adapted to landing operations; but the Rhine and parts of the Westwall would constitute added obstacles inland. The portion of the French coast from the Belgian border to the mouth of the Seine at Havre lies nearest to England. It has beaches suitable for landing at several points, and harbors at Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne and Havre; but armies driving thence toward Germany would meet defense lines along the Oise River and through Sedan, Verdun, Toul and Épinal, and might have to break through the Westwall and cross the Rhine.

The French coastline west of Havre lies further from Britain. A crescent of 20 or more miles of beach in the neighborhood of Deauville offers good landing points. Further west, the Norman peninsula is rocky and in some places lined with cliffs. It might be invaded from both sides simultaneously, and if this move were successful it would have the advantage that we would acquire a good base at Cherbourg, on the tip of the peninsula. To do this

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AURORA, ILLINOIS

we would perhaps first have to seize the Channel Islands, which the Germans hold and undoubtedly have strongly fortified. A similar effort to seal off the rocky Brittany peninsula from two sides might be made by attacks in the region of Dinan and St. Nazaire. Not only would any invading forces landing west of the Seine have the disadvantage of operating over longer lines from England, but they might encounter greater difficulties inland, for they would have to break through the German defense lines along the Seine and take the region around Paris before driving ahead into Germany.

Because the part of the coast from Holland to the Brittany peninsula is the most favorable for invasion it is more heavily defended than any other strip of coast in Europe. Concrete anti-tank walls, "Element C" (a grillwork barrier of steel and cable), pillboxes, guns of all sizes from machine guns to 20-inch howitzers and rifles (or perhaps even larger), millions of water and land mines, underwater obstructions, turrets moved from the Maginot Line and every other kind of fortification that human ingenuity can devise are studded thickly on this coast. The Channel tides offer another impediment; a 20-foot rise and fall is not unusual and sometimes the variation is more than 40 feet.

III

What are the principal factors involved in an invasion? Books could be written on the subject. All that can be attempted here is a simple résumé of the known factors involved, with a brief indication of the part each must play if the invasion is to be a success.

1. *Air bombardment.* We must continue our attrition attacks upon German industry, but gradually the weight of our air power will be shifted to an assault on communications and airfields. The heavy bomber forces which have been operating more or less directly under the British War Cabinet and the Combined Chiefs of Staff will probably have come under General Dwight D. Eisenhower's direct command some time before D-Day. The use of heavy bombers for the close support of ground forces is difficult and usually inefficient, as Cassino showed; a strategic bomber force is not a flexible weapon. But we shall have to use these bombers to smash enemy communications and to try to break, or at least impede, the flow of supplies and reënforcements to the section or sections of the coast selected for invasion.

2. *Airborne troops.* The destruction of enemy communications

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will be in part, also, the job of the airborne troops. They will be dropped by parachute, or transported in glider or transport plane behind the enemy's coastal defenses. They must cut telephone lines, blow bridges and perhaps seize an airfield or a railroad junction, holding these points to prevent the Germans from rushing their strategic ground or air reserves to the threatened part of the coast. They may also be used in attacks upon the rear of the enemy's fortifications. The immensity of the task of landing enough airborne troops to be effective can be briefly illustrated. To transport one airborne division of some 8,000 men requires hundreds of transport planes and hundreds of gliders — the total is in four figures; yet one airborne division would be a relatively small unit in an airborne invasion of western Europe.

3. *Underground armies.* French, Dutch, Belgian and other patriots may be expected to mobilize their utmost possible strength at a concerted signal on D-Day. Their job, like that of the air forces and the airborne troops, will be to hamper and cut German communication and supply lines, particularly those supplying enemy troops in the invasion area. The resistance forces inside the Continent must not be counted upon too heavily; Hitler has suppressed them ruthlessly, and the police forces of Europe are filled with collaborationists.

4. *Navy.* To the British and American Navies will fall the task of transporting, supporting, supplying and reënforcing our invasion forces. The British will carry a preponderant part of it. Operations will probably be both "ship-to-shore," *i.e.* from large ocean-going transports, via landing craft, to the invasion beaches, and "shore-to-shore," *i.e.* by landing craft direct from British bases to invasion beaches. Transports will be of many different types. Landing craft vary from little assault boats, armed with rocket launchers, to great 4,000-ton LST's (Landing Ships, Tanks) which can cross the Atlantic under their own power. The magnitude and complexity of this effort can be illustrated by two examples. It requires about 120 normal landing craft to carry only two battalions. About 25 big transports and cargo ships are needed for one division, "combat-loaded," *i.e.* ready to disembark fighting.

Consider, too, just the one difficulty of amphibious operations described by Commander R. C. Todhunter, R.N., in a recent article in *Britain.* He wrote: "If you have a tank landing craft, say 200 feet long, drawing three feet forward and seven feet aft, the keel slopes four feet in 200 feet, *i.e.* one in 50. On any beach that is one in 50 or steeper, the craft will ground bows first in three feet

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of water; but if the beach is very flat, say one in 200, she will ground aft, and there will still be five feet of water at the bow, which may be too much for tanks or vehicles to wade." Add to such complexities a great rise and fall of the tide, and the problem of the Navy begins to be seen in perspective. The Navy also has the job of reconnoitering and marking the beaches, of removing mines (up to the high-water mark) and underwater obstacles, and of bringing the troops to the specific beaches they are to assault. And when the assault begins, naval gunfire ranging in size from rockets to 16-inch shells must substitute for the Army's field artillery.

5. *The assault troops.* The invasion will reveal all sorts of new techniques, tactics and weapons — rockets, special anti-concrete shells, detachable gas tanks filled with viscous flaming liquid to be dropped from planes, new devices for eliminating mines, etc. Amphibious tanks may play a rôle. The timing must be to the split second, the plans must be letter-perfect. But nothing will substitute for courage, and the assault battalions must be prepared for heavy losses.

6. *Supply.* The establishment of a beachhead is not enough. If the knockout punch is to be successful our troops must sooner or later capture a port or ports. A modern army requires something like a minimum of one to two tons of supplies per man each month. Despite the great advance in amphibious technique and the development of specialized landing craft which permit the unloading of supplies over open beaches, the delivery of such a volume of supplies necessitates the possession of a sheltered port. But even if we capture ports we shall find them blasted and torn, with piers and cranes demolished and channels blocked.

The mere statement of such problems indicates that the invasion will be the biggest military undertaking in history.

IV

There follow, in approximately accurate sequence, the minimum requirements for the establishment of a beachhead on an enemy-held coast. The reader can check off those which he knows have already been fulfilled. We shall see on D-Day — and thereafter — whether we have made adequate preparations to meet the others.

1. We must have sure and detailed knowledge of the topography of the coast and of the strength and dispositions of the enemy and his fortifications.

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2. We must have clear-cut sea superiority. In the vicinity of the invasion coast we must have sea domination.

3. In the air, we must have at least localized superiority, if possible localized domination.

4. We should have at least a two-to-one superiority in manpower and firepower at the selected points of landing.

5. We must sever or impede the enemy's lines of communications to the interior, so that he can be prevented from launching a tremendous counterattack before the beachhead is really established.

6. We must silence or neutralize the enemy fire — particularly the fire from his coastal batteries — along the strip of coast to be assaulted.

7. Our troops must get ashore.

8. They must push inland beyond the beach. At Dieppe, many of the British troops never got further than the beach. At Tarawa, the Marines were pinned down to a strip of beach for 24 hours.

9. The beachhead must be extended sufficiently to put our landing craft beyond small-arms range.

10. It must then be extended so that our landing craft and transports are beyond light field artillery range and perhaps beyond that of medium artillery.

Finally, if a beachhead is to be held against German efforts to push us into the sea, or if several beachheads are to be coalesced into a great beachhead, we must quickly capture or construct numerous airfields. We must quickly capture and put into working order a port or ports, and we must then extend the beachhead so that our principal supply port is beyond the range of the enemy's artillery.

These are heroic tasks. In the eyes of our High Command they are susceptible of accomplishment, or the invasion of western Europe would not be undertaken. But we must remember that nothing is certain in war. Any military operation, and particularly one so unprecedented as this, is a gamble. There are many unknown quantities. Our Army is still relatively untested. The exact strength of the Germans and the size of their reserves are still question marks. There is little doubt that we can get ashore somewhere on the coast of western Europe — perhaps in several places simultaneously. The problem will be to stay there. There will be many crises.

The first crisis, of course, will come in the act of invasion itself. The second crisis may come at any time from D-plus-1 to D-plus-

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7, when the German reserves immediately available near or relatively near our beachhead are thrown against us in heavy counterattack. This may be the most dangerous moment. It will not necessarily come quite so soon; at Anzio it was delayed. Still a third crisis may come between D-plus-30 and D-plus-60 when the enemy's strategic reserves, perhaps drawn from Germany or even from the eastern front, come into action. From 7 to 12 divisions, for example, might be shifted from the eastern front to the French coast in somewhat more than two weeks. If our troops surmount these crises it will be safe to believe that they are in western Europe to stay.

The invasion is the climax of everything we have done heretofore. Failure will be the failure of our entire strategy; success will justify it — our training, our preparations, our plans. The Germans know the decisive moment is here as well as we do. The struggle will be sanguinary.

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CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM, A NEW SOVIET APPRAISAL

By Calvin B. Hoover

A GREAT deal of interest has been aroused by the recent appearance in a Soviet publication of an article dealing with fundamental elements of the capitalist and Socialist economic systems. The article, "Some Questions in the Teaching of Political Economy," which appeared in the periodical *Under the Banner of Marxism*,[1] has been taken to be an authoritative pronouncement of the most far-reaching importance, representing a radically-changed appraisal by the Soviet Government of the nature of capitalism and Socialism, fraught with bright prospects for the future relations between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries. Is this interpretation correct and are the happy expectations which are based upon it justified?

There can be little question of the importance of the article, even though there is considerable misunderstanding in this country about the "official" character of anything which appears in Soviet publications. To judge from some comment, one would almost suppose that Stalin or at least his personal representative censors everything which is published in the Soviet Union. It is perfectly true that no one in Russia would publish anything which he thought would be viewed unfavorably by Stalin, since the consequences would probably be serious indeed. This fact does most importantly condition the nature of everything which is printed. Though a Soviet writer knows that Stalin or anyone close to Stalin will read only a small proportion of what appears in even the more important books, periodicals and newspapers, he will not disregard the possibility that his product will receive such attention. Nevertheless, very little which is published in Russia can automatically be considered an authoritative pronouncement, even though practically every author in the U.S.S.R. writes with the earnest intention of avoiding conflict with any state or party official more powerful than himself.

[1] The editors of *Pod Znamenem Marxizma* (*Under the Banner of Marxism*) are L. A. Leontiev, M. B. Mitin, P. N. Fedoseiev, V. C. Kruzhkov, L. A. Orbeli, V. P. Potemkin, P. F. Iudin, S. I. Vavilov, M. P. Tolchenov and M. N. Korneiev. The article in question appeared in the issue No. 7–8, 1943, p. 56–78. It is unsigned and seems in the nature of an editorial. Most of the American comment on it has apparently been based upon a very useful summarized translation by Henry F. Mins, Jr., which appeared in the Spring 1944 issue of *Science and Society*. My thanks are due Dr. W. A. Perlzweig, of the Duke University School of Medicine, who collaborated with me in the article's translation and analysis.

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It is perfectly possible that the position taken by the writers of the article in question might later be sharply repudiated by Stalin without anyone feeling that such action meant that Stalin had changed his mind. It is certain, however, that the article would never have been written if the authors had any premonition that their position would be repudiated by Stalin. It has happened, times without number, that articles have been published and policies advocated, which have turned out to be contrary to the party line as later established by Stalin, or by some other party official if the matter were not considered important enough to warrant Stalin's attention. If a heresy is considered sufficiently dangerous, the writer may be required to confess his errors publicly, as were Bukharin, Tomsky and Rykov among many others. The public confession of error has been so often correlated with eventual liquidation as to render it an experience not lightly to be risked.

The occasion for the publication of the article in *Under the Banner of Marxism* was the resumption of the teaching of political economy in the higher schools after a considerable period of suspension. Defects in the textbooks used earlier were characterized at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party as amounting to "wholesale transformation of the subject of political economy from a general historical science devoted to the study of the living tissue of society into a collection of anti-scientific abstractions and lifeless schemes." Due to these errors, "students lost the sense of the progressiveness of the development of human society." The present writers conceive their responsibility to be that of outlining the proper principles and methods for teaching political economy and of preparing textbooks on the subject, now that instruction is to be resumed.

Far from suggesting a repudiation of Marxism, the writers show an almost agonized concern that their principles and method should be considered rigorously Marxian in the most orthodox sense. At the same time, they reflect a sense of confidence in the efficacy of the present Soviet economic system and a consciousness of its permanency. Consequently they are able to say that in spite of the fact that the Soviet economic system is founded squarely upon Marxist principles, Marx could not be expected to have been able to draw up a blueprint of the exact structure and method of functioning of a present-day Socialist economic system. The errors and mistakes in the teaching of political economy in the past thus were due not to any lack of validity in the Marxian doc-

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trines but to the attempt to interpret these doctrines too rigidly and too abstractly. These mistakes could have been avoided if the development of society had been considered from an adequately historical point of view.

The thesis of the article is that the present Soviet economic system is quite consistent with Marxism and that any insinuations to the contrary represent the stupid failure of left wing Communists to understand Marx and Lenin, the present Soviet economic system, and the nature of the laws of economic progress. A fundamental error of these critics was the idealization of the primitive communism which existed at the dawn of history. The development from primitive society into the class society was erroneously presented not as progress but in terms of mankind's banishment from Paradise through original sin. Thus the goal of the Soviet economic system was represented as a communism in which the way of life would be similar to that of primitive times. Actually, mankind lived under the most miserable conditions at this earliest stage of human development. Communal organization was a necessity if men were to obtain the barest means of subsistence. There was no surplus product during this period, either for the use of exploiting classes or as a source of accumulation for the improvement of the means of production, for cultural advancement or for any other purpose.

It was an inexcusable error, the authors of the article maintain, to fail to realize that great progress took place when mankind evolved through the stages of slavery and of feudalism to capitalism. Under capitalism the great improvements in the means of production which had been made possible by the development of a surplus beyond that necessary for immediate subsistence permitted the development of a still larger surplus product. It is true that under the capitalist system this surplus product became, in the main, the property of the parasitic bourgeoisie and was accompanied by economic crises with their attendant miseries. Under Soviet Socialism no part of this surplus product has to be turned over to parasitic owners of private property nor does it lead to periodic crises of overproduction. It is used as the source of improvement of capital equipment, for education and cultural purposes, and to provide the means for national defense.

There is a difference, too, between capitalism in different countries and in different stages, the writers allege. The monopolistic, imperialistic capitalism of Fascism and Hitlerism is anathema.

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The capitalism of the United States and Great Britain is at least accompanied by democratic and parliamentary institutions, including labor unions. Interestingly enough, the writers claim that the Soviet system is even more democratic and that it affords the greatest opportunities for "full blossoming of the individual."

The writers refute as erroneous the doctrine that economic laws do not exist under Socialism. There are economic laws under Socialism just as under capitalism, they say, although they are not the same laws. The important difference is that under capitalism economic laws operate outside social control to produce catastrophic results. Under Socialism economic laws are used for social ends. Thus there is a law of value under Socialism. There are, they explain, two kinds of prices in Soviet Russia: one governs in the fully socialized area of the economy and another in the "free or private markets" in which are sold the products produced by peasants in their individual gardens or those produced by individual craftsmen. The first type of price is consistent with the laws of value of a Socialist economy. It reflects the elements of cost of production, as established by the prices set by the state on labor of various kinds and qualities and on capital equipment. Price in the free or private market reflects only the current inability of the economy to produce sufficient goods to satisfy the demand at prices which reflect costs in the socialized economy.

The Soviet Socialist economic system has, however, emancipated itself from the capitalist law of average profit. Under the Soviet system, the writers continue, it is possible to undertake industrial production even when the cost in the initial stages is so high that the average rate of profit cannot be earned. This does not in the least mean that cost of production is ignored; the writers insist on the desirability of precise cost accounting. It does mean, for example, that the steel industry of the Urals could be put into operation even though the cost of bringing together iron ore and coal from distant points seemed prohibitive. As methods of production were improved and more favorably located supplies of coal were discovered and developed, the cost could be lowered.

The value of labor, and hence the wages which it earns, is not measured by the amount of time which workers expend but by the value which the labor contributes to the product. This, of course, justifies almost any conceivable differences in rates of compensation between citizens of the Soviet state. Thus it is an important device for repudiating the Communist doctrine of distribution of

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income, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need." The correct principle of distribution is now declared to be, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."[2]

A strong tone of Soviet nationalism runs through the entire article. There are repeated references to the Soviet fatherland. Again and again the authors point proudly to the success of the Soviet economic system in building an industrialized Russia which could so successfully provide for national defense. Prospective teachers of political economy are admonished that the teaching of economics should not only further the building up of Socialism but should also promote "love of our Soviet fatherland and hatred of its enemies."

II

It is remarkable how successfully the authors harmonize the tenets of the present Soviet economic system with the principles of Marx and Lenin. It is true that this requires skill and care in selecting appropriate passages from Marx and Lenin. But Stalin long ago chose with great shrewdness the ideological ground upon which he intended to defend the kind of economic society which he rules. Indeed, it requires no great *tour de force* to find in Lenin's "State and Revolution" alone the necessary sources for such a defense. In the main the authors of the article had only to follow the line already marked out by Stalin.

In order to appreciate this it is necessary to recall the essential steps which have been taken since the October Revolution in molding the Soviet state to its present form. Stalin has claimed for many years that the régime which he has established constitutes the first stage of Communism, and should be called Socialism, in contrast with the second and ultimate stage, which is Communism proper. In this final stage the state would no longer exist, and distribution would, indeed, be "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." Until such a stage is reached, however, the state must continue to exist and distribution must be according to the value of services performed.

This concept is definitely advanced by Lenin in his "State and Revolution," written in 1917, although there are numerous ambiguities and even contradictions in his exposition of the thesis. In an embryonic form it can even be found in Marx. The concept

[2] It is ironic that both the Soviet economic system and capitalism lay claim to the same distributive principle.

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seems to have developed in the course of a conflict with the ideas of Proudhon concerning the nature of the revolution which was to overthrow capitalism. Marx pointed out that it was absolutely necessary for the workers to organize a "dictatorship of the proletariat" if they were to hold the power which they had seized. To do so they must temporarily carry on some of the forms of the state and society which had been overthrown. It seems certain that both Marx and Lenin believed that this period would be very brief and that as soon as the conquest of power had been complete the state would "wither away" and the workers themselves would administer industry. Indeed, Lenin is most categoric about this withering away of the state. He changed his mind, however, as he perceived the difficulties of destroying capitalism, of maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat, and of founding a Socialist society.

Lenin in 1921 inaugurated the New Economic Policy, or "Nep," which he characterized as "a step backward, the better to leap forward," and which did reintroduce some of the elements of capitalism. This period was accepted by Communists of the left with the greatest reluctance, and it seriously complicated the ideological timetable. There was no way in which the period of "Nep" could be integrated into the stages of Communism which Marx or Lenin had foreseen; yet during this period the mold which was largely to determine the shape of things to come was taking form.

In 1929, in the second year of the first Five Year Plan, Stalin surprised his Trotskyist opponents, who were accusing him of preparing a "reaction of Thermidor," by inaugurating his first and only sharp turn to the left. Almost all of the capitalist elements of "Nep" were liquidated, as were the Nepmen and kulaks themselves. A gigantic stride was also taken toward the collectivization of agriculture, which was later to become complete. A wave of terror was instituted against the "former people" who had been associated in any way with the bourgeois Tsarist state. The personal property of kulaks, Nepmen and "former people" was forcibly expropriated.

This sharp and powerful turn to the left was accompanied by an attack on the leaders of the right wing of the party, such as Bukharin and Rykov. Stalin nevertheless took steps to halt the leftward trend when it had gone as far as he considered advisable. He stopped dead the movement toward the renewed equalization of wages which had swept the country in 1929 and 1930.

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He slowed down, but took care not to halt, the rate at which agriculture was being collectivized, and he redressed some of the worst abuses of power which were being carried out at the expense of the peasants. Yet a couple of years later he was to hold to his policy of industrialization, and of collectivization of agriculture, even though it meant death by starvation for countless peasants.

After this one leftward turn in the early thirties Stalin inclined in the direction of the right and toward a policy of Soviet nationalism. He had earlier repudiated the Trotskyist doctrine of "permanent revolution" and had liquidated the abortive effort to spread the world revolution to China. He was now in the course of proving what he had so long contended, that Socialism could be established in one country, even if no international revolution took place. Gradually the position of the new professional and governing classes was improved. The limitation on the amount of wages or salary which a member of the party could accept was dropped. Greater differentials in salaries and wages were granted. The "progressive method" of education, found wanting in the development of the technicians required by a greatly expanded industry, was abandoned and the old formal system of education was reintroduced.

The glorification of the Spartan way of life for the governing class began to disappear.[3] Military titles and the trappings and other accompaniments of formal military discipline were revived in the Red Army. The Order of Suvorov was added to those of Lenin and of the Red Banner. Russian historical figures were no longer ridiculed and despised; such "heroes" as Alexander Nevsky and Peter the Great were dramatized and glorified in film and literature. The teaching of history was altered and new textbooks were written in accordance with the new trend. The Society of Proletarian Authors was dissolved and the old operas, ballets and plays, never wholly displaced, were restored to favor.

It must never be forgotten, however, that in all this there was little evidence of a renewed "retreat to capitalism." A new type of state had evolved which was almost wholly collectivist, absolutist and authoritarian. It shows signs of permanency and absolutely no sign of "withering away." In this new society there is no private property of consequence in the means of production.

[3] When I revisited the Soviet Union in 1939 no sight impressed me more than an advertisement on a large signboard which I saw in both Kiev and Moscow, done in a style which would have done credit to *Esquire*, depicting a lady in evening dress drinking from a champagne glass. It was an advertisement of Soviet champagne! Ten years earlier such an advertisement would have been considered an impossible blasphemy.

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Instead, substantially all means of production are in the hands of the state. The Soviet state has become the most powerful and all-pervading form of political and economic organization of human society which has ever existed. Yet Stalin has been able to root it into Marxian-Leninist doctrine by using the exceedingly convenient concept of the two successive stages of Communism. Stalin and his followers vigorously deny that this new political-economic state form is state capitalism. Whether it is, or whether it is indeed a form of Socialism, is perhaps a matter of semantics. It is certainly fundamentally different from the political and economic system which exists under the quasi-laissez-faire capitalism of the United States.

The authors of the article in *Under the Banner of Marxism* make several references to the second stage of Communism in which the state withers away and distribution is according to need. There can be little doubt, however, that this second stage of Communism has come to play somewhat the same rôle for Soviet writers as did the second coming of Christ for the later Christian theologians. The evidence seems very strong that Stalin, on the basis of experience, has decided that the first stage of Communism, which he styles Socialism, is to be the permanent form of Russian state and society.

Plainly the authors of the article are fully aware that this is so. There is no reference to the withering away of the state under present circumstances. There is a reference to the incorrectness of the charge of bourgeois critics that the state intervenes in the Soviet economy even more than it does in a capitalistic economy. The authors say that this represents a misunderstanding of the rôle of the state under the two different systems. In the capitalistic economy the state intervenes in an effort to overcome the contradictions of capitalism, or in the interests of one class against another. In the Soviet economy the state is not "intervening;" the Soviet state is itself the instrument of society and operates without contradictions in the interest of the whole of society. The authors have a somewhat obscurantist allusion to the direction of the economy by the Communist Party and by the "builders of Socialism," and there are a number of references to the brilliant leadership of Stalin. They do not otherwise attempt to explain the glaring discrepancy between the original Marxian-Leninist concept of the first stage of Communism, which definitely presupposed a much reduced rôle for the state, and the present Soviet system of a dictatorship state. There is no refer-

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ence in the article to world revolution and the references to capitalism are unusually objective in their nature. But world revolution in the Trotskyist sense has not been an objective of Soviet foreign policy for a long time.

It has already been pointed out that the article does not represent an authoritative statement marking out a new party line, even though the authors would not have written it if they had not been quite sure that it was in accordance with the party line. Actually its significance lies partially in the fact that there is relatively little new in it. It definitely accords with actual developments in Soviet principles, policies and practices over the years. It is important precisely because these principles, policies and practices have now been so fully accepted in the U.S.S.R. that a group of writers feels safe in spelling them out for the use of teachers of political economy and writers of elementary textbooks on economics. There can consequently be no possibility that their article is a statement of policy issued for its effect upon officials or public opinion in foreign countries.

III

What is the significance of the evolution of the present form of the Soviet state for the rest of the world? Perhaps of most importance is the answer it provides as to the power of survival of a modern, collectivist, industrial state both in time of peace and under the utmost strain of war. It is easy to forget that 20 years ago and less it was confidently maintained and very widely believed that Socialism was practically an economic impossibility. We should also remember that it was usually taken for granted that Socialism meant an increase in democracy and a decrease in the authority of man over man. The predestined failure of a system of Socialism was often assumed to arise out of the inability of such a society to induce appropriate economic action from the populace. Consequently one would be quite wrong to say that the development of the Soviet state has proved that democratic Socialism would "work." But it has clearly been demonstrated that a collectivist state can exist and function, even under the most difficult circumstances, when it is organized on the basis of command and obedience.

Communists, whether Trotskyists or Stalinists, used to assume that the successful establishment of Socialism in Russia would inevitably be accompanied by the spread of the proletarian revolution in all lands. However, the Soviet régime has long ceased

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simply to embody a segment of the revolutionary world proletariat which had succeeded in capturing the great Russian semi-colonial fortress of capitalism and was intent on pursuing the proletariat's main purpose — the extension of that conquest to the rest of the capitalist world. The revolution which, beginning in Russia, was supposed to evolve a classless, stateless world society, has become a single state, Russia. That state is not by any means identical in characteristics with the bourgeois, democratic states of the West; but it nonetheless shares with them many of the essentials and even the trappings of sovereign nationalism.

The Soviet state does not, and indeed could not, deny its pedigree. Quite regardless of the foreign policy it follows, the Communist Parties of all lands will continue to recognize its leadership, invoke its prestige and seek its aid. The brilliant success of the Russian armies against the Wehrmacht guarantees Soviet power an important rôle in the postwar world. The Communist Parties throughout the world which were faithful to the U.S.S.R. in the period of great tribulation cannot be expected to forego invoking the help of Soviet power in the time of triumph. The Soviet state, similarly, cannot be expected to disavow all kinship and sympathy with Communist Parties in other countries, nor fail to use these parties as an instrument of Soviet Russian foreign policy where opportunity offers.

The relationship between the Soviet state and the Communist Parties of other countries may be expected to be close when there is no conflict between the interests of Soviet Russia as a national state and the interests of any one of the Communist Parties. The Soviet state may even find it more natural to maintain friendly relations with Communist governments than with capitalist governments. This may not always be true, however. In the defeated Axis countries particularly, the Soviet state might conceivably prefer governments from which it would have no compunctions about exacting reparations. Likewise, when internal stability in other countries is to the advantage of Soviet Russia for the sake of trade relations or for some other reason, the interests of Russia as a nation might well override any ideological sympathies. In no case does it appear likely that the interests of Communist Parties in overthrowing capitalist governments would be allowed to take precedence over the national interests of the Soviet state.

The recent decision of the Soviet Government to give prelimi-

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nary approval to the plan for an international stabilization fund, involving as it does participation in international economic affairs with capitalist countries, great and small, serves to illustrate the fact that the Soviet state has long passed the stage where there is any feeling of embarrassment about such dealings.

The monopoly of foreign trade which is so appropriate to the Soviet system of a collectivized economy and which has served the Soviet state so well is not at all likely to be given up. Indeed, the Soviet trading monopoly is so integral a part of the economic system as to be inseparable from it. Before the war the effort to achieve as high a degree of economic self-sufficiency as possible dominated the foreign trade policy of Soviet Russia. This may be somewhat relaxed if military considerations no longer seem so compelling; but no great results should be expected from such a development.

Theoretically at least, a collectivized economy with a state monopoly of foreign trade has a powerful advantage in carrying on trade negotiations and bargaining with other countries and their nationals. Participation by Soviet Russia in an international agreement to lower tariffs, for example, would of itself be meaningless, since all the purposes of a tariff from the national point of view can be attained much more directly by the simple decision of the state trading monopoly to buy or sell or not to buy or sell. On the other hand, a state with a collectivized economy normally has no motive, as capitalist countries sometimes do, for trying to sell as much as possible and to buy as little as possible. Furthermore, the development of the Communist Party in Russia from the spearhead of a revolutionary movement into the administrative bureaucracy of a state means that in this field also there is almost no prospect of the foreign trade policy of Soviet Russia being dominated by revolutionary purposes. Consequently, a serious potential barrier to trade between Soviet Russia and capitalistic countries has disappeared.

All things considered, it is correct to conclude that Soviet society has evolved into a state form which has resumed the coloration of Russian nationality. Both in the economic field and in the political field the U.S.S.R. can be expected to act toward capitalistic countries primarily as a dynamic national state, even though still strongly conditioned by its collectivist and authoritarian form.

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IF THE NAZIS FLOOD HOLLAND

By Eelco N. van Kleffens

ALTHOUGH the greater part of Holland rises above sea level, the world's imagination has always been caught by the almost equally large low-lying sections — former swamps, lakes, inland seas — which would be submerged were it not for dunes, dykes, locks and pumps. Voltaire, that caustic wit who loved us not, condensed his feelings into the famous valediction: "Adieu, canaux, canards, canaille!" And in the English tongue there was Oliver Goldsmith, who wrote in "The Traveller:"

> Embosom'd in the deep where Holland lies,
> Methinks her patient sons before me stand,
> Where the broad ocean leans against the land.

And Byron, who referred in "Don Juan" to "that water-land of Dutchmen and of ditches," and Thomas Hood, who wrote playfully that "Holland lies so low, they're only saved by being dammed."

As with the poets, so with us all. It is the water which looms large in any mental picture of Holland (and in a good many pictures on canvas as well) — the water, and the patient, skilful, unremitting toil of the inhabitants, toil which has transformed vast flooded areas into lush, fertile land and kept the hungry water-wolf at bay. In America, the conception of Holland threatened constantly by inundations is part of the childhood recollections of millions who treasure the memory of "Hans Brinker, or the Silver Skates."

People living on a continent cleft by that aggressive giant, the Mississippi, have no difficulty in understanding why the world has always been so much interested in our broad man-made acres. In Holland, every day of every year, a never-ending, tenacious struggle is waged and won (most of the time) by puny men against one of nature's most powerful elements. Just as the airman or the mariner cannot relax his vigilance for one second on pain of damage or death, so the Hollanders who man the dykes, the locks and the pumps must be forever on the alert. The penalty of a moment's lapse of attention and care is loss of homes, loss of wealth, loss of life. This epic and romantic quality of the everyday life of the Dutch people has had a universal appeal to men's minds.

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The Germans are now denying the people of Holland enjoyment of the fruits of that epic battle: the peaceful possession of their land. Worse still, they surrender the prize to the foe. They deliver the land to the waves from which it had been wrested. To us Hollanders it seems a particularly odious and damaging form



of high treason. Can the world look on unmoved? American public opinion has already replied with an emphatic "No." Holland's achievement in driving back the sea is rightly considered part of the patrimony of western civilization.

So much for what may perhaps be called the moral side of the

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problem of German inundations in Holland. Let us now get down to the specific facts.

The accompanying map shows those parts of Holland which lie below highest sea and river level and those which rise above it. The former are shaded so as to differentiate the sections subject to inundation by both sea and river water from those subject to inundation by fresh water alone. The unshaded areas represent higher land. The sand dunes along the coast, bulwarked by a number of very heavy dykes, have been left white like the other somewhat higher parts of the country.

As Professor S. van Valkenburg has written, "The Dutch lowland is still an intricate system of reclaimed lake and marine floors."[1] The area subject to inundation is divided into a great number of districts, called "polders." Each polder usually has its own system of dykes, drainage canals and ditches and its own discharging sluices or pumping plants, or both. At a rough estimate, there are about 2,500 such polders. Rainfall and water which has seeped in from adjoining areas must be removed from each of them in order to maintain normal living conditions. If the level of the polder is sufficiently high, water is removed by gravity flow through discharging sluices into the sea or into tidal rivers during low tide; if this is not possible, it is removed by means of pumping plants. In a small number of polders both methods are used. At a rough estimate, the area of land drained by gravity flow through sluices is about 980,000 acres, and that drained wholly by pumping plants about 2,340,000 acres. A great many pumping plants are electrically driven, while others have Diesel or steam engines. There still remain, in addition, quite a number of the famous windmills which give such a characteristic note to the Dutch landscape. In the old days these windmills provided the only water-removing machinery.

The polders vary greatly in age and size. The work on some of the larger polders which was completed in northern Holland around 1650 attracted considerable attention from contemporaries. Sir William Temple, for example, who at one time had been British Ambassador to Holland, wrote in 1673 in his "Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands:"

> There is in North Holland an Essay already made, at the possibility of draining these great Lakes, by one, of about two Leagues broad, having been made firm Land, within these Forty years; This makes that part of the Country called the Bemster, being now the richest Soil of the Province, lying

[1] "The Netherlands." Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943, p. 6.

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upon a dead flat, divided with Canals, and the ways through it distinguisht with ranges of Trees, which make the pleasantest Summer-Landschip of any country I have seen, of that sort.

Since the seventeenth century a vast amount of work has been done in those regions, culminating in the truly gigantic project for the reclamation of most of the Zuyderzee, already partly completed before the present war. When the great dyke was laid across the mouth of the Zuyderzee it transformed this arm of the sea into what is virtually a lake, called the Ysselmeer.

The part of the Netherlands liable to be flooded is approximately 45 percent of the country's total area — that is, almost one half. Moreover, this part is of overwhelming importance to our national economic life, containing by far the largest part of the population, all the largest towns, all the most fertile regions, all the greater commercial centers and a considerable portion of the national industries.

The following tables tell the story of what would happen if inundations were carried out to the fullest hydraulic limits. Table I indicates the effects on Dutch agriculture, Table II that on Dutch industry. The agricultural figures are based on statistics of 1937, the industrial on those of 1938, revised somewhat in each case to bring them as nearly as possible into conformity with reported conditions in 1943.

TABLE I

	Production, in tons, in areas subject to inundation	*Percentage of total national production of these products*	*Percentage of total agricultural production in the Netherlands*
Wheat	324,176	81.3	3.7
Rye	137,220	23.8	1.6
Pulse	55,254	86.7	.6
Potatoes	1,697,285	50.3	19.4
Sugarbeet	1,261,617	89.3	14.6
Rapeseed	45,974	61.2	.5
Milk	1,779,345	63.2	20.2
Total	5,300,871		60.6

TABLE II

	Income, in billions of florins, in areas subject to inundation	*Percentage of total amount in the class of industry*	*Percentage of total amount in the Netherlands*
Ceramics	24.3	71	1.7
Printing	44.2	85	3.1
Building	215.2	82	14.8
Chemical	40.1	77	2.8

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Wood and cork	44.5	90	3.1
Clothing	88.2	80	6.1
Leather and rubber	24.7	53	1.7
Coal and peat	4.3	5	.3
Metal	194.3	67	13.4
Paper	20.2	73	1.4
Textile	21.2	23	1.5
Gas and electricity	100.1	85	6.9
Food	182.1	76	12.6
Total	1,003.4		69.4

The threatened districts might be inundated in several ways. Cessation of pumping and stoppage of the discharge of water would cause the water level in the polders to rise above the ground level relatively quickly, depending on the volume of seepage and rainfall. Water also can be let into the polders from the sea, from the Rhine or other rivers, and from lakes. This method can be adopted gradually or it can be done abruptly by destroying sluices and breaching dykes. In the latter case, there would be very great destruction of life and property. But no matter what method was used, if the inundations were carried above a certain level there would almost certainly be damage to pumping plants. The introduction of sea water would of course render the soil unfit for agriculture for some years to come.

Several times, in the course of the centuries, the Hollanders have themselves resorted to inundation as an extreme measure of defense. They did so, for instance, in the course of the Eighty Years War against Spain, and again in 1672 when Holland was attacked simultaneously by Britain, France and the Electors of Munster and Cologne. They did not hesitate to resort to flooding again late in 1939 and early in 1940, when the German menace against Holland became apparent; and the Dutch Army found it helpful in the course of their short campaign against the invaders. It is very important to note, however, that the Hollanders were at great pains to limit the resulting damage as much as possible, and that their precautions met with complete success. The Germans are notorious for their ruthlessness in war, especially when they are operating in other people's countries. What will happen when *they* start inundations in Holland? Their sinister record justifies the gravest misgivings.

Although the Hollanders cannot complain in principle if the occupying forces use inundations as part of their defense, they are greatly concerned as to the possible extent of the inundation

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and the methods by which it is carried out. The Germans wish to cover the flank of their Army and hope to reduce the length of the coastline which they must defend against invasion. Flooding will render the terrain impassable, will submerge or waterlog roads and railways, and reduce heavy transport to zero. If it is carried out carelessly it will in addition make the inhabitants homeless, ruin all their stores and stocks, and cause famine. Beyond this material ruin, too, looms the specter of epidemics, since drinking water installations will inevitably be either destroyed or polluted.

There is no way of determining precisely even what the Germans are doing, let alone what they are planning, but reports which so far have seeped out of the country are very disquieting. In the southwestern islands considerable areas have already been evacuated and flooded, and this has been done in the most callous manner. People abroad who are sitting comfortably in their homes of an evening cannot imagine what it would mean to them if suddenly enemy soldiers entered to tell them that their house, land and all their personal property except what they could carry was to sink beneath the water within a few hours. This is exactly what has already happened in parts of Holland, and no doubt will continue to happen on an increasing scale. The Germans have had plenty of time to arrange to avoid the cruel hardship of these summary evictions; but for reasons of their own they have chosen the brutal way, setting on the march in still another corner of Europe another column of helpless humanity — farmers, workers, town-dwellers, with their wide-eyed children, their pathetic bundles, their despair and their silent rage.

In a recent German broadcast,[2] a certain Major Hollinger explained the method of flooding used in these and other areas of Holland. At 8 a.m. on February 1, 1944, he said, the sluice-gates of all drainage and irrigation canals flowing into the sea were closed. After sketching the history of inundation as a military weapon from Roman times to the present day, he continued smugly:

> Land can be flooded either by closing the floodgates, so that the water from the drainage and irrigation canals, which otherwise would flow into the sea, is dammed up and overflows the banks; or by opening the floodgates at high tide, and closing them at low tide, so that seawater floods the countryside. Meadows flooded with salt water are ruined for years, but flooding with fresh water has no such disastrous effect. The German authorities are so far taking

[2] German broadcast in English for Eire, April 15, 1944.

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the slower way of flooding the hinterland of the Channel Coast sector with sweet water, for which the farmers are of course very grateful.

It almost sounds as if the farmers were supposed to be enjoying it all, although the implications of the words "so far" were hardly cheering.

At the end of this war, Holland, like the other countries now under the German yoke, will have been robbed, devastated and maltreated by Germany in a great variety of ways. But even if the Germans do not flood more of her territory than they have done already,[3] her predicament will be unique in that before starting in to rebuild great portions of her dwellings and factories and agricultural plant she will first have to reclaim from the water the land on which they stood.

The 9,000,000 people of the Netherlands are packed densely — 640 people per square mile as against 43 in the United States. After the war, the area available for producing foodstuffs to support the lives of these people will be greatly reduced — just how greatly will be determined by the extent of the German inundations. There will be tremendous problems of housing and feeding. For a long time there probably will be intolerable overcrowding in the dry areas. It will be necessary to import a great part of the country's food supply — perhaps most of it — in a period of world scarcity. There will be unemployment, with all its dangerous consequences. Health will be threatened or worse. Poverty will be universal. Indeed, in some respects the outlook for Holland seems blacker than for any other country now occupied by Germany.

The world may be sure that, in conformity with the country's inclinations and traditions, the Hollanders will do all they can in this crisis to help themselves. But there hardly could be a more unfavorable moment in which to undertake a vast land reclamation project than just at the end of a period of enemy occupation and organized plunder. Of course, much will depend on how many sluices, pumping plants and power stations the Germans decide to destroy. But even at the best, the reclamation of land, the rebuilding of houses, the restocking of farms and the rehabilitation of industries must depend to considerable extent on outside help. Holland gave assistance in Belgium, France, Austria and Hungary at the end of the last war; and she has aided France, China and other countries with gifts of money, material, labor and technical assistance when they were visited by floods or

[3] For reasons of security, no exaet data can be given.

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earthquakes. Perhaps now that she is confronted with so dire a calamity the outside world will in turn help her. Though she feels her case is somewhat special, she does not ask for charity and will gladly pay in so far as she is able for help through UNRRA or other relief agencies.

Holland will not forget that it was Germany which caused this present calamity. She hopes and trusts that the world will not forget. Common sense and ordinary justice seem to require that Germany be compelled to make good as great a part as possible of the damage she has done in Holland, of course with due regard to the claims of others. To the extent that Germany can make good the damage she has done, Holland does not expect to pay for it. Money payments from Germany will probably be impracticable. But Germany can and should make deliveries in kind (it is too early to determine exactly what they should be), and Holland expects her associates of the United Nations to join her in insisting that this be done. When a beaten foe has a record of inhumanity like Germany's, compassion yields place to the requirements of justice.

In Holland's case, the problem of adjustment has a special territorial aspect. If Germany wantonly destroys so much of Holland's soil that her 9,000,000 people are unable to live on the land which remains, it may be found necessary to grant her an equivalent portion of German territory or at any rate the usufruct from it. As already noted, Holland's population lives 640 to the square mile. The population density in Germany before the Nazis began their course of conquest was only 360 per square mile. (The figures, incidentally, put German laments over their need for *Lebensraum* in proper perspective.) If Germany's course of destruction in Holland goes to such lengths that the Dutch people need additional land in order to live, some suitable form of compensation (if territory, then territory *minus* Germans!) must be found. Hollanders are not annexationists by nature. In the course of the centuries they often have been in a position to annex parts of what now is Germany. They refrained. The Germans are now showing the extent of their appreciation for this forbearance.

Holland would have preferred to avoid bringing forward any proposal of this nature. Whether she will ultimately be compelled to press for its adoption depends on the Germans. I believe that public opinion in the United States realizes that it may be necessary and that, if so, it will be just. Mr. Herman P. Eber-

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harter, a member of the House of Representatives from Pennsylvania, stated the case fairly when he said to the Foreign Affairs Committee on March 30 of this year: "It is reported that the Germans are flooding part of the Netherlands. This desperate action is further proof that the Nazis have a complete disregard for the rights and welfare of other nations. As a result of this act, thousands of acres of good land may have been ruined and valuable property irretrievably lost. But such considerations never gave any qualm to the selfish and callous Nazi mind and heart. To the Dutch people, who are being so cruelly tried under the brutal German yoke, go our sympathy and the assurance that with Allied victory will also come retribution and the correction of such crimes as those against life and property. The Germans will have to pay, perhaps, with their own territory for the ruined land."

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE GERMAN IDEA

By Benedetto Croce

I. WAR AS IDEAL

IT can be said that a first although unexpressed assertion of anti-militaristic thought took place in the history of historiography when, in the nineteenth century, boredom and irritation developed towards books entirely made up of accounts of wars and of negotiations preparing or concluding them; and there arose the insistent demand for another form of history which would give what truly corresponded to the major interests of the human mind and soul: the history of religion, of philosophy, of science, of the arts, of customs and moral life — in a word, the history of civilization. Along this line modern historiography moved, always going forward, not only restricting the too-large field which formerly had been given to matters of war, but infusing even into its accounts of these a spirit of which they had formerly been deprived, referring them to the development of the spiritual life in all its forms. Even the history of warfare as a technique, as one of the various techniques of human endeavor, is an aspect of this spiritual history, and more directly of the history of applied science. But war, considered as war in itself, does not lend itself to any historical intelligence, since it cannot be referred to a proper category or ideal of its own.

In fact, this is a fever which periodically fires up in the veins of men and in the course of which individuals and peoples, whatever may be their qualities or rank, fight to overcome and destroy one another. The vicissitudes of the struggle can be followed, by anyone that looks upon them detached and from afar or reads of them in books, with a lively participation of the imagination and as strong a fellow feeling as those with which one watches the spectacles of the circus, the wrestling ring or the cinema. But substantially those vicissitudes are nothing more than a monotonous beating and being beaten, in which luck plays a great part and which is not reducible to historical configuration, because the nexus — or, let us say, the logical and historical significance — is to be found elsewhere.

Editor's Note. This article will appear in a book by Signor Croce, translated by Vincent Sheean, to be published shortly by Random House.

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As in historiography the accounts of wars have been overcome and dissolved in the manner indicated, so in human societies, progressively as they removed themselves from savage and barbaric conditions (like those of the medieval renewal of barbarism in which battle was daily and general), and as, breathing more deeply, other orders of facts and works called upon the soul, war faded from the horizon. Sometimes, indeed, humanity appeared to have outgrown that condition. To its return all civilly educated men, lovers of peace and industry, felt the same sort of repugnance as to criminal insanity. Not that military institutions were any the less attentively and jealously cared for, since the intimate conscience warns us that war cannot be suppressed from the world and that it is necessary to keep them ready in case of need, as we keep doctors and medicines and surgical instruments ready for a malady that may always begin again. In the years of our Risorgimento, even during the necessary wars, men always looked forward to that which is above wars, and the longed-for Italy showed itself (as a verse of Tommaseo says) "severe and humble, armed and loving." This state of feeling endured even after 1871, and was disturbed in Italy (as more strongly in other parts of Europe) only at the end of the century. Then there was written in England, against the threatening idea of a war which the inexpert courted, a very wise book — Norman Angell's "The Great Illusion" — which received universal praise. And when in spite of everything the new fever, the new war, was set alight some years later, when at last it had been dominated and was spent, then that aversion to war immediately formed itself again in some of the major peoples of the two worlds. War was feared by them like a disease and not exalted as an ideal.

Now, how has it come about that, in spite of this stage attained in civilization, in spite of this general good sense, war in some intellectual currents has in fact been made to conform to an ideal — to a sublime, resplendent and inebriating ideal? And that for the concept "war disease" has been substituted one of "war health?" And that the continual struggle in which we are accustomed to symbolize life, which is "war against war" — a "negation of negation," as we say in philosophical terms — has received in its own content that against which it fights? And that instead of the image of the honest man who takes arms because of duty and not by taste for warmaking, and through duty attains strength, courage and the spirit of sacrifice, imaginations have created or made idols representing others very different —

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unheard of beings whose appearance, voices and manners are warlike, rapacious, obsessed by butchery and destruction? Undoubtedly such a disturbance of the intellect and imagination is to be traced to that retrograde romanticism, strongly sensualist and materialistic, which was called decadence. It ignored and wounded many delicate sentiments and soiled and corrupted many pure affections, contaminating them with libido and sadism. Moreover, it corrupted the virile and dutiful resolution to fight in the wars which the world's course might make necessary, transforming it into the criminal folly of exalting and provoking and instigating war, the equivalent of deliberately engendering the diseases which are to be cured. At the same time, it corrupted noble and humanitarian traditional patriotism into a sort of ferocious bestiality which to begin with took the name of "nationalism."

Probably such an ideal or counter-ideal would nevertheless have exhausted itself in the realm of inflated and empty literature if it had not found its point of support in a people at the very center of Europe. This people made of it the directive idea of moral and political life, giving up such universalism and cosmopolitanism as had shone forth in its great philosophical-poetic age, and rendering itself sealed and deaf to any understanding of the substantial teaching of Kant or Goethe. It would be a very insufficient and moreover improper explanation to say that Germany, lately arrived at unity and the power that unity gave her, had been seized by the need of expansion and dominion against other peoples holding world empire. Such a need would have been able to seek and find satisfaction by means of policy, and even upon occasion by arms and war, without any necessity for thereby poisoning the very springs of moral life.

That country (it is always well to remember) does not have the civilization of Greece and Rome or that of Christianity at the origins of its national history and of its participation in European history, but the ferocity and devastating impulse of the barbarian invasions. Its heroes of those days were merely the chiefs of hordes, and its epic does not present the human figures of the epics of Greece and Rome or even of the French — not Achilles, Hector and Aeneas, not Roland and Olivier, neither Andromache nor Lucretia — but those of somber cut-throats and of atrocious and semi-demoniacal bloodstained females; just as in its subsequent modern history it found its most conspicuous expression in Prussianism, from the Teutonic Knights to Fred-

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erick II of Hohenzollern and to Bismarck, the founder of unity, who gave his imprint to the new Germany with everything he had in himself of the cruel, sneering and cynical, an imprint which those who succeeded him incised more strongly in its face. Once these and other similar German historical traditions had been fused with the romantic decadence we have outlined, straight out of the mixture came racism, the new zoölogical form of the myth of the chosen people "which does not contaminate itself with the nations." Thus one might almost say that the fight to the death which "Germanism" has undertaken against "Hebraism" comes from no other than professional jealousy and rivalry, since, as is well known, this concept is rigorously Hebraic and was conceived and put forward in the fourth century before Christ by Esdras, who, however, had some serious motive for holding by it. All the cynically and obscenely ferocious words which we have heard with shudders in the course of the present war issued from the mouth of that people, boasting of its warlike destiny and scorning its adversaries as merchants. These are the ugly words which are fabricated in war when it is elevated to the ideal, when by internal logic it is led to adopt sentiments, attitudes, images and accents usual in the world of crime: such is not the custom of the despised merchant peoples, whose custom is sociable and preserves even in the agitation of passion the restraint and the manners of good breeding and moral discrimination.

It is probable and indeed natural that at the end of this long and terribly ruinous war there will again be discussions and excogitations on the way of establishing in the world "perpetual peace" (whereas it would be a great enough thing if there could be established a peace temporary but durable, in which all the peoples might find, as near as may be, their best). Perpetual peace is perpetual utopia, because it contemplates nothing more or less than the shattering of the mainspring of human life, which is in sorrow and peril. But what certainly should and can be done is to clear away from the mind every residuum and tear out every smallest root or filament of "war as ideal," and against the warrior to set up the worth of the citizen and merchant, remembering that merchants know how to hold their own against warriors when necessary and to win, as can be seen at the present time and as our far-off ancestors of the Lombard League taught the warriors of Barbarossa. That we Italians, in spite of traditions which are so clearly opposed to those of Germany and Prussia,

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should have been swept on to serve their policy by a faction which had mastered the powers of the state and degraded to its instrumentality a king whose title originated in national and liberal plebiscites, is one of the strangest and most horrible distortions that the interweaving of events can bring about in a people. Then was when we heard the solemn exhortation to make ourselves, in a word which had always been repugnant to us, "militarists." The lesson was administered to us in the inspired accent of the elementary schoolmaster who has freshly received, dogmatically, in his noncritical mind, and hastens to proclaim before the peoples, what seems to him a profound and original scientific truth but in reality is altogether banality and foolishness: "We not only do not believe in perpetual peace, but we consider it a depressant and a negation of the fundamental virtues of man, which only through the cruelty of battle are demonstrated in the light of the sun."

As if in the course of public and private life there could be any fear that sorrow and tragedy might be lacking, and with them the opportunities to prove the virtues proper to man!

But here I must pause, feeling as I do that from the theoretical clarification which I had proposed to make of certain concepts concerning historiography and ethics I have trespassed into cases and problems of our present life, and have entered into the heart of our dolorous passion, to the appeals of which the purpose of attending solely to scientific discourse today cannot always close the gates of the soul. At all events, even this trespass carries with it a proof of the importance of the rebellion that took place in the nineteenth century against histories of wars, and of the fecundity of the new beginning which historiography then made.

II. DUTIES AND DUTY

We know that the spirit is a system of distinctions which for that reason is itself a unity. If the distinctions were not, the unity would not be; since a unity without distinctions is mathematical and abstract, not organic and complete. If the unity were not, neither would the distinctions be; because they are such only in the unity which they compose. Outside of unity the noun distinction loses all sense, becoming a simple sound of the voice. By this full identity of the two terms it is not permitted to pose unity (though often this has been attempted) as the superior principle from which the distinctions separate — a mythical God, as it were, who, existing in himself, resolves to create a

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world, instead of the true God who creates himself with the world and creates it enjoying and suffering.

The very same activity which has the specifically unificatory function is one of the distinctions — or, it may be said, one of the forms of the spirit — and is called moral activity, which continually conquers disharmony, that is to say the necessary negative moment of every activity, and attains spiritual harmony. Thanks to this, the spirit moves from conquest to conquest and life continually enlarges upon itself.

Disharmony, the negative moment, is in fact the ever resurgent desire of a particular form of the spirit to persist and develop without taking account of the other forms, from which it is necessarily born as new from old in order to become old itself, leading the others and retreading with the others the eternal spiritual circle. It is, for example, the pretense of creating poetry with a soul empty of the experiences of human passions, a soul which comes to conclusions within itself, as the aesthetes and decadents believe, without resonance and without consequences in the whole spirit, without producing an ulterior mental and practical process. The same may be said of philosophical thinking or of practical doing which force themselves into absolute self-sufficiency or autarchy, endeavoring, the former to do without practical, moral or poetical life, the latter to do without theoretical, moral and religious life. Not, of course, that this deviation and error has not, like all deviations and errors, a motive of truth in it, since every special form of activity obeys a law of its own and a "duty" of its own. But the deviation or error comes from wishing to rise above everything of which one is a part, contradictorily substituting the part for the whole. Thus, under the appearance of rigid observance, a duty passes over effectively into violation of duty.

Among the perils of spiritual life this is the most insidious and, it might be said, the most diabolical, if the devil (as Dante heard them say in the theological schools of Bologna) is "a liar and the father of lies." Nor is it needful nowadays to collect or multiply examples when we have had for several years before our eyes the spectacle of a people which contributed greatly in the past to the work of Europe, but which, entering into a horrible delirium, not only exalted the negative to the place of the positive, and made of war (which had been counted for centuries as one of the three calamities, along with pestilence and famine) an ideal of superior life, the only one worthy of the

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German man, a hero and warrior by nature, but also, with equal distortion, conferred abstract absoluteness on the concept of the fatherland and on the duty of defending the fatherland. Love of one's country has justification and moral worth only when it is born and lives on the trunk of humanity, towards which it stands in one respect as a compendious image and a symbol thereof, and, in another respect, as the nearest field, even though certainly not the exclusive field, of our duties. Montesquieu nobly wrote in a notebook of his thoughts: "Si je savais quelque chose utile à ma patrie et qui fut préjudiciable à l'Europe, ou bien qui fut utile à l'Europe et préjudiciable au genre humain je la regarderais comme un crime."

A fatherland which is to stand *über Alles* (if that were not, as it usually is, a simple emphatical expression) would express a perverse and criminal feeling. Similarly, the war maxim to "do the greatest damage to the enemy" encounters its logical and moral limits in the exclusion of such damage as strikes that which is equally sacred to the enemy and to ourselves — which, being lost, diminishes both him and us, and us rather more than him, we having been authors of the loss and taking upon ourselves the hatred and shame. Herein is the moral momentum of what is called *jus gentium*, natural law or international law, which in every other respect is a law like the others.

I have on my heart as I write these words the destruction which officers of the German Command deliberately made, in spite of having been warned that they were about to destroy things which belonged neither to Naples nor to Italy but to the international world of studies, of the Great Archives of Naples, with their treasures of medieval parchments, the register of Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, the Angevin registers, the Aragonese chancellery, the Farnese papers, the documents of Neapolitan history which were interwoven with those of the history of Europe and the Orient, an inexhaustible fount of precious information, the object of indefatigable research by Italians and foreigners, jealously preserved all down the centuries, now no longer in existence, devoured by the flames after having been sprinkled with gasoline. How many hours of my youth did I pass consulting those volumes, and those other bundles of papers, now also ashes, which contained the records of southern commune and family life! With what joy I returned to them whenever my studies led me back again! How I see now, with my eyes veiled in tears, those old men, those masters of

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mine, who were, in the ancient monastery of San Severino, their proud and loving custodians — Bartolomeo Capasso at the head of them all! And to think that the men who, in the light of the culture of the world and of Germany, made themselves guilty of such an act (comparable to what was habitual with poor ignorant barbarians like Alaric or Genseric and suchlike *deutsche Recken*, giants of German history) themselves believed, perhaps, that in this way they served their fatherland and fulfilled their duty!

But men who keep themselves fundamentally and substantially *men* know how to make duties submit to duty, as Schiller said he denied particular religions because of religion. They spring at once, with the heart which does not deceive, to the right side, in such emotion as sometimes breaks out spontaneously even in the souls of brigands and others given to sin and vice and crime, who have not burned out in themselves every spark of humanity and have not fallen into the state of automata and machines, as — all too truly — have those Germans whom we saw devastate Europe all around us, and who today systematically and methodically are destroying our Italy, not only in the lives of her citizens, not only in the patrimony of her sons' weary labor, but in the ideal patrimony in which she was and is a mistress to other peoples. Fear, repugnance and horror diffuse themselves about those men because of the extreme degradation of humanity which has befallen them through their fatherland and devotion to the fatherland and discipline for the fatherland, through that stupidity of an extrinsic and pedantically conceived duty and of a blind, inhuman obedience to an idol or Moloch of theirs. "Inhumanity" is the word which rises above all others. I still remember, by contrast, in what accents a young Jewish lady, a student of classical antiquities, who came to Italy after the ferocious persecution of the Jews in Germany had begun, carrying in her thin face and sorrowful eyes the signs of the shock and misery she had suffered, said to me in wonder at the welcome she found in Italy: "The Italians are human!"

How came it to pass that the Germans, whom we used to love in their classical philosophy, in their Goethe's poetry, in music and in the good fellowship of their honest and industrious habits, and whom we still further admired for the services they rendered to science and technique, for the wealth and power to which they had raised their country, have become that which they are today, an object of abhorrence for the whole world on the part of every

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kind of person? That is a problem harassed with terrible difficulties: and it will impose itself upon the entire world in that day in which we must somehow establish a cohabitation of peoples and in which certainly we shall not dream of cancelling the German people from the earth.

I have never believed, and most certainly I will not be led by passion now to believe, in the myth of peoples and races and of their indelible characters; and I shall continue to adhere to the concept, both critical and consoling, that such characters are not naturalistic and deterministic facts, but historical formations, of more or less long duration, of various intensities, which can be dissolved and give place to other different and opposite formations.

This historical formation of that which stands before us today as Germanism I have summarily traced out elsewhere for what it is. But perhaps in the conceit of the superiority of the Germans towards the other peoples, in their weakness for the argument of force, in the language of the conquering barbarian which is their habit, there is, more than may seem at first, a hidden tormenting consciousness of inferiority because they have never yet succeeded in competing with the other peoples in the liveliness and clarity of intuition, in the art, style and act of behavior, in moving others to interest and sympathy and attracting the imagination and giving rise to imitation and fashion, in calling luck to themselves and taking advantages that are spontaneously offered, thus giving proof of political sense; in making themselves respected by respecting others: so that for their limitless ambition and their dream of the *Kolossal* there is nothing left to try except imposition by violence. The scourge, the club, and whatever more modern and more scientific and more terrifying weapons have been substituted for or added to these, have seemed to them means conducive to procuring by short cuts the dominion of the world — from which, obtained in this manner, in a vacuum, and what is more in the midst of the revolt of every moral force, one cannot see how they could profit. "Triumphs," once said a poet of theirs in the time when Germany, too, warmed itself in the rays of European liberty, "are equal to defeats when their fruit consists in the lamentation and boundless hatred of the world."

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WOMEN IN BRITAIN

By Barbara Ward

BRITAIN has an adult working population of only 33 million. Yet on this basis she has built up a continental army and a vast navy and air force, equipped them very largely from British resources, and shipped millions of tons of armaments to allies abroad. This achievement was made possible only by the fullest and most far-reaching mobilization of labor — of all labor, men and women alike. It has revolutionized the lives of most women in Britain. Millions have been called to do work which men did formerly; thousands have undertaken new jobs and responsibilities created by the war; and even those who have not left their homes find these homes a very different place to live in as a result of total mobilization. Today, out of some 17 million women between the ages of 14 and 64, although about 10 million still work in their homes, over seven and a half million are employed in industry, civil defense and the armed forces. Since the beginning of the war, two and a half million women have entered defense work who did not previously work at all. For every two women in employment before the war, there are now nearly three, or (to give a comparison with an earlier effort) the proportion of women in the forces, civil defense and essential industry today is double that of the peak year of 1918.

It would be impossible — and tedious — to give a full account here of all the activities into which women have been drawn by the needs of war. In many cases, the work has not differed very greatly from the old peacetime routines. For example, thousands of women have been transferred within industry itself. The very great extension of the civil service — in 1939, there were some 94,000 women in the non-industrial civil service, in 1942 the figure for permanent and temporary women civil servants was over half a million — has been brought about by recruiting a larger number of women for work which would in any case have been done by women in peacetime, though by a more limited number. But in other spheres of the war effort, the changes are very drastic.

In engineering, the percentage of women in the total labor force rose from 16 to 35 percent between 1940 and 1943. In recognition of this fact and of the very great variety of skilled work the women were performing, the Amalgamated Engineers' Union

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admitted women to membership for the first time in January 1943. Hitherto, women had tended to be admitted to the unskilled unions only (to the Transport and General Workers Union and the National Union of General and Municipal Workers), a right they secured in recognition of their work in the last war. In the aircraft industry, the increase in the number of women workers has been phenomenal. In 1940, 12 percent of the workers were women; in 1943 the figure was 40 percent. Over half the labor force working in chemicals and explosives are women. Even in the very heavy industrial jobs, hitherto regarded strictly as the province of men, women have worked successfully. Although only 17 percent of the workers in the iron and steel industry are women, some factories have reached a much higher figure. For example, one firm producing tank castings employs women to the extent of 70 percent of its staff. There are even women working in the shipyards and naval dockyards. And of course women conductresses on busses, postwomen, women porters and engine cleaners are such a commonplace of life today that it is hard to remember the time when all these jobs were filled exclusively by men.

Industry is not the only sphere in which women are doing kinds of work which were never theirs before this war. The women's forces — the WRNS, the ATS and WAAF — have been used to release every possible man for combat duties, which has meant not only that there are women clerks and cooks and orderlies and drivers, but that women have been employed on highly skilled technical work like photography, meteorology, draftsmanship and radio location, while ATS crews man AA gun sites and in the Air Transport Auxiliary women pilots ferry every type of plane from the factories to the airfields.

Nor is it simply a question of new skills. Many women and girls who otherwise would not have had any responsibility, have been compelled as officers in the women's services to take decisions and enforce actions which shape the lives of other people. This increase in responsibility has occurred to some extent in civilian life. There has been a certain amount of upgrading in industry, and some women have become forewomen. Another big development is the much more widespread recruitment of women welfare officers and personnel managers. In the civil service, a few women — a very few — have been promoted to higher posts, for example to be Assistant Principals and Principals and — in the progressive Board of Trade — to be Assistant Secretaries. Even in the

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section of the civil service still closed to women, the diplomatic service, the war has led to the appointment of four women officials.

These are all changes in the type of work done by women and in the extent of their employment. To give a full picture of the revolution that has changed their wartime lives, however, some mention must be made of the radical changes in the social environment in which the majority of women have to carry on their work. The war and the labor shortage have transformed the old pattern of daily life. First the husbands went; in many large towns, a great many of the children went away at the same time under the Government's evacuation scheme. This was the first great shock to the accustomed fabric of the home. In 1940 came heavy bombing. One house in five in Britain was damaged or destroyed. In 1942 the full effect of the mobilization of women began to be felt. Daughters were called up, and since they were (to use the Minister of Labor's rather repellent phrase) "mobile," they left their homes to begin a new life in barracks and lodgings and hostels in strange new surroundings in industrial towns or deep in the country. The pressure on woman power — and the attraction of good wages — drew married women into work. Instead of following the old routine of cooking and cleaning and washing, they left their children in day nurseries — there now are 1,402 of them in this country — relied on the works canteen to give their husbands a good meal, and themselves used the canteen or dropped into a British Restaurant. Sometimes the new routine works. The following, quoted from a Mass Observation report, is typical of the energy and skill with which many women have tackled the problem:

> I get up at 5 in the morning and get the worst of my housework done, and the children all washed and dressed, and I do the washing, and get my dinner started, so it'll only want a warm up in the evening. Then I go to work, and I get back at 9:30 in the evening and give them all their supper and tidy up a bit. I seem to manage. Sometimes when the alarm goes on Sunday mornings I say to myself, "I won't go today;" but then I think, if everybody said that on Sunday mornings, then what would happen? And so I get up. If everyone worked like I do the war would be over very soon.

But often the new routine does not work or does so only at the expense of good housekeeping — which is not too serious a sacrifice in wartime — or of the woman's nerves and health — which very definitely is.

These are only a few of the drastic changes introduced into

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family life by the war. They touch all classes. The wealthier homes are more affected by the calling up of domestic servants, the poorer by the greater measure of industrial conscription. Everywhere the effect has been to revolutionize the old domestic routine, to break up home life, send women out of their homes, introduce them to new types of work and responsibility and, in a great many cases, give them a measure of financial independence they did not enjoy before.

Now in the fifth year of the war many people are asking whether the revolution has come to stay. They underline the two most marked tendencies — the ability of women to undertake with success jobs and responsibilities hitherto reserved for men, and the breakup of home life. From this they argue that Great Britain is moving toward a new conception of woman's place in society. As a result of this war, it is held, women will gain full economic equality with men, just as after the last war they gained political equality. They will compete for the same jobs, receive equal pay for equal work, enjoy the same opportunities of training and apprenticeship, and be debarred from no work on account of marriage. Home life will be conducted on a more communal basis, with more day nurseries, more factory and office crèches, more British Restaurants, more school meals, more labor-saving flats. In general, it is said, women will be emancipated from their rôle of housewife and mother to work as the companion and equal of men.

Admittedly, this is painting the picture in strong colors. Nobody expects the revolution to be as complete or as rapid. Indeed, a great majority of women do not think about it at all. But those who do think about woman's problems tend to see the future in this extreme form; and they either desire it intensely or look on it with loathing. One of the reasons why the problem of woman's place in society is so very rarely discussed rationally must surely be the intensity with which rival schools of thought approach the question. On one side to suggest that it might be quite fun to be a mother and not an engine driver is dismissed as black reaction. On the other, the idea of relieving an overburdened wife by setting up a day nursery is attacked as the thin end of the wedge of communal living and the totalitarian state. A great gulf seems to be set between feminists and anti-feminists — which perhaps does not create the sanest atmosphere in which to judge the strength of the forces molding woman's place in society or the direction in which they are driving her along.

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II

Will postwar Britain be revolutionized, as these prophets joyfully or gloomily predict? It seems safe to say that the change will not be so great as wartime experience suggests. The great majority of people whose lives have been upset by the war regard the changes as inevitable, unpleasant and essentially temporary. The breakup of home life will be followed by a strenuous and general attempt to build it up again. The men coming back from the forces, the girls leaving their barracks and their hostels, will want to find their family base again. There are no reliable statistics about the postwar intentions of the millions of women who have gone into war work, but a sample inquiry conducted in 1942 by Mass Observation showed that over a third of the women — war workers and prewar workers together — said they meant to give up industrial work after the war. As the number of women in work has increased during the war by about one-third of the prewar figure, the Mass Observation result, if correct over a wider field, suggests that the number of women in industry may quickly fall to its prewar figure when peace comes.

The effects of war, deep and widespread as they are, can be exaggerated. Even in these times of national emergency when the pressure on women to leave their homes is greater than it can ever be in time of peace, the vast majority of married women have not undertaken any form of paid employment, and in nearly ten million cases care of their homes and children is still their chief work. There are only three million married women and widows in war work, an increase of little more than a million over the prewar figure. The majority of these, on their own testimony, will return to their homes after the war. Thus the chief revolution the war has brought to the majority of women in this country is to make home life very much more difficult, but not to destroy it or even give it second place.

Another reason for making a rather cautious estimate of the effect of the war is the extent to which the tendencies now being freely attributed to the war existed in prewar society. The number of women "gainfully employed" has been increasing slowly for over a century. Nor is the weakening of home life a new feature. The falling birth rate is not a phenomenon of wartime — on the contrary, the birth rate has gone up. On the side of employment, the range of professions and jobs open to women has steadily expanded over the last forty years. Women were

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barristers, doctors, architects, surveyors before the war. A woman was President of the Trades Union Congress. Women served in Parliament and on local government. There was even a woman Cabinet Minister.

Most of these changes came about after the last war and came more quickly because of it, but the trend was already set in that direction. The last war was an acceleration rather than a cause. Or, to change the metaphor, it was like a very large wave in an advancing tide. It raced far up the shore, and when it receded the tide had risen another foot. This metaphor is perhaps more exact because it illustrates how delusory are some wartime changes. Although the tide rises slowly all along the shore, it does not at once reach — and indeed may never reach — the highest mark reached by the largest wave. So with the work and status and prospects of women. Much that looked certain in 1918 in the way of rights and opportunities was swept away in the years after the war. The tide rose but it did not rise as far or as fast as the great wave of wartime experiment had suggested. In 1919, for example, the "Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act" laid it down that

> A person shall not be disqualified by sex or marriage from the exercise of any public function or from being appointed to or holding any civil or judicial office or post, or from entering or assuming or carrying on any civil profession or vocation or from admission to any incorporated society (whether incorporated by Royal Charter or otherwise).

And in May 1920 the House of Commons passed a unanimous resolution that

> it is expedient that women should have equal opportunity of employment with men in all branches of the Civil Service within the United Kingdom, and under all Local Authorities . . . and should also receive equal pay.

Yet at the beginning of the next war women were still debarred from the civil service on marriage and were still paid at lower rates than men simply on the grounds of sex.

III

However certain one may be that the tide of economic opportunity for women is flowing steadily, one still finds difficulty in saying how far the mighty wave of this war's effort will recede or how far the tide will be seen to have advanced when normal conditions return. So many postwar factors will come in to influence the result. Of these, full employment is the most important. If British society achieves full and steady employment after

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this war, women will have a far better chance of achieving equal economic opportunity — equal pay where the work is equal and an equal chance to enter jobs and professions closed to them before this war. Women's wages, like all wages, are fixed in peacetime by woman's competitive position. If very many women compete in a shrinking labor market, inevitably their wage level will fall. If men are haunted by the fear of unemployment, they will press for the exclusion of women, especially if women are competing against them at lower rates. It is a fact that, whatever the theory of trade union action, organized labor has been chary about admitting women to equal wages and equal opportunity. In 1811, a men's union protested against "women being unfairly driven from their proper sphere in the social scale . . . and unjustly encouraged to compete with men in ruining the money value of labor." This attitude has slowly weakened. Women are admitted to union membership and the action of the AEU in this war may prove to be a revolutionary advance. But again it may not. The extent to which it remains a dead letter or becomes a real buttress to the bargaining position of women workers will depend more than anything else on full employment.

Another factor in determining women's economic position after the war will be the extent to which a very wide range of new activities, which the war has shown to be needful and possible spheres of employment, is maintained and expanded in the postwar years. If industry developed to the full the newly recognized need for welfare officers, and for labor management in general, a new profession would come into being in which there would undoubtedly be room for women. The new Education Bill will very greatly expand the need for teachers and, incidentally, one of the amendments proposed by the House of Commons and accepted by the Government was the removal of the ban on married women teachers. The development of youth clubs and youth movements demanding trained and skilled leadership and the promise of greatly expanded health services may offer entirely new opportunities for women's employment and relieve the pressure of competition on older jobs and professions. Finally, to carry speculation on to a fundamental shift in the basis of Britain's economic life, the more this country moves from secondary to tertiary industry — from heavy manufactures to consumer goods of high quality, from iron and steel to plastics and light metals and luxury articles in whose making skill and intelligence and taste are as important as brawn and muscle — the

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greater will be the chance of useful employment for women, who in this war have proved themselves the equals of men in intelligence[1] and often better than men in dexterity and conscientiousness.

It is not only a question of postwar employment. A quite different problem has gradually and painfully forced itself on the attention of the Government and, to a much lesser extent, on public opinion. The population of Great Britain is static and will soon decline. Even if the prewar birth rate is maintained, the nation will reproduce itself in the next generation to only three-quarters of its present size. If it falls still further, the population of Britain may fall as low as 20 million by the turn of the century. The unpleasant economic consequences of a declining population are not generally understood, or people would talk less blithely of Britain's overcrowded island. But even the most optimistic cannot but feel a chill at the heart at the grey prospect of a population of whom three-quarters are over fifty. The one- and two-child family has become the norm. To arrest the decline and give the country the best resources for its future, a large clamorous body of healthy young citizens, the three- and four- and five-child family is needed.

The Government has at last registered its concern officially by setting up a Royal Commission to inquire into the causes for the declining birth rate. If it reports in favor of drastic inducements — economic and social — to foster family life and increase the size of families, and if the Government acts on its advice, an entirely new factor will have been introduced into women's lives in this country. Hitherto, all the pressures — economic and social, of fashion, habit, prestige — have reacted against family life. If there is now a reversal of this trend, the effects may be startling. Among a great many educated women there is already a revulsion against the earlier so-called progressive idea, that child-bearing was an intolerable burden from which emancipation ought to "free" women. There is a new interest in the running of a home and the education of children as the highest form of skilled profession to which a woman can devote her energies. Will this revolution in feeling spread through society? If it were backed by the propaganda and economic assistance of the Government, it might very well set a new pattern of social thinking. Incidentally,

[1] This testimony from a Royal Ordnance factory is worth recording: "We found soon that it was a matter of appealing to intelligence and if the intelligence was there it did not matter whether it belonged to a man or a woman."

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the apparent change of policy in Russia may have some effect here. Those who have pressed most for greater economic opportunities for women have always turned to the USSR as a model of emancipation. Now it looks as though the Russian Government were revising its earlier policy. Coeducation has apparently been abolished there and women's training is to be directed much more towards domestic work and mother-craft. Is it too fantastic to suggest that in ten years' time the five-child family may be the "progressive" ideal? The effect of this on the problem of women's employment would be very great. Even with the most elaborate system of day nurseries, the care of very young children would lie with the mother, and there would be strong reënforcement of the traditional pattern of British life — that the wife on marriage no longer works for an independent wage.

In assessing the influence of the war on women's status in Britain, one must therefore allow for two external factors. The first is the extent to which the underlying tendency toward greater economic opportunity is a secular tendency, independent of war. The second is the possibility that peacetime changes in employment, in governmental policy and in public opinion may later react against the changes brought about by this war. Yet, allowing fully for both these factors, it is safe to say that the extent and variety of women's employment in the last two or three years will act as an acceleration in the process of securing their greater economic freedom and opportunity.

For one thing, public imagination has been caught by woman's achievement in this war. It is a measure of the strength of this feeling that even the House of Commons, which in its ninth year of life does not always very faithfully reflect the people's mood, has shown itself keenly aware of the injustices and prejudices connected with women's work. In 1943 the House compelled the Government to revise its scheme for paying women defense workers less compensation than men for air-raid injuries. In that same year it was laughed out of its proposal to appoint a committee of four young men to inquire into conditions in the women's services. Again, under pressure from the Commons, the ban on married teachers was raised in the Education Bill. Finally — and most sensationally — on March 28, 1944, the Churchill Government suffered its first defeat, by one vote, on the question of equal pay for women teachers. The Commons were alive to the implications of their action. Captain Quintin Hogg, speaking for the Tory reformers, said: "This amendment, if passed, would

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certainly affect the position of the Civil Service: it was intended to do so." (At which the House cheered.)

There can be no doubt at all that a substantial majority in the country supports the demand for "equal pay for equal work" as wholeheartedly as the earlier demand of "votes for women." True, the economic implications of equal pay are not fully understood, but as a statement of principle and aim only a very small minority would now oppose it. To give one small but not unimportant pointer, on a recent Brains Trust broadcast all the members save one unhesitatingly supported the principle of equal pay. The one dissentient, the immortal Commander Campbell, said that "women did not want it" and was shouted down.

Public opinion has changed. So has the opinion of women about their own capacities. They have gone into all manner of exceptionally difficult technical jobs and carried off the work quietly and efficiently. They have accepted responsibility in the services, in industry and in the administration and have given a good account of themselves. It is not only a question of greater self-confidence. They have earned better incomes and gained greater independence. The more energetic and intelligent among them will certainly fight conditions in which, for doing identically the same work, they receive half the man's wage. The case of a girl who by wearing slacks and calling herself Michael earned £5. 10 a week for doing work for which as a woman she would have received £2. 10 raised a laugh when it was reported in the daily press. But it is a portent, and public opinion is overwhelmingly on the side of the girl. It is safe to prophesy that, although the journey toward economic equality may not be as quick as the more hopeful expect, the women of this country are moving in that direction and the war will have accelerated their advance.

IV

That being so, one may ask a last question: Is the change desirable? Is the goal of complete political and economic equality — or, rather, interchangeability — between the sexes a sound and healthy basis for social life? Anyone writing on this subject must at this point leave the foundation of reported fact. What follows is not a deduction from official reports or statistics or mass observations. It is opinion — one person's opinion. As already noted, the issue divides opinion fiercely, and one hears extremist views more often than attempts to reach a balanced conclusion. Yet surely, as in most other spheres of human life,

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the extreme position — on the one hand that there are, practically speaking, no differences between men and women, on the other, that there is virtually no resemblance — ends in frustration and misery and the deformation of social life. It must be said first of all that the issues of political and economic equality are not on the same footing. The political ban which was lifted after the last war gave women their fundamental human rights. To forbid them the right to vote or to stand for election in a self-governing community was comparable to setting up special law courts to try women or to enacting that the ordinary processes of law should not afford them protection since they were women. Economic equality raises very different problems. No man has the right to every form of work for the simple reason that he is not fitted for every form. Nor are wages fixed in accordance with basic rights. So far there is not, unfortunately, even a right to a minimum wage. The wage level is determined by competitive pressure, by the state of the trade cycle, by historical accident. These facts set unavoidable limits to women's economic rights. Women are limited by physical strength. If they work after marriage and have children, they must be absent at intervals from work. Their competitive position — which in the past has not been strong — largely determines their wage rates and, until it is stronger, the raising of their wages might have unexpected and objectionable results. This is not to argue in any way for the prewar status quo. It is simply to avoid a false simplification — that economic rights are as easy to define as political rights and as straightforward to achieve.

Great Britain's record in the matter of women's employment is not good. Wage rates over a large sphere of industry are roughly 50 percent lower than those paid to men. Even in this war, the women have been given the unskilled work to a very large extent, and there have been strong traditional prejudices against promotion and upgrading. In some trades, such as printing, the men workers have even refused to "dilute" the labor force at all. Although since 1940 the pressure has for once been reversed, and it has been necessary to try to attract women to work, the traditional wage rates have in all too many cases been maintained. The question whether the "rate for the job" can be more generally introduced after the war depends mainly upon trade union action and indirectly on full employment. The admission of women to the AEU is a healthy sign. Nevertheless, as long as girl workers tend to leave industrial work on marriage, there will

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remain a deterrent to promoting them to responsible positions or even training them for specially skilled jobs. But this difficulty is concerned with opportunity rather than payment. Where equal work is done, there can be no valid argument for a differentiation in rates. The rate for the job should be the norm, and exceptions should be allowed only where the short-term effects of raising the rate would mean wholesale unemployment among women. In the long run, the gradual raising of rates would benefit the whole community, especially men workers whose own rates would not be depressed by the competition of what is still in some cases sweated labor.

In the civil service, the issue is clear. It is a melancholy fact that the British Government has the worst record as an employer of women. In spite of the solemn revocation of discrimination after the last war already noted, women civil servants were still paid less at the beginning of this war than men doing the same work; the road to promotion was still barred; and they were still compelled to leave the service on marriage. The war has changed this to some extent. Some women have been promoted and for the time being the marriage ban has been lifted; but discriminatory rates are still paid and the women recruits for wartime service have been almost inevitably brought in to serve in the lowest grades. The reason why the question of equal pay for equal work roused such a storm in Parliament was that the state's record as an employer of women is notoriously bad, and it was hoped that by insisting on the fulfilment of the 1920 pledge in the case of one branch of the state service — the teachers — the Commons would secure fair treatment for women throughout the civil service. This will probably be achieved in the course of the next few years and may well be the greatest gain for women achieved in this war.

It is all the more necessary because many women do not marry. The surplus of women over men is mercifully shrinking in this country, but who knows whether appalling casualty rates in the Second Front may not once again deprive millions of women of the chance of home and children? It is incredibly unfair that they who enjoy none of the compensations of family life should suffer economically and socially (in the matter of promotion) because of the assumption that they will marry and leave the service. They enter by the same examination in equal competition with men, but at present this is all the equality they get. In a country in which many thousands of women are certain

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not to marry, sex disqualifications in the matter of salary and advancement are most unjust. To this must of course be added the proviso that the proper accompaniment to equal pay is a proper system of dependents' allowances. Either by family allowances or generous tax rebates, the income of the married civil servant must be made approximately equal to his single colleague, male or female. But unmarried women frequently have dependents, too, and the system of allowances and rebates should be elastic enough to cover their needs as well.

The case for equal pay and opportunity as the norm, with divergencies only where the interest of the women themselves demands them, seems unanswerable. But one is not on that account justified in believing that a great majority of women want to abandon the home and the family as their first and most important sphere of activity or that they should be encouraged to do so. In every society there must be some division of labor. Even if mothers do not look after their children, somebody must, unless the total disappearance of the next generation is accepted as a desirable objective. And if somebody must, why not those who are most closely bound to the children by instinct and affection? Besides, in a world in which collective and centralized methods of control and supervision must in the interests of economic stability increase, it is vitally important to secure to the citizen the widest possible measure of autonomy in his political and social life. The home, in its privacy, its diversity, its loves and loyalties, is the first bulwark of distinct human personality against the encroachment of mass organization, mass education, mass leisure and mass work. It is surely a totally perverted sense of value that would maintain that the creation of life and the molding of human beings were in some way degrading occupations, unworthy of the attention and energy of a trained and intelligent woman. For thousands and thousands of men and women, the end of the war means just exactly coming home. It cannot be called an unworthy task to ensure that there will be homes to which they can return. The pattern which still dominates British life — of wifehood and motherhood as the norm — is the only satisfactory basis of social living, and to demand free opportunity and advancement for the women who by choice or necessity do not conform to that norm is not to argue that their way of life is preferable or that home life, rightly conceived, is not a challenge to a woman's highest faculties.

But that is not the last word. One of the chief reasons why the

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crusade for women's rights has sometimes taken the false turning of an attack on the values and opportunities of home life is because of the deplorable conditions under which so many women have been asked to carry on their work in the home. The greatest single cause of degradation is extreme poverty. In so far as the war has created the determination to achieve full employment, it has directly influenced the future of millions of housewives. Another cause has been the lack of a proper family income. To have more than two children has pushed the "marginal family" below the poverty line. Family allowances have been proposed in the course of the war, though not yet on an adequate scale. Bad housing is another handicap. And behind these major difficulties lies the less advertised problem of relaxation and leisure for the overburdened housewife. For the poor, there are none of the reliefs enjoyed by their wealthier neighbors — no nannies, no helps, no nurseries, no place where the children can be left during the morning shopping or the afternoon rest. The communal and educational side of the housewife's life has been neglected. The great work done in rural communities by the Women's Institutes has little or no counterpart in city life. Although the work of the home is not essentially degrading, all too often it has had to be carried on under degrading conditions, and the drudgery connected with unscientific, unplanned and unremitting household work has created a dangerous and disastrous bias against the vocation — one might almost say the skilled profession — of building a home.

How will the war affect these problems, which after all touch the lives of far more women than do the better known topics of equal pay and opportunity? To discuss the larger issues of income and housing would involve the whole question of postwar planning and reconstruction, but it can be said with certainty that women are far more conscious than they were before the war of the need for better houses, for properly equipped kitchens, for greater communal life through clubs and social centers, for home help and day nurseries as auxiliaries to the mother, for health centers and for more scientific feeding. The war, too, has taught that, provided the housewife can rely on some assistance in her daily work, her home need not be her prison. As a recent statement issued by a group of Conservative women put it, "a woman's home should be her focus, but not her boundary." Over a million housewives in this war have worked unsparingly in the Women's Voluntary Services, doing any job in the local com-

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munity which needed doing. After the war these spare energies can be canalized into local government, social work, communal activities of all sorts. Women have not taken full advantage of their political rights. Wartime responsibilities may teach them a new attitude.

Another sphere of activity for the housewife opened up by the war is part-time work. Educated women might find time to give their services to the schools and Young Peoples' Colleges — there will be a very serious shortage of teachers. Women with industrial experience might take over on a part-time basis the so-called "blind alley jobs" which fall now to adolescents. One firm has already worked out a successful experiment on these lines. Finally, it should be possible to make far more use of the intelligent experienced housewife whose children are grown up and who needs only a refresher course to fit her again for professional or industrial work. The war has shown that flexibility is possible in all these matters. The false division between home and outside work can be made less wide, and it is interesting to notice in this contest that women with technical and professional skill such as electricians and architects are much more alive today to the needs of the housewife. For example, it is the Women's Electrical Association that has done pioneer work for scientific household equipment — for labor-saving kitchens, cooking utensils and domestic needs of all types.

It would seem that the tendency for women to draw together regardless of walk of life, profession or experience reflects a growing realization that the problem before them is not only to achieve fair and equal opportunities in work and dignified and worthy conditions in the home. It is even more to ensure that women in making demands on society are prepared to return the benefit fourfold and balance new rights with the acceptance of new responsibilities. Here is a matter of common concern, however violent disagreement may be on other questions; for it is a fact that the women who for the last 25 years have been enfranchised and for whom today an even greater influence in national life is sought are uneven in quality, and the degree to which they have already made use of their opportunities is all too slight. In the war, individual young women have shown superb courage and initiative and resource. The great majority have been conscientious and hard-working, but nearly everyone who has studied young women in the factories and the offices, or has been concerned with catering for their leisure time, is struck by two

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things. In conscientiousness they do not equal the women over forty, and their standards of social awareness and political consciousness are appallingly low. Much of the difficulty which has arisen over the moral laxity and promiscuity of young girls in wartime is due to the fact that there are apparently no standards to which they recognize an appeal. The break-up of home life, evacuation, bombing, the absence of mothers on war work have accentuated the dangers; but in spite of all these extenuating circumstances, there is the frightening possibility that a new generation is growing up with no principles and no standards and barely any sense of responsibility.

This is the most vital point of all. Whether she is a wife or an official or a worker, a woman in a self-governing community is called on to behave as a sensible and responsible citizen. The war has shown how great potentially is the desire for service. Older women in the Women's Voluntary Service, girls in the armed forces, youngsters in the Girls Training Corps, prove that the finest possible material is there. But the over-all picture of apathy and irresponsibility shows that neither the educational system nor the political and social organization in Great Britain is completely fulfilling its task of molding and sustaining an adult sense of citizenship among women. This issue concerns a much longer term than the war and its aftermath. War has brought out the best and the worst in the women of this country, but it alone will not decide which is to be the dominant type — the "good time girl," wasting her factory earnings on trivial and dangerous pursuits, or the hardworking responsible woman in public work and in the home. The lasting answer lies in part with the educational system, in part with the political and social reconstruction of this country. The war has opened up some new opportunities, cast down some old barriers and created some problems of its own. But the real issues of women's work and women's rights and women's place in society all lie ahead, still to be solved.

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AN AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

By Frank Tannenbaum

THE future historian will note, when he deals with America's participation in the present war, that for most purposes it was in effect a hemispheric undertaking. True, the brunt of the effort has of necessity fallen upon the United States, but given the distribution of effective power and interests in the Western World this is neither surprising nor unexpected. What may seem to call for special comment is that of the 20 republics south of the Rio Grande, only one — Argentina — should seemingly have remained indifferent to the issues involved or even in some measure friendly to our enemies. But even in this case, the Argentine Government belatedly broke off relations with the Axis Powers and their satellites; and there is evidence that the majority of the people have from the beginning been on the side of the Allies in this war.

This very remarkable moral, political, and, in a sense, military alignment of the Western World on the same side in a great war has illumined an accepted assumption — the unity of this hemisphere. The idea is old, as old at least as Bolívar; but it was the visible threat of a German victory in Europe that at last gave it unmistakable expression. In spite of Latin American fear of the United States, so well and so long fostered by agents of Hitler and before him by others (including Latin Americans like Vasconcelos, Ugarte, Fombona and Pereyra), it became evident that the link that tied North and South America together was more than physical — it was political and spiritual as well. There had been, before the storm clouds gathered, in an age that now seems far off and a little unreal, much discursive and eloquent writing and preaching upon the sharp differences between the peoples and cultures of the United States and Latin America. One was Anglo-Saxon, the other Latin; one was Protestant, the other Catholic; one was material, the other spiritual; the culture of the United States was, as the tale was told, crass, coarse, and corrupted by an unholy zeal for money making. We had not only a "dollar diplomacy," but also a dollar-seeking way of life. Every item in the life of the United States that could be made to brand our culture as barbarous, uncouth and grasping was emphasized and exaggerated — a Southern lynching, a New York speakeasy, a Chicago

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gangster, the seventh divorce of a movie star, a corrupt political machine, all and more were used to prove that we were a gullible, godless and greedy people, a Shylock among nations and a constant threat to the very life and independence of Latin America. The "ideological warfare" was in full swing before its name had been invented.

And yet, when the crisis came, the discord so busily sown in previous decades was largely washed away and an essential identity in attitude and community of interest quickly prevailed. This "revelation," for so it might be described, reflected the fact that the people of this hemisphere, when looking out upon the world, had a common view of the universe. For it is true that the familiar list of differences between the United States and Latin American peoples is only partially descriptive and denies the imprint of their experience in this hemisphere. The conquest and settlement of the Americas has molded all of the peoples on this side of the Atlantic into a recognizable folk in a way not shown by the ordinary catalogue of their varying characteristics. This uniqueness of outlook and attitude, of feeling and philosophy, is a by-product of the sharing by Americans everywhere of certain profound experiences in their common history in this hemisphere which have left their residue in attitude, notion, belief, practice, values, habit, language and mannerism. More than four centuries of a common heritage have implanted in all of us a "something" that is American rather than European. It is discernible in our prose and poetry, politics and polity, in our popular heroes and folk tales, in the stories told to children, and in the moral issues that burden the grown-ups.

That something is a by-product of the essentially universal American experience with the Indian, the Negro, the open spaces and wide horizon, the unfilled areas, the peculiar use of the horse (the cowboy, the Gaucho, the llanero, the vaquero are brothers under the skin), the peculiar American experience with ranching: of driving cattle a thousand miles as is still done in Brazil, for instance. It is the persistent tradition of a culture uprooted in the old world and replanted and developed in the new, the common experience of the mixture of races and peoples in their varying degrees, of the constant flow of immigrants and their amazingly rapid metamorphosis into something essentially different from what they were, in the evidence of social and physical mobility, in the pride and self-assurance born from a world easily molded and changed. It stems from the common belief in progress, from

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the common notion that government is a human and malleable instrument subject to pressure and open to change by political "revolt" at the ballot box or by a "revolution," from the fact that all of the nations in the hemisphere achieved their independence by revolution, and that their greatest heroes are all successful "rebels" against old world "tyranny." It derives from the fact that the belief in democracy is ingrained even in areas where the "caudillo" and the "political boss" is a persistent and sometimes sinister figure, and from the fact that all political upheavals have — with very few exceptions indeed — been at least in the name of democracy. Those influences under varying forms and in different degrees have given Americans a common psychological and spiritual heritage deeper than the traditional, obvious differences that separate them. This identity of experience extends even to the feeling of isolation, of being set apart from the rest of the world, of being separated and protected by both the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans. When they speak from the depths, Americans talk about the same things and say essentially the same things about them. Even a cursory knowledge of the truly national literature of this hemisphere will make this clear.

It was consistent with the basic experience of the folk in the Western World that when face to face with the greatest moral and political conflagration of modern times they should react to it in very much the same way — as in fact they have done. Psychologically and morally the American people everywhere responded to the alternative offered by Hitler by almost spontaneous opposition. This was what their common experience dictated.

The identity of north and south was enhanced by the common peril. Danger made clear the helplessness of the Latin American countries, individually and even collectively, in the face of a ruthless military power bent upon conquest. It also made evident the dependence of the United States upon both moral and material support from those countries for the defense of its own or any other part of the hemisphere against aggression from abroad. The military need to keep the Panama Canal and the passage around Magellan Strait open to United States shipping and closed to that of our enemies made the coöperation of the countries in Latin America essential to us. By the same token, the survival of the Latin American countries as individual nations depended upon the military strength of the United States. It was unmistakably clear that the countries of this hemisphere are in the same boat militarily and politically, and no words can hide the fact.

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This military and diplomatic unity was born of necessity and made easier and more logical by the common historical experience of North and South.

II

It would, however, be unrealistic and misleading to gloss over the persistent stress and strain that prevail between the United States and the countries of Latin America. The talk in the nations to the south about the differences, the emphasis upon the cultural and spiritual divergence, the warnings of danger, have a basis in the bigness, power, organized energy, wealth and military strength of the United States. We are the great nation in this hemisphere. Our mere size and power are like a permanent shadow, protective or threatening as you will, but inescapable and unavoidable. Our protestations of affection and concern are, in spite of our best diplomatic efforts, the protestations of the big brother; our very manner if not mannerism reflects that. This is the fact and no one can conceal it — not even by studiously avoiding mention of it. So, too, the protestations of the Latin Americans that they love us, admire us, respect us — or the opposite — are in effect the behavior of a little brother, and nothing can hide the fact, neither humility, nor bravado, nor even studious indifference. Anyone who has attended any Pan American conference will readily identify the attitudes, speeches, disclaimers and protestations, the deference and implicit jealousy or fear that reflect the simple fact of our bigness. The overflow of American energy in the past and its possible overflow in the future are a constant theme song, accompanying every political argument, every projection into the future.

Diplomatically this gulf between the one great power and a number of small ones has been bridged by the doctrine of equal sovereignty, a doctrine that makes Haiti and Santo Domingo — to use just two instances — equal entities with the United States in a diplomatic argument, if in nothing else. This doctrine has its numerous corollaries, the most important of which is the principle of non-intervention in the internal and external affairs of any one of the 20 Latin American republics. Equal sovereignty as a theory and non-intervention as a policy are really deliberate attempts to redress the balance in this hemisphere between one very powerful and a number of weak nations. And, as a matter of fact, they do redress the balance in a certain way and within certain limits; they tend to defend the dignity and justify the

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confidence of the weaker political units in their dealings with the United States. They also tend to give Pan Americanism a kind of moral basis which it lacked until these policies were fully acquiesced in by the United States. The effect is to provide a basis of security, especially as we have actually implemented these measures in various ways, such as converting the Monroe Doctrine from a unilateral to a multilateral instrument. It cannot be denied that these changes in attitude and practice have been effective in deflecting the preoccupation of the Latin Americans with the "bigness" of the United States, for the time being. But perhaps their most important immediate consequence has been their influence upon the United States, where they have led to the writing and acceptance of a "self-denying ordinance." They have led us to behave as if the theory of sovereign equality were true and not merely an operational formula.

These doctrines and the conventions based upon them, useful as they may be as operational tools in a very complex and ill-balanced international structure, are nevertheless pure fictions. The theory of the equality of sovereignty, the non-intervention policy, the Monroe Doctrine and its various corollaries, the policy of recognition, whatever it may be at the moment, and even the Good Neighbor Policy, are in effect intervention. In the nature of the case, given the difference of power and the inner lack of political balance in most of the countries in Latin America, whatever we do or fail to do has the force of intervention. Our policy, whatever it is, our attitude, whatever it is, has a significant influence, in many instances a decisive one, upon both the internal and the external policy of most, perhaps all, the countries in Latin America. Our power is such that we are a party to every transaction, even against our will. We are a weight in every balance. We are an influence in every political judgment, every decision. When we refuse to intervene, we merely intervene on the other side. When we do not support our friends, we in effect support our enemies; when we will not intervene on the side we believe in, we intervene on the side we do not believe in. We cannot escape the consequence of our power; we may refuse to exercise our responsibility, but in doing that we merely exercise it on the wrong side.

In a political world so unstable as Latin America, where government in most cases rests upon a slender and tentative alignment of political groups and personalities and where the individual factor plays so large and significant a rôle, any move that

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appears to favor those in power strengthens them in their hold upon public office and tends to perpetuate it, and every move that looks like indifference on our part carries an implication of censure, weakening those who hold political power, strengthening the opposition and hastening the day of revolution. The one thing we cannot achieve in Latin America is neutrality; our very declaration of a policy of "hands off" has the effect of lending support to one or another group contending for place and position. The Good Neighbor Policy, effective as it has been, and so valuable in promoting a moral alignment against aggression at the time when the alignment had to be made, was in effect intervention on the side of the governments in power. Any favor extended, any courtesy shown, increased the prestige and hold of the personalities in office and tended to perpetuate them in that place.

To say this is not to suggest that any other policy would have been more desirable or that any other policy would have made us less interventionist. It is merely to point out for the sake of "realism" and practical politics that the doctrine of non-intervention has a much more limited meaning than it implies. Both the internal and the external policies of the countries of Latin America are sharply responsive to our mere presence; anything we do or say — even if we say or do nothing at all — has the effect of intervention. It is no accident that in many Latin American countries the American ambassador is the most important political personage in the country, even if he does his best to be the least important one.

It need only be added that our failure to admit or our refusal to exercise the inevitable influence that stems from our position may become a contributing cause of political chaos and disillusionment. Our moral responsibility equals our power, and the awareness of that reality is, or ought to be, the first thought in shaping our Latin American policies.

III

Though much has been written on the subject, we perhaps do not yet realize how greatly the Latin American countries have contributed to the fulfillment of our wartime objectives in this hemisphere. As a background for examining some of the concrete evidence of this coöperation we might first remind ourselves what our policy was in the days when our danger of becoming involved in the war was growing. Summarized, our objectives then were: (1) To organize and arm the hemisphere for defense. (2) To de-

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stroy any attempt to use any part of it for direct or indirect military operations such as espionage, the construction of submarine bases, propaganda, sabotage, or for the supply of valuable raw materials to the enemy. (3) To obtain bases for our military and naval forces. (4) To acquire as rapidly as possible the available raw materials for our own needs. (5) To achieve hemispheric unity both for political and military ends. (6) To obtain military aid from Latin America by the organization, arming and training of local troops for use in actual combat if and when need and opportunity offered. (7) To maintain the peace in the area as an essential means of achieving some or all of these objectives.

First and perhaps most important, we should note what may be called the spiritual preparation of the Latin American countries. Long before we were involved in the war they evidenced a growing sympathy for the cause of the Allies, an increasing shift toward coöperation with the United States, and at the same time a growing fear and repudiation of the doctrines and aspirations of Germany. Fully a year before December 7, 1941, there were many signs that the various nations in the western hemisphere were forging a common policy. Even an incomplete citation of the available material provides impressive testimony that in the face of the gathering storm the peoples of the New World were banding together for a common effort. A partial collation of the evidence for 1941 is given in Part I of an Appendix to this article, beginning on page 649. It makes clear that a ground swell in favor of coöperation with the United States had been developing in Latin America before Pearl Harbor. The fatal events of that day produced a unity of action and policy in this hemisphere barely equalled and certainly not exceeded by the British Commonwealth of Nations. Even more significant, perhaps, is the fact that without the formal political unity of the British Commonwealth, and without the common background of language and culture, the nations in the Western World in a moment of crisis behaved in fact as if they belonged together, as indeed they did, in the face of a common danger.

That the above is no overstatement is seen from the immediate response of the countries to the south of the United States after the news of Pearl Harbor was flashed to the world. The evidence is recapitulated in the Appendix (Part II, page 650). It makes clear that the American nations accepted and reacted to the attack against the United States as an attack against themselves, and that with amazing speed and thoroughness they united

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against the aggressors. By the end of January 1942 — that is to say, within six weeks of Pearl Harbor — all of the nations except Chile and Argentina had either declared war or broken relations with the Axis, and since then both of these have followed suit. There is now not a single nation in the hemisphere which has not cut its official contacts with the Axis Powers.

This moral coöperation was accompanied by a military effort which must be judged by its potential importance. Save for naval battles, the actual conflict did not extend to this hemisphere; the war did not reach either the Pacific or the Atlantic coasts of any of the Latin American nations. But it is clear from the evidence at hand (see Appendix, Part III, page 652) that both preceding Pearl Harbor and immediately following it the American nations were preparing for such a possibility, and it may be assumed that they would have accepted the physical challenge of the Axis Powers as in fact they accepted the moral challenge.

The record of military preparations and actual assistance is obviously incomplete as summarized in the Appendix. It does not give a full picture of the military and naval effort of the Latin American countries nor of the exact amount of United States aid extended to these countries. For obvious reasons such information cannot be published. But enough is cited to show that everywhere the moral support extended to the United States was implemented by military effort, and to make perfectly clear that if the war had reached this hemisphere the effort would have been very much greater and would have formed a more significant part of our undertaking.

Our own aid to the military rearming of Latin America has been extensive. Details are not available except in broad terms. We know that under lend-lease agreements, up to January 1, 1944, a total of $127,000,000, chiefly for military equipment, has been allotted the Latin American countries. Of this amount, $34,648,000 was assigned in 1942 and $92,954,000 in 1943. Lend-lease agreements have been entered into with every country in Latin America except Argentina and Panama (the last-named receives aid under different provisions). Of the amount so far assigned, one-half has gone to Brazil, and three-fourths have gone to Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru. While no detailed figures on the distribution of arms are available, we know that of the total more than $20,000,000 has represented ordnance and ammunition, $51,000,000 airplanes, $36,000,000 tanks and vehicles, $617,000 watercraft, and the rest industrial and agricultural items. Every coun-

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try except Argentina has received a certain amount of modern military equipment. But the amounts expended under lend-lease are after all only a part of the total sum of money either loaned, invested, or given to the different countries for a great variety of purposes, all of them designed to increase hemispheric solidarity, to develop and make available the raw materials needed for the war effort, and to increase the effectiveness of the Latin American nations in the general enterprise of winning both the war and the peace. There is no room in this paper for a full examination of all of the various economic aids extended to Latin America or even for evaluation of their implications. However, a few items in the program of economic aid and coöperation are listed in the Appendix (Part IV, p. 654). That the Latin American countries have coöperated with us effectively in the achievement of our objectives is incontrovertible on the evidence submitted here and in the light of other obvious facts which there is not space to recount.

IV

The economic and military contributions by the United States have increased the prestige of the governments in power. There is, however, no reason to assume that they have materially affected political habits in Latin America, or even the basic instability there. Nothing that happens during the war will lessen the personal emphasis upon honor and prestige, the extreme individualism that borders on the anarchic, and the importance of the *personaje*. Nor will it have seriously broken down the isolation of the various classes from each other; the rôle of the Indian, the *roto*, the peon, will remain substantially unchanged. So too will that of the *gamonal*, the *hacendado*, the *amo*, and the *señor;* and the prestige of the military will, if anything, have increased. We have in effect armed the continent as it has never been armed before. In the sphere of domestic affairs, ambitious generals will have better means at their disposal for playing the game of "revolution," and the governments will have more effective tools at their disposal for the suppression of "popular" uprisings (the use of American equipment by both sides in the recent rebellion in San Salvador is a case in point). We may have made the "normal" dictatorships more permanent, and therefore less palatable, and in consequence more tyrannical and efficient. How completely a naïve political dictatorship and a belief in democracy go hand-in-hand is illustrated in this news-

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paper announcement of July 2, 1943: "The Nicaraguan Senate approves changes in the Constitution to permit President Anastasio Somoza to succeed himself. It also incorporates the Atlantic Charter."

Perhaps more serious than the predictable stirrings of domestic political ambitions as a result of the military equipment we have placed in the hands of local army chieftains is the very real danger, if not the likelihood, that these new tools may be used in older quarrels between Latin American nations. It must always be remembered that international quarrels in Latin America have all too frequently served internal political ends. What assurance is there that the arming of Peru and Ecuador will not lead to a renewal of the old animosity settled under duress after Pearl Harbor? What certainty is there that the arming of Bolivia and Chile will not lead to an attempt to satisfy an old ambition and to rectify an essentially unstable boundary situation? What, further, is the assurance that the arming of Brazil may not lead to that country's military embroilment with Argentina? To raise these questions is not to predict that any such consequences are inevitable; but it is important to repeat here that unless the United States shows a sense of responsibility proportionate to its power in this hemisphere, the arming of the Latin American countries may, and in all probability will, have consequences other than those it had in view when it placed arms at the disposal of the governments of Latin America.

It must be remembered that there is no reason to assume that political attitudes, and the persistent feeling that a government in power is a usurper, have been in any important way modified. Political practices will remain as they were before the war; so will the essential instability of the political structure; so will the artificial character of political parties. Revolution will still be the one sure means of changing government; suppression of opposition by more or less drastic means will still continue a favorite political technique. The source of the difficulty lies beyond immediate cure, and certainly beyond cure from the outside. The political form is a function of the structure of society in all its ramifications, and the things that can be added by an outside paternalism will not have any serious effect upon the system as it exists.

If there is a "solution" for the political instability, it must come from a better balancing of the inner forces, a greater evening-up of incomes within the different countries, a more general

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identification of the governments with the people, a larger participation in effective politics by the mass of the community, and a greater responsibility of political parties both in and out of government. But such a consummation, if it comes at all, will take a long time, a very long time. What we have done is to strengthen the governments in power. These governments came to power in most places — we need not specify — by arbitrary means, by revolutions, by pronouncements, by the suppression of the legislature, by "unanimous elections," by plebiscites (voluntary and popular, if we are to believe the governments), by every means except that of the accurate counting of votes freely given. The question of democracy is really irrelevant to the point. If the governments in power had not thus come to office, others in their place would have achieved public control by the same sort of "democratic" means. Democracy in our sense is not at issue. Nor is there any question as to the inevitability of our behavior during a war of the proportions of the present conflict. The simple point is that we have become identified with strengthening, favoring and maintaining the present governments. We are being held responsible for saddling the present "tyrannies" upon the people. The words "present tyrannies" are used advisedly, for in their place other tyrannies would have been equally "good" or equally "bad," and they would have come to office by the "natural" process of substitution. But we have impeded this natural process of Latin American "democracy," have dammed the process, and when the dam breaks, as it will, as indeed — exemplified by Bolivia, San Salvador, and rumblings in other places — it is already breaking, we shall be blamed for the revolutions as we are now blamed for the tyrannies. The democratic groups accuse us of maintaining the dictatorships in office. They would equally blame us if we interfered against them.

The difficulties and perplexities are numerous. One of them that most Americans, official and unofficial alike, will not recognize is that our influence, our democratic influence, is essentially revolutionary in Latin America. If we really mean what we say, if the preaching of the Four Freedoms is to be taken literally, then we are vehicles of social revolution in most, perhaps all, of the Latin American countries. Revolution, bloody conflict, and prolonged social chaos: there is at present no other road to achieve the Four Freedoms. If we do not mean what we say, then we are going to be accused — are already being accused — of hypocrisy, of support-

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ing the "evil powers," of conniving at the suppression of democracy, of saddling arbitrary and anti-democratic government upon the peoples. For it is true that the Four Freedoms, if they are ever to be achieved, involve a basic change in the land structure of Latin America, everywhere except in Mexico and Costa Rica; and this means prolonged social strife and at least temporary agricultural depression, and involves the transfer of political power and prestige from the present small and divided upper class to the large mass of the people. There is no assurance that anything that can be done will, within any reasonable time, have that effect; it might even prove to have the opposite effect. But the doing of it, whatever that implies, is a task beyond the means, purpose or ken of what we can either propose or execute.

This conclusion might lead profitably to a detailed analysis of the economic consequence to Latin America of the war and of the financial and material contributions received from us. All that can be said on that score here is that the immediate inflation has increased discontent and raised a very real threat of wide political disturbance as soon as the war is over, if not before. Moreover, the ambitions aroused by our pouring in of money as loans and as outright gifts must of necessity remain unfulfilled. There is no way of maintaining an artificially stimulated economy after the prime motive for it, the winning of the war, has come to an end. Nor even in the event of full employment in the United States will we provide an adequate cushioning for the transition from a war to a peace economy. The income of the governments will in all probability shrink to something like their former levels; the sources of national income will remain narrow as they were before; and the flow of easy, if not free money, perhaps even the flow of investment money, will come to an end.

This is said without undue pessimism. It must simply be remembered that there is no way, in the long run, of maintaining an economy above its natural level, and that charity — if the word be permitted — is not a healthy or a permanent basis for either economic or political stability. What Latin America needs, if either political or economic stability is to be achieved, is the growth of a numerous, independent, small land-owning peasantry and the growth of a large and vigorous middle class. But the achievement of both of these essential objectives involves not only an investment of capital in Latin America but a continuity of public policy there that is probably not to be had in human affairs.

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INTERNATIONAL CREDIT AND CURRENCY PLANS

By Louis Rasminsky

WHATEVER may be the ultimate fate of the plans themselves, the publication last year of American, British and Canadian proposals regarding postwar currency arrangements has precipitated an interesting public debate which has thrown a great deal of light on some of the basic issues involved. In view of the dense cloud of mystery and suspicion which frequently surrounds international finance, it is essential that any covenants reached in this field should be open and openly arrived at. The unusual procedure of Treasury officials in different countries inviting the world to witness them in the process of thinking out loud (and thinking their own private thoughts rather than the thoughts of their governments) has been justified by the results. After a year of vigorous discussion, a wide area of agreement on essential points has now been reached among the officials of a large number of countries. This agreement has been embodied in a "Joint Statement by Experts on the Establishment of an International Monetary Fund," published simultaneously in April 1944 in several capitals, including London, Moscow, Washington and Ottawa.

The Fund proposal is one contribution to the task of reconstructing a functioning international economic system; and its potential usefulness is clearly conditional upon parallel action on cognate problems such as commercial policy and international long-term investment. In turn, tolerable international economic arrangements will not endure, and competitive currency depreciation, excessive trade restrictions, barter trade deals, rigid and stultifying exchange controls will not be avoided, unless the great industrial nations are successful in maintaining a high and reasonably stable level of domestic economic activity. No international arrangements, monetary or other, will survive if the large countries so mismanage their affairs that they are half the time in the doldrums and the other half in a cyclone of activity.

The details of the Fund proposal have been fully discussed and an impressive body of literature has already been produced. In Canada we have followed the discussion in the United States with attention. I do not propose to reëxamine the details, but rather to discuss some of the objections that have been raised to the general

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principles underlying the proposals. The principal objections seem to be based on the following three theses: (a) that international economic coöperation is a method of getting the United States to "share the wealth" with less favored countries; (b) that the proper solution of the world monetary problem is a universal return to the gold standard; and (c) that bilateral arrangements for the extension of credit would be preferable to, or more practical than, broadly based international arrangements.

II

I am afraid that there is a fairly wide suspicion in the United States that international economic coöperation in any form means a "hand out." Thus the currency plans have been represented as a nefarious plot to rob the United States of its gold reserves; as an attempt to make Uncle Sam the milch cow for the rest of the world; as a subtle scheme to restore world financial supremacy to the United Kingdom. As a rule, of course, such views are not held in responsible circles. On the contrary, determined and effective efforts have been made in high official quarters as well as by private writers to present the facts of the American international economic position to the American people in their true perspective. But the task of education, though well started, is incomplete. The only excuse a foreigner can have for commenting on the "hand-out" thesis is the hope that his reaction may throw further light on the problems involved.

The views to which I have referred have been sufficiently widely held for a sufficiently long period to have impinged deeply on the consciousness of foreign countries. I believe that far from desiring to obtain from the United States anything which by the remotest stretch of the imagination could possibly be construed as a "hand-out," there is almost no length to which self-respecting foreign countries would not go in order to avoid this. It is helpful to look at this matter from the point of view of a country which is contemplating getting special assistance, say a loan, from the United States. The experience of European and Latin American countries which have got into excessive debt to the United States during the past quarter century has been so bad — both from the viewpoint of their own domestic stability when the loans ceased to be available and the spurious economic structure they supported collapsed, and from the viewpoint of the international friction and the national humiliation which resulted when the inevitable defaults occurred — that the one

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thing most of them want above all to avoid is a repetition of this experience. The real danger, so far as the more responsible foreign countries are concerned, is not that they will wish to raid the American pantry but that they will be so anxious to avoid any suspicion of such an intention that they will be hesitant to count on the permanence of that degree of American coöperation which is willingly offered. From self-interest, and not necessarily on any high moral grounds, responsible countries will ponder very deeply before contracting financial obligations to the United States which they will be unable to discharge in full even under adverse circumstances. I am aware that there are more responsible and less responsible countries; and there may be some which would cheerfully borrow and default. But it would be a mistake, I think, to allow such countries to constitute the norm for determining general attitudes and policies.

The fear that the International Monetary Fund is a method of getting the United States to give a "hand out" to the world arises from the credit provisions of the plan, *i.e.* the provisions which will enable countries to purchase foreign exchange for their own currencies. In many respects these credit provisions are, indeed, the central feature of the proposals, and it is important that they should be properly understood. If the creditor countries are unable to agree that their participation is desirable, *from the point of view of their own national self-interest*, then it would be better for all concerned that they should not participate.

Why is it necessary to provide foreign exchange credit facilities? Why not operate on a cash basis in international transactions? In trying to answer these questions it is helpful — indeed it is essential — to keep in mind that the realities with which we are concerned are goods and not money. Any country's ability to finance imports from abroad out of its own resources is limited to the volume of exports it can sell, plus the volume of its holdings of internationally acceptable reserves it can liquidate — gold or foreign exchange or negotiable securities. The lend-lease and mutual aid programs of the United States and Canada are simple recognitions of this fact. Apart from all questions of fairness in the distribution of war costs, we must remember that our allies were unable to pay cash for the goods they needed from Canada and the United States to fight the war in which we are all engaged. The monetary appropriations of the lend-lease act in the United States and the mutual aid act in Canada were not used to provide them with money but to provide them with goods.

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Failure to be equally realistic about postwar credit arrangements can lead only to confusion of thought. What are the realities of the postwar situation in this respect? Certain countries will have import requirements greatly in excess of their immediate capacity to supply goods abroad. It can be taken for granted, I think, that the unregulated movement of short-term capital which exerted so disturbing an effect between the two great wars will no longer be tolerated; the needs of various countries for foreign exchange will arise because they need goods. I use the term "goods" in a broad sense to include all current account requirements including the invisible as well as the visible items. On the other hand, there will be certain countries (such as Canada and the United States) whose capacity to supply goods abroad — and thus to maintain the incomes and purchasing power of their primary producers or manufacturers and their employees dependent on export markets — will exceed their immediate requirements of goods from abroad.

What is to happen in this situation? So far as relief goods are concerned the gap will be met to a certain extent through UNRRA. Some writers maintain that nothing further need be done and that countries should then get back on a cash basis in their international transactions. For reasons which I shall go into in greater detail later, I do not think that the proposal that nothing further should be done to meet the postwar need for credits is realistic, or that it stands the slightest chance of being adopted. If it were adopted, trade between countries would soon be reduced to a state of barter, with miserable consequences for all.

But first let us look at the matter from the point of view of deficit countries — that is, those whose import requirements are in excess of their immediate capacity to supply exports in exchange. How are they to balance their international accounts if no arrangements are made under which credits are available?

There are two broad courses of action open to them. They can either attempt to increase the level of their exports to the level of their imports, or to reduce their imports to the amounts that they can pay for currently through exports or through the liquidation of such internationally acceptable assets as they may hold. How can they go about the former? Theoretically they could attempt to increase their exports by cheapening them through cost reductions at home, in an effort to undersell foreign competitors. This is the method of internal deflation. But does anyone believe that any country will deliberately pursue a policy of internal deflation

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and accept the consequences in the form of unemployment and reduced incomes on the scale that would be required? The deflation would be severe since its purpose would be to make possible a great volume of cheap goods for export, to balance the unusually heavy import requirements of the reconstruction period. This question answers itself. Another possibility is that these countries would try to cheapen their exports by the method of deliberate currency depreciation or export subsidies. But how would foreign countries react to such practices? Would they not feel that their interests had been adversely affected, and is it not certain that they would retaliate? In other words, would not this start a general wave of competitive currency depreciation, anti-dumping duties or rigid import restrictions from which all would suffer?

Or suppose that these deficit countries, realizing the perils of competitive retaliation, determine to avoid such measures as exchange depreciation and export subsidies, and take the second course suggested above, that of limiting their foreign exchange expenditures to their foreign exchange income. They would be able to do this only by imposing stringent controls over their imports. If they did so we should all begin the postwar period with a fresh set of quantitative trade restrictions, and once embarked on this course there would be no turning back. Capital would be invested in the domestic industries. Their products would increasingly replace imports. Labor would find employment in these industries. And once the emergency had passed, the difficulties of adjustment would, if experience is any guide, always appear too formidable for governments to face. Countries which were major importers (and these include some which will not be on the receiving end of relief shipments) would no doubt seek in many cases to exploit their power as consumers by entering into bilateral trade bargains with their suppliers. They would offer to make large bulk purchases on condition that the proceeds be left on deposit or used to buy goods in the purchasing country. What matter if the goods it has to offer in exchange are not needed by the selling country or if their prices are high? This is the old road to autarchy and international chaos.

III

Let us now look at the question of credits from the point of view of the surplus countries, which I think will include Canada as well as the United States. On a strictly cash basis, the ability

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of these countries to export would be limited, broadly speaking, by the amount of imports they were willing to take from their trade partners. Is it for a moment conceivable that such countries would accept the consequences of this situation, entailing as it would the disorganization of their export markets? Rather than face these consequences, would not the surplus countries be willing to give the deficit countries time for payment in some form or other? In other words, is it not a fact that credit will be extended? This credit will not be extended primarily for the good of the deficit countries, nor even because the surplus countries are sufficiently intelligent to realize that all nations will benefit by the reëstablishment of a functioning international economic system. Credits will be extended because in real terms — in terms of disorganization of export markets and consequent unemployment and loss of income in export industries — the cost to the surplus countries of withholding them is far greater.

If my argument is correct, then, Fund or no Fund, credit will be extended after the war by countries in the position of the United States and Canada. So far as the short-term credits of the type contemplated by the Fund are concerned, the problem resolves itself into the question whether such credits should be extended from day to day and as a result of deals between individual countries, or whether they should be extended through a central pool on the basis of principles laid down in advance. I shall give my reasons later for preferring the latter course. If one accepts the view that credit will in fact be extended, then the important question from the point of view of the creditor countries is whether the existence of an International Monetary Fund increases or reduces the risk of not obtaining repayment of credits when they desire it.

I think that the creditor has greater freedom of action in obtaining repayment under a genuinely international monetary system than he has under a monetary system bolstered by bilateral credit deals. For the latter will tend, I believe, to lead to bilateral trade deals. In such circumstances the creditor can obtain repayment only by increasing his imports *from the country to which he has extended credit;* in a truly international system, such as contemplated by the Fund proposals, he can obtain repayment by increasing his imports *from any part of the world.*

It is important for creditors to realize that international indebtedness can, over any extended period, be liquidated only by the international transfer of goods and services. If such coun-

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tries get tired of being capital exporters and wish the return of sums previously advanced, they must facilitate the return by increasing their imports from abroad or by limiting their sales abroad. Goods and services offer the practical form of return. I do not argue that the adjustment must be made exclusively by the creditor. The debtor has an equal responsibility to limit his borrowings to the amount he can honestly hope to repay and then make an honest effort to transfer in goods the amounts needed to effect repayment. But if the creditors, in these circumstances, refuse to facilitate such transfers in the ways I have indicated, they are simply closing their eyes to the facts of life in international transactions and have no right to complain at the consequences of their own irrational behavior.

IV

The view that no concerted international action to improve the world monetary organization need be taken beyond measures to provide immediate postwar relief usually expresses itself as a demand for the return to the international gold standard.

It is not unfair to ask the advocates of a return to the gold standard which gold standard they have in mind. Presumably they do not mean the monetary arrangements prevailing before the outbreak of the present war, for these can only be characterized as uncertainty tempered by bilateralism. In the United States and the creditor countries of the European gold bloc the value of the national currency in terms of gold was legally defined. (In some cases the national executive had limited authority to change the definition.) But elsewhere exchanges were either free to fluctuate, with a greater or lesser degree of market intervention by governmental or semi-governmental agencies, or were rigidly controlled through official exchange regulations, supplemented by bilateral trade deals and clearing agreements. Surely no one wants to return to this.

Or do the advocates of a return to the international gold standard have in mind a return to the situation of the 1920's? Do they wish a series of uncoördinated redefinitions of the values of currencies in terms of gold by various countries? This, it seems to me, is simply proposing a repetition of the process by which the pound was overvalued, the franc undervalued, and a topsy-turvy structure maintained for a while through massive exports of capital from the United States.

Or is it possible that they are thinking of the really successful

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operation of the gold standard before 1914? And, if so, who is to provide the management and the credits which London, through her position as a large and willing importer and as the world's leading financial power, was then able to provide?

The only meaning that can be read into the exhortations for a return to the gold standard is that the United States should itself base its currency firmly on gold and that other countries should base their currencies on the American dollar or on gold. There are a good many reasons why most countries will be unable or unwilling to do this. In the first place, the international financial position of many countries will be so precarious that they will be quite unable to base their monetary systems on gold for some time to come. Countries such as the United Kingdom which have lost a large proportion of their foreign assets and have accumulated huge short-term foreign liabilities would find it impossible to reëstablish immediately the gold convertibility of their currency. The obverse of this is, of course, the concentration of most of the world's monetary gold reserves in the United States. Many countries will be unwilling or unable to adopt policies which will enable them to "earn" the gold on which to base their monetary systems; their demand for imports of goods will be so great that they will not be able to afford the luxury of importing gold. Nor will most countries be willing to accept thereafter the discipline which adherence to an unregulated international gold standard would impose upon their domestic policies.

If one thing is clear about postwar economic policy, it is that the primary objective of all governments will be to maintain employment at high levels. This aim will take precedence over exchange stability; and if exchange stability is desired, some technique must be developed to make the two aims compatible. Few countries will adhere to an international gold standard or to an international monetary standard of any sort if the consequence is deprivation of all liberty of action with respect to domestic economic and social policies. The United States stands virtually alone among the great economic powers in a position of assured international liquidity, due to her enormous gold reserves; she, almost alone, need not fear that a situation may arise which inhibits her from carrying out desirable domestic policies because of their possible effects on her balance of international payments.

I am aware that a volume of monetary gold which in the aggregate is substantial is held by countries outside the United States, and that certain foreign countries' dollar balances have also been

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swollen temporarily as a result of abnormal war conditions, such as American military expenditures abroad and the difficulty of obtaining normal imports from the United States. It would be seriously misleading, however, to think in terms of aggregates in this connection or to contend that there has been a major redistribution of world gold reserves because United States holdings fell from $22.7 billion to $21.9 billion in the course of 1943.[1] In the first place, a large part of world gold reserves outside the United States is held in a few European creditor countries, several of which have announced their determination to pay cash for their relief requirements. Moreover, even the figure of liquid international assets for any particular country is misleading as an indication of the deficit it will be prepared to run in its international accounts. Only in war are countries willing to see their international cash fall to zero; in ordinary times protective action of one form or another will be taken long before this position is reached.

For many countries, the international margin of reserves is narrow; and if they commit themselves to adhere to an "automatic" international gold standard they commit themselves to the unknown. Those who think that all that is needed is a return to the international gold standard evidently believe that countries will be willing to base their monetary policies on changes in their international reserves, influenced as these will be by the varying fortunes of the gold-mining industry and by the domestic and international economic policies of the financially strongest countries, notably the United States.

The linking of national monetary and economic policies with those of the United States, without any margin in the way of assured credits, and without any arrangement for continuous consultation such as that provided in the proposed International Monetary Fund, would present very grave difficulties for many countries. True, the United States is such a colossus in the world economic system that, linked or unlinked, foreign countries cannot help being greatly influenced, for better or for worse, by the trend of affairs there. But it is one thing for a country to accept this predominant American influence when that country is in a position to express some views on the course of events or is free to cope with it with such ingenuity as it can muster, if things

[1] This matter of the distribution of monetary gold reserves provides an interesting example of how easy it is to regard the recent past as "normal." A reduction in American holdings from, say, 75 to 70 percent of world reserves is hailed by some as great redistribution of the metal: but 70 percent still looks comfortably large when compared with the United States' share in world trade, which before the war was less than 10 percent.

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do not go well; it is quite another thing for one country to tie its fortunes inexorably to policies pursued by another, no matter how farsighted and well-chosen those policies might be.

What the advocates of a return to an "automatic" gold standard fail to grasp is the central position which the idea of maintenance of a high level of employment has taken in current economic thought. For emphasis I repeat: government policies will have this as their main objective after the war. There will be no universal return to the gold or dollar standard, and if world monetary stability is desired, we will have to set about creating it. Its creation will involve agreement on a code of behavior and general acceptance of restraints on the use of exchange depreciation as an instrument of economic policy. It will also involve the assurance that temporary balance of payments difficulties (due, for example, to an industrial recession in an important foreign market or to a crop failure at home) will not force countries into deflationary policies destructive of prosperity. The credit provisions of the Fund proposal give this assurance.

I am aware that this conclusion will not satisfy those who favor "all or nothing" solutions, contending that a choice must be made once and for all between exchange stability and national economic policies. I do not think that a clear-cut choice of this sort will, in fact, be made. The Fund proposal seeks to establish an international monetary standard to which all countries can adhere, but one which has a reasonable flexibility and which will not restrain countries from pursuing the goal of economic stability at a high level of activity. Divergences between national policies will develop even so; there will be stresses and strains. This will be true under any conceivable arrangement: but I have faith that generally acceptable solutions are more likely to be found through the machinery of consultation, warning and advice provided by an international agency such as the Fund than as a result of the uncoördinated unilateral action of individual countries.

V

The necessity of some credit arrangements to enable countries to get on their feet economically after the war, and to stay there even if their neighbors start staggering a bit, is, I think, recognized by most students of this subject. The important division of opinion as regards permanent international monetary arrangements lies between those who feel that these credit facilities should be on a pooled basis and those who think that they should

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be bilateral credits extended from one country to another. The most persuasive arguments in favor of the latter course have been put forward by Dr. John H. Williams in two recent articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS in which he argues for what he calls the "key currency" approach to this question. The important contributions which Dr. Williams has made to monetary thought and the obvious goodwill which permeates his approach clearly require that most careful thought be given his proposals.

It would appear that the keystone of the arch in the structure proposed by Dr. Williams is an agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the sterling-dollar rate, supplemented by an undertaking to support this rate by coöperative action in purchasing offerings of each other's currencies and accumulating balances up to agreed amounts. The other currencies would be left to cluster around either sterling or the United States dollar.

I have several misgivings about this approach. In the first place it is difficult to see where the smaller countries fit in. I have an uneasy feeling that the "key currency" approach is the monetary counterpart of the Great Power doctrine of international organization generally. This approach seems to accept, if not to encourage, the splitting up of the world into economic blocs. It implies a sterling area with a group of satellite countries revolving around the United Kingdom and a dollar area with a group of satellites revolving around the United States. The creation of blocs of this sort has in the past involved discrimination in trade as well as in currency matters. Surely the main objective of international monetary organization should be to dismantle and not to perpetuate such arrangements.

Under them, certain countries would fall automatically into one grouping or the other; but there are many others which would not. The "key currency" approach seems, for example, to neglect the importance of gaining the adherence of European countries to the new international monetary code. Europe is an important factor in world trade, both as an importer from many of the countries which might be covered by the sterling-dollar arrangements and as a competitor with them. It would seem unwise to leave these countries, whose financial position will be precarious, to fend for themselves in the hope that they will soon link onto one or other of the major currencies. Without assistance of the kind that could be provided under international auspices — and in this connection, the disinterested expert advice they could

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expect would be just as important as the access to short-term credits — it appears likely that they will go in for rigid exchange controls of a pervasive and discriminatory type. This seems particularly probable in view of the postwar budgetary situation that will prevail in the countries of Europe now occupied by the enemy.

Moreover, the "key currency" approach raises delicate problems regarding the internal relationships of the members of the two major groups. Is it expected, for example, that the United Kingdom will act for the group of satellite countries constituting the sterling area in their relations with the dollar area? That is to say, will the United Kingdom use part of the dollar credits available to her to cover the dollar requirements of the satellite countries, and take over any dollar surpluses the satellite countries may acquire? Or is it contemplated that each of the satellite countries in both the sterling area and the dollar area will make independent currency-holding arrangements with the United States and the United Kingdom respectively?

There are many more inescapable questions. What about the position of the smaller countries which are economic satellites of neither the United States nor the United Kingdom, or which are satellites of both? What about the position of a country like Canada which normally has a surplus of sterling and a deficiency of United States dollars on its current account transactions? Is it expected that Canada will obtain her American dollar requirements from the United Kingdom, explaining what the dollars are needed for (an explanation to which the British would be entitled, since they would be ultimately responsible for the repayment of the dollars)? Or is it expected that Canada would finance the British deficiency of Canadian dollars by accumulating sterling, while the Federal Reserve System or the American Treasury finances the Canadian deficiency of United States dollars by accumulating Canadian dollars? Canada would not be able to offset the one against the other. Or if such offset is in fact contemplated, and if the number of "key" currencies is larger than appears at first sight, then we are back at an international plan.

What, moreover, about the exchange rates of the smaller countries? The underlying thought in the "key currency" approach appears to be that the dollar-sterling rate is the only one that matters: because some countries are small their exchange rates are of minor significance. But must not the importance of an exchange rate be measured by reference to particular commodities? For example, no one would claim that the Canadian

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dollar is a "key currency" in any general sense. But so far as the American wheat states are concerned, the Canadian dollar is in fact a "key" currency, and so is the Argentine peso and so is the Australian pound. If postwar monetary organization were limited to a stabilization of the dollar-sterling rate and Canada or Australia obtained a competitive advantage over American wheat producers by currency depreciation, is it at all likely that the latter would be satisfied with the explanation that these were not "key" currencies? Examples could be repeated at will: so far as bacon producers are concerned the New Zealand pound and the Danish crown are "key" currencies; so far as newsprint producers are concerned the Canadian dollar and the Swedish crown are "key" currencies. What, in the light of this, are the real prospects of monetary stabilization arrangements which are confined to the Great Powers?

The "key currency" approach has been supported in certain banking circles in the United States on the ground that it enables the creditor to choose his debtor and impose pressure on him if he is misusing his credit. I have already stated my reasons for thinking that assured access to credits of specified amounts, on specified conditions, will be needed to make it possible for most countries to adhere to an international monetary system. So far as the pressure is concerned, it is important to bear in mind that the need for temporary credits through the Fund will arise to a considerable extent because some countries are more successful than others in maintaining a high level of employment at home. No one government (and much less a central bank) can with impunity tell another government how far it should push a policy aimed at high employment for its people. True, domestic policies may be so prodigal that comments must be made on them and restrictions placed on further access to credit. In my opinion, this can be done with the least danger and the greatest prospect of success through a group of governments as represented by the Fund.

VI

In the literature on the currency plans, several writers have insisted on the necessity of making a sharp distinction between the balance of payments problems of the transitional period and those of the longer run. For example, Dr. Jacob Viner, in an important and constructive article published last autumn in the *Yale Review*, argues that "the monetary agency to be established should be looked upon as an agency with predominantly routine

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peacetime functions to perform for a stable and orderly world. . . . The emergency salvage and rehabilitation tasks should be left to other agencies specially designed for such purposes. The intermediate and long-term capital needs of non-relief countries should be provided for on non-political, non-usurious and otherwise generous terms, but once more by agencies appropriate for such functions."

The Joint Statement is quite categorical in stating that "the Fund is not intended to provide facilities for relief or reconstruction or to deal with international indebtedness arising out of the war." It says nothing — nor has very much been said elsewhere — about how these transitional problems are to be dealt with. Until some other means have been found of dealing with it, it is obvious that the countries mainly concerned — in particular the United Kingdom — will not be able to afford, out of their own resources, the burden of making their currencies fully convertible on a multilateral basis. The Joint Statement specifically authorizes such countries to maintain exchange regulations of the character which have been in operation during the war, while working toward the multilateral objective.

This escape clause is clearly the least satisfactory feature of the Joint Statement, particularly for a country like Canada whose balance of international payments has the peculiar structure I have referred to. For Canada, multilateral clearing is the chief merit of any form of international monetary organization, and hope for this is now deferred. Nevertheless, I still think it worthwhile to proceed with the creation of the Fund, for two main reasons. First, if we are ever to achieve international monetary coöperation we must reach agreement while the atmosphere is relatively favorable. Countries have become used to working together closely during the war. It will require less psychological adjustment to extend these close wartime relationships for peacetime purposes now than would be required five or ten years after the war has ended.

Secondly, I feel that even the degree to which the Joint Statement pledges various countries to work as rapidly as their circumstances permit toward the goal of multilateral clearing makes it a commitment worth having. In the United Kingdom, which is obviously the most important country that may have to use the "escape provisions" of the transitional period, there are important sections of opinion which are prepared to write off, for the time being, the possibilities of reconstructing a genuine world

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trading and monetary system and which favor a form of sterling area isolationism. This appears to me the essence of the view recently expressed in a series of articles, "The Principles of Trade," in the influential London *Economist*. It is interesting to note, however, that the authors were so impressed with the magic of words that they characterized their proposals as "multilateral," and invented a new word "omnilateral" to describe the type of trading and currency arrangements that are ordinarily thought of as multilateral.

The virtue of going ahead with the international monetary plan at once is that every country's flag would thereby be nailed firmly to the mast of genuine multilateralism and that the responsibility for creating conditions which permit all to accept the plan's objectives would be pooled. Unless commitments are given now, and unless joint procedures for meeting the problems of the transition period are worked out at once, it seems almost inevitable that bilateral or "plurilateral" techniques adopted in the immediate postwar period to meet transitional balance of payments difficulties will turn out to be of very long duration. And it seems all too likely that they will engender the frictions that soon spread from the economic to the political plane. One would feel more comfortable if constructive plans for dealing with the balance of payments problems of the transition period were as far advanced as the international monetary proposals.

If the monetary plan is to work, it will have to be paralleled by agreement on commercial policy, international long-term investment and other aspects of international economic policy. Perfect harmony will not be reached; but it would, I think, be a mistake to put the monetary proposals into operation in an international economic setting so adverse that the prospects of successful operation were remote. An early breakdown would discredit the whole idea of international collaboration. The monetary plan should be regarded as only one part of an integrated program. For many reasons, it is a convenient starting place, and great encouragement can be derived from the wide measure of agreement which has been reached. This agreement is limited to experts and as yet involves no government commitment, but it provides a firm basis for discussion of relevant problems. One can only hope that the approach to the other problems, such as commercial policy, international investment and the specific difficulties of the transition period, will be as constructive and realistic as the proposals for an International Monetary Fund.

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THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS

By Edward S. Mason

THE word "cartel" is enjoying an extraordinary and somewhat curious vogue in the United States. Its meaning, like that of many more or less technical words adopted for popular use, has become more vague while at the same time becoming more portentous. And the overtones are definitely sinister. If international finance is somehow more to be feared than the domestic variety, how much more so is this true of international cartels. People either are for cartels or against them. Very little of the recent literature is devoted to careful description or cool appraisal of their activities. Those opposed have relied on such words as conspiracy, monopoly, Fascism and treason; while, on the other side, people like Lord McGowan of Imperial Chemical Industries describe cartels as a means of assuring orderly marketing, planned expansion of international trade, elimination of cutthroat practices and all that is admirable and reasonable. It must be said that the anti-cartel people have been much more successful than the pro-cartel people in getting their favorite connotations accepted, at least in this country.

Cartels, in the narrow and proper sense of the term, are agreements between firms in the same branch of trade limiting the freedom of these firms in the production and marketing of their products. Cartel agreements aim typically at the restriction of output or sales by the member firms, at an allocation of market territories and a fixing of the price of products. Such restrictive agreements are, of course, illegal between firms engaged in domestic trade in the United States. But American firms can form export associations which, on occasion, have entered into international cartel arrangements with associations or firms in other countries. These American export associations are formed under the Webb-Pomerene law, which contains certain limitations now being tested in a series of anti-trust cases.

As stated by Wendell Berge, present Chief of the Anti-trust Division, export associations are not permitted under the Webb law to enter into international agreements which, "(a) restrain trade within the United States; or (b) restrain the export trade of any domestic competitor or association; or (c) enhance or depress prices within the United States, substantially lessen

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competition within the United States, or otherwise restrain trade therein." Despite these limitations, American firms have in a number of cases entered into full-fledged international cartels fixing prices and allocating markets. Unless the Webb-Pomerene law is more strictly enforced, they may be expected to enter such cartels still more extensively in the postwar period.

Although cartel, in the strict sense of the word, means a marketing agreement between private firms, in current usage its meaning has been greatly broadened. It is used to include patent and process exchange agreements between firms in different countries, such as those consummated with foreign interests by DuPont, Standard Oil, and International General Electric. Frequently, patent exchange arrangements contain marketing agreements; indeed, the market agreements may be the real reason for exchange of patents and processing knowledge. This type of cartel arrangement is, perhaps, the one which primarily concerns American firms. Since, however, the market control features depend mainly on the patent rights which are exchanged, the nature and extent of the restrictions on international trade which they involve become technical patent questions which it is not our purpose to discuss here. The phrase international cartels is also interpreted to include joint ownership of foreign affiliates by potential competitors, *e.g.*, the Latin American Duperial companies jointly owned by DuPont and Imperial Chemical Industries.

International cartels are sometimes formed under governmental auspices and with government participation; indeed some of the best-known — most notorious, if you will — international cartels have been negotiated by governments. This was true of the prewar tin and rubber cartels. Government-owned enterprises also frequently participate in what are, in other respects, private international cartels. As government participation increases — as it may well do in the postwar period — the international cartel, which in its pure form is an agreement between private firms, takes on the character of an international commodity agreement. The United States Government has entered into commodity agreements for wheat and coffee; agricultural interests are pressing for broader participation after the war. If other governments sponsor and participate in international cartels in industrial materials and manufactured products, not only will a considerable part of the international trade of the world be brought under a high degree of commodity control, but the distinction between

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cartels and commodity agreements will become progressively less meaningful.

Before proceeding to a consideration of some of the problems which a policy toward cartels must take into account, two facts bearing on the formation of cartels should be emphasized: first, that most of the important international cartels have arisen out of situations in which it could be plausibly argued that a serious lack of balance existed between productive capacity and current consumption of the products in question; and second, that a functioning international cartel has usually required the effective prior "organization" of producers in the domestic market.

The formation of international cartels in rubber, tin, nitrates, steel and many other important products was preceded by situations in the participating countries which politically important producing interests considered unsatisfactory. Productive capacity was greater than the world market could absorb at prices sufficient to maintain the producers in the style to which they had become accustomed. In some cases the number of workers employed was large, and falling world market prices had seriously influenced wage rates. In others the exports in question were heavily relied on for government revenues and foreign exchange. When producing groups are confronted with declining or inadequate markets, they turn naturally to methods of controlling output and price. If private action proves inadequate, appeal is made to the state; and if the producers are politically influential, it usually is not made in vain.

Relief from excess capacity may be provided by limiting imports, either directly or by protective tariff, by export bounties, by production subsidies, and in many other ways. Among these other ways is the formation of an international cartel which will "adjust supply to demand" (*i.e.* restrict output), which will provide for "orderly distribution" (*i.e.* allocate market territories) and which will "stabilize prices" (*i.e.* raise prices). In the postwar period, partly as a result of war-expanded output, we may expect to be confronted by excess capacity in many countries and on a large scale. The only successful remedies will be the maintenance of a high level of income in the principal countries of the world and a shift from these industries to others. Yet we may expect other remedies to be suggested, including restriction of imports, export subsidies and international cartels with or without government participation.

This will be particularly true in countries in which domestic

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industries are already well organized or, if one prefers another term which is almost a synonym, monopolized. The members of international cartels are ordinarily either very large firms controlling a predominant share of the export of the cartellized product from a given country, or associations including the principal exporters of such products. Restriction of output or exports, a typical cartel activity, frequently requires an allocation of the restricted quantities between the member firms. If such allocation is to be effective, it may require control measures by the export associations. Unless export business is completely separated from domestic production, effective cartellization for exports is difficult without considerable control of the domestic market. English participation in the European steel cartel, for example, was impracticable as long as the tradition of competition between steel producers ruled the domestic market; and when English exporters were finally brought into the cartel, this action was accompanied by a substantial cartellization of the domestic market, at government insistence.

Extensive American participation in cartels would likewise presumably require a considerable measure of coöperation between firms in the domestic market. But since the United States is rather enthusiastically committed to an anti-trust policy at home, such participation appears unlikely, at least in those industries in which exporting firms are not only numerous but also engaged in production for the domestic market. Our antipathy to monopoly, however, is not shared by other countries. Many European countries will look favorably on international cartels, along with import restrictions, export bounties and other measures, as a means of coping with excess production.

II

A discussion of the effects of international cartels may fairly center on the following three aspects of cartel practice: (1) *Trade barriers*. Cartels are said to involve privately imposed limitations on the free flow of commodities of international trade. (2) *Security*. The participation of American firms in international cartel arrangements is alleged to have involved restriction of the production and development of products and processes necessary to the war effort, and the use of American connections for enemy espionage purposes. (3) *Political*. International cartels are said to promote a relationship between private enterprise and the state which may involve the use of the power of the state to further the

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purposes of private interests, and the use by the state of business enterprises as instrumentalities of public policy.

There are also various cartel problems which might be treated under the general heading "economic warfare." International cartel connections have posed certain difficulties for blacklisting and other economic warfare policies, due to ambiguities of ownership and the mobility of assets involved in such connections. But these problems are not limited to cartels and will not be of much significance in the postwar period.

Cartels as trade barriers. There can be little doubt that international cartels on the whole restrict the total volume of world trade and divert its channels. Their primary purpose being to restrict the freedom of participating firms and associations to compete on the world markets, they would not long continue to exist if prices and outputs were not more satisfactory to participating members than they would be if competition were unrestrained. Instances are numerous in which tariff reductions have not produced an expected increase in imports because market allocations by cartels have prevented foreign producers from selling outside of assigned territory. On occasion, it is true, cartel restrictions may have increased the total volume of world trade. High cartel prices have frequently brought productive capacity into the market, as well as a greater volume of exports than would have otherwise existed. If an international cartel prevents the installation of domestic productive capacity by threatening to cut prices in a particular country, imports into that country may be maintained and, along with them, world trade. This result has been achieved on more than one occasion in Latin American countries. Such expansion of trade, however, is not likely to be adduced as a merit of cartellization.

The influence of cartels on the diversion of trade from normal competitive channels is undoubtedly greater than is their influence on the total volume of trade. International cartellization tends to divide the world into spheres of commercial influence by allocating to the nationals of particular countries exclusive selling rights — apart from outsiders — in specific territory. In cartel arrangements American firms are normally assigned the United States market, sometimes the whole of North America and, on occasion, parts of South America. British firms have special claims to Empire territory. In the period before the war, the growing strength of German firms in a number of cartels won them increasingly large areas of European territory. In the period

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between the wars, mandated areas were frequently reserved by cartel agreement to the firms of the country holding the mandate.

Although, in general, international cartels tend to restrict the volume of world trade, it does not necessarily follow that restriction is in all cases undesirable nor that, under the competitive conditions facing American firms, American participation in such cartels would lessen our foreign trade.

After the war, an international security organization may restrict the exports of strategic materials to the nations recently guilty of aggression. If so, a fairly serious restraint of foreign trade will be involved. Unrestricted competition between the nationals of various countries may lead to the rapid exhaustion or the wasteful exploitation of irreplaceable resources. If so, the case for regulation and restriction will be a strong one. In some branches of commerce which have the character of a public utility, such as shipping, air transport and international communications, competition between the nationals of the countries concerned is not likely to produce desirable results, and agreements limiting the freedom of the competing interests are probably necessary. The immediate postwar period will see a number of industries expanded beyond the needs of civilian consumption. Temporary control of international competition pending a conversion of facilities and a shift of manpower into other employment is perhaps desirable.

Are private cartels the appropriate restricting and regulating agency in areas of foreign trade in which a restriction of competition may serve broader interests than those of the producers immediately involved? If an international agreement restricting trade is necessary in the public interest of several states, the agreement should presumably be consummated by public bodies rather than private business enterprises. The word "presumably" is used advisedly, since the intervention of the state in foreign trade introduces a possibility of political conflict which may be more dangerous to the maintenance of peace than conflict between private cartel interests. The other side of the picture is that a tradition of governmental agreements on specific and relatively minor matters is probably a necessary prelude to broader international agreements on the vital questions of war and peace.

It does not follow that because international cartels restrict trade American participation in them will restrict American trade. Where a goodly part of world trade had already been cartellized, it has been argued, American participation would be

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necessary in order to maintain or increase our exports. It is said that by local price cutting, monopolization of distributing outlets and other practices, some fair, some unfair, foreign cartels can effectively deny certain foreign markets to certain American products, whereas if American firms were members of the cartel, access to these markets would be secure. This argument is difficult to document and, on its face, not very plausible. High cartel prices abroad offer excellent competitive opportunities to American enterprise, and cartel practices have in all probability resulted in the loss of more business to American competition than they have gained.

A more serious danger to our exports rests in the influence which foreign cartels on occasion exert on the governments of their national participants. Through this influence, tariff barriers may be raised against our products and our exports impeded by other forms of state action. While American participation in international cartels might lessen these barriers, the price would probably be a smaller share of the foreign market than might be won by outright competition. Moreover, it is within the power of the American Government to deal with trade barriers by the usual international bargaining processes. There is, however, truth in the contention that if the trade of the rest of the world is cartellized and our own exporters excluded from cartel participation, we shall purchase our imports at monopoly prices and sell our exports on world markets at competitive prices. The "terms of trade," in technical language, may be turned against us by foreign cartel activities. Again, however, this is probably a matter to be handled through the bargaining powers of the American Government.

In general, it may be said that private cartel restrictions constitute a definite type of trade barrier, that the seriousness of this trade barrier is greatly increased by government support of cartel practices, and that neither world trade nor American trade is likely to be increased through American participation in cartels, regardless of how widespread are cartel ramifications in other countries.

Security Aspects of Cartels. The fierce light of Congressional investigation and anti-trust prosecution has recently beaten on certain American firms which in the prewar years entered into patents and processing arrangements, mainly with German firms, involving market agreements extending considerably beyond legitimate patent rights. The committee hearings and the anti-

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trust prosecutions have been surrounded by effective publicity, and the implications of the agreements have, in consequence, lost nothing in the telling. Out of the facts revealed (the most complete compilation is in the Bone Committee reports) have grown various generalizations, ranging from a description of the American participants as dupes and their firms as cogs in a "German master plan" to a characterization of international cartels as essentially Fascist institutions. There evidently has been no doubt in the minds of the accusers that American participation in international cartels is highly dangerous to American security.

Anti-trust cases against American firms whose agreements with German firms hampered their freedom to develop or produce useful war materials were effective in eliminating these restraints and thereby releasing American production. The much-publicized cases of magnesium, beryllium, military optical instruments and synthetic rubber are too well known to require further comment. Whether the patents and processing agreements between American and German firms have, on balance, hampered American war production, is, however, an open question. To answer it we would need to know the value of the technical knowledge disclosed by each side to the other and the uses to which this knowledge has been put. To date only one side of this story has been told. There can be little doubt that the Nazi Government exercised much more careful supervision over the disclosure of technical knowledge having potential military usefulness than did the American Government; and it is clear that on occasion the disclosure of information to American firms was accompanied by restrictions framed with an eye to the military ends of the Nazi state. It would be very difficult for the American Government to exercise that degree of supervision without a pretty serious alteration of our political and economic traditions. No doubt the exchange of technical information by American firms holding important Army and Navy contracts will have to be scrutinized more carefully in the future, but it is more than doubtful whether the exclusion of these firms from an international exchange of patents and processing knowledge, even of the prewar type, would benefit this country either in war or in peace.

International cartel connections have been used by nationals of our present enemies for espionage purposes and, particularly in Latin America, for political propaganda and psychological warfare. It is hard to see, however, that these activities raise questions peculiar to cartels. Foreign affiliates and foreign agencies

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can and do serve much the same purpose. The intimate relations between nationals of different countries involved in the exchange of laboratory and processing information may be peculiarly suited to such purposes; but these arrangements do not necessarily involve participation in cartels.

There is, of course, a widely spread doctrine that the foreign economic interests of monopoly capitalists are a primary source of war and that, since the interests of such capitalists are frequently served through international cartels, cartels must be in some sense a menace to peace. "The internationalism of international cartels is the most dangerous type of internationalism." In so far as cartel participants enlist the support of their respective governments, thus bringing the interests of the state into what would otherwise be the concern of private enterprise, there may be some truth in this thesis. The danger, however, lies primarily in substituting state conflict for the conflict of private interests, not in the attempt of business interests to lessen international competition by private cartel agreements.

One of the most ominous attempts of organized business groups to obtain state support for international restrictive arrangements — an attempt which, had it succeeded, would almost certainly have produced extreme international friction — was the Düsseldorf discussion undertaken by the leading British and German industrial associations shortly before the war. A joint communiqué declared: "Both organizations are fully aware that the advantages of agreements between the industries of two countries or of two regions could be frustrated by the uneconomic competition of the industry of another country refusing to join the agreement. In such cases it might become necessary for the organization to ask for the *support of its government.* Both organizations agree to ask for such support if the need arises."

Political Aspects of International Cartels. Examples are not lacking in the use of international cartel connections to avoid legitimate obligations to government, such as the payment of customs duties and compliance with domestic legislation and administrative rulings. But the important political questions have to do with state action in the interests of cartel participants and the use by the state of the cartel as an instrument of public policy.

The American Government, in keeping with the strong American anti-trust tradition, has pursued a policy of dealing at arm's length with business associations both in domestic and foreign

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trade. Its attitude in this has been unique among industrial nations. The British Government went very far in prewar years in encouraging business control of output and prices in the domestic market and the participation of British industries in international cartels through export associations. State assistance in the formation of cartels and the policing of cartel regulations was a common feature of continental industry and governmental support in international cartel negotiations had become almost standard practice.

The granting of tariff protection to increase the bargaining position of their nationals in cartel quota allocations was a regular policy of many European governments. As Sir Alfred Mond, organizer of the British Imperial Chemical Industries, observed: "In negotiation, the man behind the tariff wall always has something with which to bargain, which the man in the Free Trade country has not. Anyone who has had practical experience of bargaining with continental producers knows that the first thing they say is: 'You cannot export to our country, because we have a tariff. How much of your market are you going to give us?'"

Cartel participants have also solicited government help in enforcing domestic cartel regulations and in negotiating more effective international agreements. Private efforts to cartellize the production and export of tin and rubber were ineffectual; only the coöperation of the governments of the principal producing areas made the attempts successful.

For these reasons, and because of increasing public awareness of the character of the trade barriers imposed by cartel regulations, it is probable that if there is an expansion of international cartellization in the postwar period it will take place under the sponsorship and regulation of governments. Within this framework the term "regulation" should not be taken too seriously. The experience of European governments in the regulation of cartels is both extensive and unhappy. Government sponsorship of cartels would, no doubt, impose limitations on private action. Publicity might be required, and the grosser forms of restrictive practice forbidden. But there is no reason to expect effective regulation of cartel output and price policies in the interests of groups broader than those composed of cartel members. On the basis of experience there is every reason not to expect it. Governments will sponsor and regulate cartels with an eye to the expansion of the exports of their nationals. The more important foreign trade interests are in the economy of a country, the more actively govern-

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ment will support cartels and the less it will consider anything other than export interests when it does so.

This conclusion is further supported by the behavior of those government-owned firms which participated in essentially private international cartels in the period between the wars. Government-owned aluminum, timber, nitrogen, potash and phosphate producing or exporting enterprises joined in all the restrictive practices pursued by the cartels of which they were members.

As governments penetrate into cartel activities, private controls are not only in part circumscribed but cartel arrangements become available to the state as vehicles of foreign policy. In the mercantile period many foreign trading companies were semi-political in character. The British Government accomplished through the East India and the Levant companies tasks which, in the nineteenth century, were the sole prerogative of state officials. There is considerable evidence that semi-public cartels engaged in foreign trade may come to fulfill similar purposes: mention has already been made of the use by the Nazis of German cartel connections to attain various military objectives. Cartels, moreover, have been one of the important instrumentalities in the integration of European industry under German control during the last four years.

If, in the postwar period, limited world supplies of strategic materials are to be produced and allocated by cartels with government participation, private interests are likely to be overshadowed by government security considerations. Likewise, spheres of political influence in Europe and elsewhere will affect the scope and function of cartel activities.

The inter-penetration of government and business in foreign trade activities creates problems which are likely to be serious to this country. More, perhaps, in the United States than in any other country, business has remained private and public affairs have been carried on by public officials. Nor is our form of government well adapted to a flexible inter-relationship of public and private interests in foreign affairs. It would be well for us to recognize that the trend of events abroad appears quite definitely in the direction of greater state participation in all forms of foreign economic activity.

III

The prospects for a liberal foreign trade policy in the postwar period, including the reduction of private as well as public trade

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barriers, depend primarily on two conditions: the emergence of effective security coöperation among the Great Powers, and the orientation of domestic economic policies in the direction of full employment. Effective coöperation among, at least, the Great Powers is a necessary condition. The competition for supplies of strategic materials which would ensue in a world split into spheres of influence would in itself be sufficient to blast any chances of a liberal policy in foreign trade.

But international coöperation is not enough. Domestic economic policies designed to promote reasonably full employment of resources are a *sine qua non* for a liberal solution. It was the depression of the thirties which produced that array of protective tariffs, exchange controls, quantitative limitations, currency depreciation, export subsidies and restrictions through cartels which by the end of the decade had put international economic relations in a strait jacket. Prolonged depression in the postwar period would maintain all the old restrictions and no doubt add new ones.

Government policy toward cartels is part and parcel of foreign economic policy. What is done in the cartel field will be dependent on what can be accomplished in other areas. If an effective international security organization and sensible domestic economic policies develop, it may be possible by international agreement to get rid of the more restrictive types of international cartel practice along with other barriers to foreign trade. In the imposed terms of a peace settlement there are also chances of important alterations in the European cartel structure which centered in Germany. It must be remembered, however, that such measures are not likely to be successful unless they conform to the long-run economic interests of the countries affected.

At this stage of affairs both the political and economic interests of the United States run so strongly in the direction of a liberal foreign policy that the appropriate attitude toward international cartels may be said to be predetermined. The fact that this attitude also conforms to a long-established anti-monopoly tradition gives assurance that this aspect of a liberal foreign policy will probably have stronger domestic support than some others. We should realize, however, that if international events and domestic policies defeat the possibilities of a liberal international trade, then we may be confronted with the necessity of changing our attitude toward cartels rather drastically.

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ORDER IN OIL

By Herbert Feis

ONLY a short time ago the atmosphere in which international petroleum affairs were being discussed was highly charged. The violent thunderstorm which centered about the proposed trans-Arabian pipeline cast an eerie darkness over the whole panorama of our foreign relations. Now, happily, the weather has improved to a gentle drizzle, and a ruminative walk among the issues will not be unpleasant.

The pipeline project itself appears to be in suspense. While the military branches of the Government still favor a line from the Arabian peninsula to the Mediterranean as of use in case the war in Europe should be prolonged, they do not appear to be insisting that it is immediately essential. The fact that we would have to establish a new refinery on the Mediterranean if we were to use the crude oil products of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in battle has set farther forward the date at which the pipeline could make a military contribution. The companies which have agreed in principle to construct it have promised a Senate Committee not to proceed with the undertaking until the Committee has had the chance to pronounce its views. The conversations between the Petroleum Reserves Corporation and the companies looking toward the signature of a formal agreement are at a halt.

The mission sent here by the British Government has come and gone without having changed a comma in the commercial or diplomatic arrangements that obstruct the undertaking. The conferees unrolled a larger map, on which the Middle East was but a single point of interest at which their attention did not pause for long. The only press release thus far issued reports merely that the two groups reviewed specific matters of mutual interest, including "the proposed trans-Arabian pipeline," and that "the group shared the view that the peacetime intergovernmental aspects of such matters should be resolved as between the two Governments, and within the framework of the broad principles which had been discussed." Still, it would be an error to believe that the pipeline project has been sent to the archives on the fourth floor of the State Department from which only heroes ever rescue documents. In London, it is my surmise, those agreements that stand in the way of the development of American oil enterprise in the Middle East are now being fingered by re-

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flective officials. In Washington the president of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation is not given easily to relinquishing a cause that has once gained his support.

Though the conversations did not dispose of the pipeline project, they have improved the atmosphere and enlarged the field of understanding and agreements so that a mutually satisfactory disposition of the matter can be attained eventually. They brought into the open the fears of certain American oil interests regarding British designs on their properties, and evoked a joint examination of recent actions that had been interpreted as evidence of evil intention. A sense of common business was born and the right of future question and answer established — which should help to prevent the resurgence of suspicion. Reciprocally, the British were able to test for themselves the intentions and purposes which had sped up the current of American interest in the Middle East, and in turn gained reassurance that they carried no threat to the British political position.

The danger that the two Governments might enter upon a protracted struggle over the respective advantages acquired by their nationals in oil and other commodities in the Middle East is much diminished. There is in the making an understanding which will prevent differences of opinions regarding oil from becoming the object of rough-and-tumble diplomacy. If the two Governments must continue to argue about their respective rights and opportunities, they at least will keep their tempers and their reason. Their behavior will be subject to agreed rules and principles; and they are to settle their difficulties in the conference room and not in the arena, where surprise punches are approved and hoarse shouts pass for judgment.

Further, the discussions have produced a calmer and more complete understanding of the petroleum supply position of the United States, of the place of Middle Eastern oil in the whole world petroleum supply position, and of the economic and political complexities which arise in connection with the development of the resources of the area. The education which has been acquired, both by the public and by officials, will greatly aid toward a mutually satisfactory fulfillment of both American and British aims.

Finally, the discussions have produced a heightened recognition on the part of all American and British interests concerned that their control over so great a part of all the world's petroleum resources carries an international responsibility. They soon came

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to recognize that the policies adopted to govern the development of these resources must represent more than an adjustment between contending American and British interests. It was seen that the task lying ahead requires that the peoples in the producing areas be assured of receiving equitable, nay generous, consideration of their interests; and that all nations dependent on sources of supply outside their own boundaries be assured that they would be available in ample quantity, at low cost, and on substantially equal terms. The conferees were compelled, and the Governments in the future will be compelled, to take this responsibility seriously.

An attempt was made to formulate the basic principles which simultaneously might reconcile the interests of the participants and satisfy their responsibility toward other countries. It thus becomes of interest to follow the traces of reasoning and policy that have been revealed. These should have significance not only in the petroleum field but in other raw material fields that seem likely to require international attention.

II

The text of the agreement reached at the conference has been withheld from publication pending approval by the two Governments. The discussion of the matters that claimed, or should have claimed, attention must therefore be somewhat conjectural. However, the well-established character of the matters at issue, the statements to the press and the circumambient reports that come to an interested observer lend confidence to surmise.

One of the first questions discussed was the belief of each party that the other at times tried to hinder or exclude its oil enterprises from obtaining new concessions or extending those already acquired. At the end of the last war, the American Government rather flatly charged the British Government and British oil combinations with seeking exclusive opportunity in certain Middle Eastern regions and in the Netherlands East Indies. The British interests have felt that the United States sometimes attempted to do the same in Latin America. More recently the dissatisfaction has centered upon the restrictions accepted by the American oil companies as a necessary condition of obtaining a share in certain oil-bearing territories of the Middle East, and the doubt whether they will be admitted for exploratory work in the colonies and dependent parts of the British and French empires.

The conferees agreed to support a policy of "equal opportu-

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nity." All the oil interests represented were drawn together by a common anxiety: the spreading disposition of foreign governments to exclude *all* foreign enterprise and to transform all branches of the native oil industry into government monopolies. The oft-repeated denials of any monopolistic intention by both the British and American Governments translated itself into support for what in the United States has become known as the Open Door policy. This would presumably mean the application of some rule of equality of opportunity.

If the two Governments would jointly sponsor this rule before the other governments of the world, general benefit would result. It would lessen envy and recrimination. It would bring supporting credence to the idea that colonies and dependent areas were not administered to the exclusive advantage of the controlling country. It would improve the prospect of obtaining a place in the world market for every country possessing oil resources. Since American enterprise and British enterprise, by virtue of their technical competence and financial strength, have a commanding lead in petroleum exploitation and development, the realm of their joint interest would expand.

Anyone who expects universal acceptance of the doctrine of equal opportunity is doomed to disappointment. The record clearly indicates, for example, that the U.S.S.R. feels no need of, and sees no benefit in, permitting foreign private oil enterprise to share in the development of its oil resources. Those Latin American countries that have committed their resources or prospects into the hands of a national government monopoly are not likely to change their course until or unless their experience proves disappointing and their trust and liking for foreign enterprise is renewed. To what extent, if any, the authorities of the French, Belgian and Portuguese empires will accept the conception of equality of opportunity there is no present indication. The immediate area of application would appear to be in the territories ruled by the United States, the lands of the British Commonwealth and Empire, the territories of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the small but most important Arab states of the Middle East, and those Latin American countries which remain agreeable to sharing their economic destinies with outside enterprise. These areas include most of the important proven sources of oil supply.

In application, the rule would have to be shaped to the requirements of security, local order and social economic welfare.

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Each country will be justifiably reluctant to admit the enterprise of any country suspected of unfriendly intentions. In uncertain situations where political strain exists between the governed and the governors the presence of important foreign interests might not be tolerable. There will be instances where the development of oil is so integral a part of some broader program of local development that it cannot be shared between diverse groups. All these and many other varieties of circumstance will require recognition. Even when the door is open callers will be expected to come well introduced and at convenient hours, to behave themselves properly, to abstain from causing trouble in the family, and to leave when no longer welcome.

But it will not be these limitations of circumstance that will chiefly delay fulfillment of the conception of equality of opportunity. The greatest deterrent will be fears lest it create unmanageable disturbances in established currents of the petroleum trade and result at times in a marked excess of supply over effective demand, thus depressing prices, bankrupting weaker producers, causing the shutdown of poorer fields not yet fully utilized, and resulting in widespread loss to the whole oil industry. These fears have an important place in the minds of oil-producing interests when faced with any proposal that the restraints upon opportunities for exploration and production be rudely lifted. They explain why proposals for ending certain existing restraints inevitably become linked — as they did in the recent American-British discussions — with suggestions for a program of orderly adjustment of production to demand.

It may be surmised that suggestions looking to that end occupied more than a minor place in the recent discussions. Proposals for further substantially increasing Middle Eastern production — whether by construction of the trans-Arabian pipeline or through removal of present restrictive accords — immediately met the question as to how they would fit into the future world supply and demand situation. To the Petroleum Reserves Corporation and other branches of the American Government with which the proposal originated, the primary consideration was the advisability of expanding foreign sources of supply in order better to safeguard future American reserves. To other governments concerned, and to many of the oil interests, the problem is whether this should be achieved at their expense. All who have a stake in other oil-producing properties, whether in Iran or Texas, in Venezuela or Borneo, seek to visualize how the increased flow of

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Middle Eastern oil will affect their present and their future. Their view is that the development of Middle Eastern oil production must be accommodated to all other elements in the oil production situation, and that the solution must be found in some world-wide program of coördinated production.

Thus the question of what form a world-wide scheme of production regulation should take arose out of the mists of discussion, was granted existence and was put aside for further consideration. The press release conveys only the meager information that "in a spirit of understanding and consideration, the two groups explored the full range of both countries' interests in petroleum and the basis of broad principles looking to the orderly long-range development of abundant oil supplies." Even granted that the exploration remained primarily in the realm of the "spirit," we probably are safe in concluding that some attempts were made to materialize the spirit and we are justified in reviewing the main methods of materialization with which students of the economic occult have grown familiar.

There are influential advocates of an international petroleum agreement like the agreements that have operated in other commodity fields such as rubber, sugar and coffee. All such suggestions contemplate the allocation, in one way or another, of total demand among the producing sources. Usually they also provide that the total supply allotted for export shall be regulated primarily with a view to maintaining price within an agreed range. There is clear recognition by most of the proponents of such allocation schemes that their program would be acceptable (if at all) only subject to genuine international control and administration. An adequate examination of the application of any such program in the petroleum field would require many pages; and in addition might suggest that it received more serious consideration in the recent conferences than anyone would consider likely. My summary opinion is that there is virtually no chance that an allocation scheme could be negotiated. Among the many difficulties that negotiators would face is the strong wish of almost all producing areas to proceed unhindered with development; the uneven impact of an agreement upon the financial interests engaged in oil production; the inadequacies of knowledge regarding reserves; unexpected tides in the flow of different fields; and the recurrence of important new discoveries. In short, it would be too formal and too confining a dress for so acrobatic a branch of production as the oil industry. Besides, the only

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possible basis of negotiation would almost inevitably be one that enabled the poorer fields to survive and thereby burden the consumer and unwisely restrict development.

One type of allocation proposal has won influential support within the American petroleum industry — namely, that countries combine in a program of production control based on the principle of conservation. The formula is attractive because of the desirability of avoiding waste of a vital resource which may prove scarce and because of the possibility that it might furnish a simple basis for setting the level of production for each producing area. The conservation purpose is sound and deserves consideration both in the individual and combined policies of nations. But it would not provide a satisfactory basis for international arrangements for the coördination or regulation of petroleum production. The rate at which supplies should be withdrawn from under the ground in order to be most highly useful would certainly differ greatly as between different oil-bearing structures; no identical fractional formula would fit them all. Incentive for conservation would also differ greatly as between countries. For example, a small country interested only in revenue from exports would almost necessarily take a different view of the question than a large Power which might find possession of adequate domestic supplies a deciding factor in its military position in time of crisis. Again, the volume of production that might be set by estimates of conservation requirements might at any given time accord badly with the market position. For these and other reasons a world accord of the character suggested would be too rigid, would be inadequate and would likely become a disguise for the fulfilment of other purposes.

The Interstate Oil Compact under which American states set quotas for producing properties within their jurisdiction is suggested as the model and criterion. This Compact has been administered partly with a view to making better use of American oil resources than was the case in earlier periods of great waste; and it has helped greatly to reduce the loss of oil in the ground. Furthermore, its economic consequences have proven acceptable to both producers and public. But experience does not establish that it could serve as a model for an international agreement. Chance has favored its operations. The restrictions on production that were imposed in the years after its introduction in order to end wasteful practices coincided with an oversupply; and when the restrictions began to pinch, the expanding demands of

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war brought relief. The subject merits further examination. During the period when the Compact was in operation great changes have been made in the permissible rate of withdrawal within states. Whether these reflect true conservation requirements, and only such requirements, and whether their general correspondence to variations in the market situation and the price of oil are just coincidental, are subjects that might well attract some curious master of the slide rule and the technique of statistical correlation.

The summary conclusion may be ventured that any kind of hard-and-fast international agreement for the regulation of supply should be avoided. A modest and guarded approach will be well advised. The subject may now await the creation of some international board, as visualized in the recent discussions. Such a board might begin by making thorough studies of the prospective supply and requirements outlook, from which producers and governments would be asked to draw their own conclusions. Perhaps the board could also help to bring common sense and a feeling of equity and a talent for bargaining into fuller use, the better to guide producers during an emergency of over or undersupply. Then, perhaps, where the task is to satisfy some powerful wish for a new development (such as the American wish for development in the Middle East), it might undertake to effect an understanding between the interests most directly concerned. In short, the method that recommends itself for the international coördination of production is continuous consultation, guided by agreed principles and carried into effect by the informal acceptance of those who control the main sources of supply, under the gaze of governments combined in council.

Any attempt at the international coördination of production will win approval only if it satisfies, as far as practicable, the wish of all nations for "equality of access" to produced supply. This was recognized in the recent conversations. The beam of desire that expresses itself in the conception of equality of access is really two intermingled beams — first, that there should be ample and inexpensive supplies and, second, that the terms on which they are available shall be as favorable as those enjoyed by any other country. Both are natural and just; and it is incumbent upon all oil-producing countries and interests to heed them. But risk of misunderstanding will be lessened if it is recognized that there are limitations on the possibility of this. Countries will almost certainly wish to reserve a prior right to

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supplies produced in their own territories. This is a right which must be granted, but which wise nations will not use except when essential to national security; if the total world supply is ample, few are likely to be tempted to do so. A country will likewise reserve the right to control exports of petroleum for reasons of political policy. Certainly there was no ground for reproach against the United States, for example, when finally it checked shipments to Japan; and its control of exports in order to compel Spain to reduce her assistance to the Axis needs no justification. In brief, application of the idea of equality of access will necessarily be limited by considerations of security and political policy until such time as the organization of international peace has advanced far enough for nations to be able to trust its efficacy.

These reflections apply to the production of oil within national territories. The problem of access to oil supplies controlled by the interests of one country in the territories of another country raises additional queries. Would producing interests be bound to sell to all applicants at the well or at the end of the pipeline rather than to reserve the available supply for their own distributing facilities? For example, would the rule require that the tankers of all nations have an equal claim to the oil of Saudi Arabia delivered by pipeline to the Mediterranean? Or could the producing companies reserve it for their own transport and distribution systems? Or again, would the rule require that an oil company engaged in production in a foreign land refuse to obey the orders of the local government in regard to the sales of its product if those orders would result in discrimination? These queries are propounded in order to indicate the patient reasoning that will be required in order to establish the rule of equality of access in its proper place in the living body of international economic practice and agreement — whether in the petroleum or in other commodity fields. Discovery of the right answers will take much longer than the formulation of the questions. The international organization visualized in the American-British recommendations will afford the chance for a vigorous beginning.

Confronted with the three questions just noted — how to secure equality of opportunity, the satisfactory adjustment of oil supply and needs, and equality of access to produced oil supplies — governments and oil producers will find that they are called upon to deal with every difference of interest that exists in international life. If they solve them successfully they will have registered a great triumph in international economic living.

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III

The making of a vow is pleasant. But to take decisions in execution of the vow when they bring powerful interests into rough friction is uncomfortable. There has now been created a basis of understanding for the resolution of those differences regarding petroleum matters which threatened to infect all American-British relations and to spread disturbance throughout the Middle East. But the task of actually finding a satisfactory settlement of the questions that gave birth to the pipeline project remains. By what steps and on what terms can the production of oil in the Middle East be most vigorously carried forward? More particularly, how and on what terms will American enterprises in the Middle East be enabled to proceed with the task of developing their production, less hindered by restrictive engagements and inadequate distribution arrangements?

These questions are rendered more troublesome by the fact that in the *immediate* postwar period the supplies available from fields already developed in the Middle East may be sufficient for, if not in excess of, the natural market demand. Measures which have been taken are expected to double the prewar daily production — raising it from about 300,000 to 600,000 barrels. Most of the refinery capacity of Europe will be smashed. The U.S.S.R. will probably desire to proceed with the rapid development of its own supply for its own needs rather than to draw on the Middle East (though this is an uncertain element in the future prospect). The amount of equipment for making synthetic oil that will remain in use is also uncertain. In the period of poverty immediately after the war the total demand of Europe, including Great Britain, may well be below the prewar schedule. The oil producers that now supply the bulk of the production naturally ask where a greatly enlarged flow would be sold. Will the producers of the Caribbean be ready to withdraw from the European and Mediterranean markets? Will the producers in the southwest Pacific be ready to moderate their development plans in order to permit Middle Eastern oil to enjoy a greater share of the Far East market?

For the short term, before the development of an increased demand, the only alternative to bitter competition will be a compromise somewhat painful to all. In order to permit the American enterprises installed in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to commence the growth that the character of their opportunity

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impels, the other established resources of supply in the Middle East will have to, if necessary, yield a share of their market. Producers outside of the Middle East will have to curtail their shipments into the markets that Middle Eastern oil serves (the quantities involved, however, are very small compared to the size of the petroleum traffic in this hemisphere). The American companies controlling production, and the local governments that look to them for increased revenues from royalties, will have to be content with modest immediate returns.

The whole record of the petroleum industry warrants the belief that the period of adjustment and general scrimping need not be long. Unless the economic and social life of both Europe and the Far East is destined for prolonged stagnation or decay there will be a call for greatly enlarged oil production in the Middle East within a very few years after the end of the war. On this side of the Atlantic, an increase in demand and a wise regard for the preservation of underground reserves will combine to persuade producing interests to accept a diminishing share of distant markets. The American Government and the oil interests concerned are entitled to feel that their wish to proceed with the development of their concessions in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait should be dealt with in a spirit of bold confidence in the long-term prospects of the oil industry as a whole.

The public discussion has made clear certain valid reasons for the United States to seek, by whatever measures are found most economical and least disturbing, an increase in the production of American-controlled oil properties in the Middle East. The first reason is found in the prospect that before long increased production from those properties will be needed to meet the world demand. The second is that those properties should be drawn upon more amply than in the past in order to reduce the prospective drain on the reserves of this hemisphere; for these reserves would be essential to the security of the United States in the event of a future crisis. The third is the necessity of satisfying the reasonable expectations of the sovereigns of the territories in whose lands the oil resources are situated. The American participants in the international consultative organization now in the course of creation may justly ask for the sympathetic appraisal and effective recognition of these reasons. A solution by consent will be by all odds the best.

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THEY BURIED FRANCE

By Lindsay Rogers

THE GRAVEDIGGERS. By Pertinax. Garden City: Doubleday, 1944.

GREAT events leave behind them trails of misery, rarely of happiness. They also make prompt and extensive additions to bookshelves. Some of the volumes which began to roll from the presses almost before the sudden collapse of the Third French Republic was complete were potboilers — cheap attempts to lift the veil from the private lives of the Republic's last two Prime Ministers; some were eyewitness accounts of special aspects of the débâcle; the few serious attempts to write contemporary history were necessarily made without the opportunities for reflection and reappraisal which the later behavior of the principal actors would permit.

In certain ivory towers contemporary historians are sneered at. "Journalism, not history" is the taunt. But when the chronicler is honest and intelligent his work cannot be too contemporary, and he should be applauded for not permitting obvious risks to deter him. If time is certain to reverse some of his verdicts, he can find solace in remembering that he performs an indispensable service. Without it, the statesman is not able to learn promptly of, and to profit from, the mistakes of his immediate predecessors and contemporaries. What other means is there, too, of lowering the barrier of ignorance which makes public opinion hesitate to judge or causes it to judge wrongly? How else create the informed vigilance which will guard against new betrayals? Today, as Maitland said, "we study the day before yesterday in order that yesterday may not paralyze today and that today may not paralyze tomorrow." When the student of the day before yesterday is a philosopher as well as a chronicler, he will give his readers not only more knowledge but also a greater measure of wisdom. The combination is rare. When found, the world should prize it more highly than many of the rubies that fall from Clio's ivory towers.

It is contemporary history of this rare kind — published in French a year ago [1] and now about to come out in English — that the best-known French publicist of the period between the wars gives us after three years of reflection and study. In the group of writers who regularly analyzed the course of European foreign policy Pertinax (André Géraud) was outstanding. He was hard-working and honest. His sources of information were rich and varied. Statesmen courted him. Even when one disagreed with what he wrote in the *Echo de Paris* or *L'Europe Nouvelle*, one could rarely deny that he was magnificent. His writings were read everywhere and quoted by everyone; but that they were without deep influence his book bears eloquent witness. His trenchant arguments, regularly repeated, had little effect. Is it only as private individuals that the French can claim to be a logical race? Logic, said an Oxford don, is not a science, it is a dodge. The logic of the French Right was worse than a dodge, for it ended in national disaster.

Pertinax calls his work "Les Fossoyeurs" — in English "The Gravediggers." Gamelin, Daladier, Reynaud and Pétain were the important wielders of shovels. Lesser figures receive more or less extended treatment in connection

[1] "Les Fossoyeurs." New York: Editions de la Maison Française, 2 v., 1943.

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with these principals, whom they were serving or against whom they were intriguing. Lord Morley told of a young man coming down to London from an English university and applying for a job as leader-writer on the *Pall Mall Gazette*. "What are your qualifications?" Lord Morley asked. "Well," replied the young man, "I have a great gift for general vituperation." Pertinax's readers may think of him as having this gift, but only because the cumulative effect of his judgments is so devastating. He uses not an axe but a scalpel — in different places and to different depths. Mordant but not venomous, and anxious to do justice where justice is due, his criticism goes far beyond mere epithets.

The writer of contemporary history may not improperly have the qualifications which Mitford, the historian of Greece, boasted he possessed: complete partiality and a bad temper. Pertinax is partial to France, to the Republic, to the enemies of Nazism. He blasts against their betrayers. Demurrers will doubtless be entered against certain counts in his indictment. But I venture to prophesy that other gravamen will stand and that fault will have to be admitted only in regard to nuances. The French text has been under scrutiny for a year by some of those who participated in the events described and by rival chroniclers, so that errors of fact should by now be almost non-existent. It is probable, then, that Pertinax's book will be read and pondered when histories of the fall of France are no longer so contemporary and when their authors have access to archives now still closed and have been able to analyze the many apologies — epauletted, civilian and also, it is to be hoped, posthumous — which will come from the principal gravediggers and their assistants.

Pertinax's range is enormous. He writes as an ordnance expert when he discusses in great detail the lack of French preparations in respect of matériel — airplanes, tanks, anti-tank guns, armored units, etc. He is a military critic when he follows the German campaign in France from day to day, considers the intricate dispositions and the steadily worsening fortunes of the different French armies, and stresses the faulty conceptions of the generals and their imperfect or non-existent execution. Using British as well as French sources of information, he deals with the lack of liaison between the allied armies and the mutual suspicion and hostility of their leaders. Then he turns to the political figures — Daladier and Reynaud and their satellites. The chapters on Pétain reëxplore a good deal of the same ground, though from a different point of view. Illumining the chronicle are frequent learned passages calling attention to comparable pages in previous centuries of French history. Charlemagne, Charles IX, Louis XIV, Richelieu, Mazarin — with them Pertinax seems to be as familiar as he is with the gravediggers themselves.

The story of French foreign policy from the advent of Hitler teems with epigrams and interpretations of French thought and life. The analysis of the acts and motives which led to the French request for an armistice is exceedingly detailed. More fully than any other writer, Pertinax tells how the scales trembled and then were weighted with a numerical but not a moral majority of the cabinet against the attempt to set up a government outside of metropolitan France to continue the war. Those who wanted France to follow the Dutch, Norwegian and Belgian examples lacked an outstanding leader. Unhappily, the President of the Republic demonstrated the truth of the principle that ordinarily the Elysée is a prize for "the most insignificant and the most neutral." Lebrun's insignificance was natural and sterling — even though, ironi-

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cally enough, he was the only President since Jules Grévy who had been re-elected. All his Prime Ministers made fun of him. "He had the gift of tears," and two words described him: "perpetual panic." At Bordeaux a President like Poincaré or even Millerand might have taken a government to Africa and given the fleet to the British.

The gravediggers triumphed, however, and Pertinax recounts at length the tragic, sordid story of the Vichy régime. In telling this Pertinax becomes the law professor and argues at some length (why should he have bothered?) that the transition was unconstitutional: that the statutory emanations from Pétain — "Nous, Maréchal de France, chef de l'état français" — have no taint of legitimacy. The volumes end with an epilogue — a summing up of the prosecutor, a reasoned verdict of the judge.

What I have said suggests that Pertinax's range is vast and that his analyses of men and events are detailed. He has made no concession to lure the general reader. The two volumes of the French edition which appeared a year ago have now been translated, with corrections, refinements and additions. Elaborate footnotes constantly bark at the reader from the bottoms of the pages. Since the gravediggers were at work at the same time, each portrait repeats parts of other portraits. The artist is not content to sketch and does not economize on detail: he paints the hairs in the nostrils. After what must have been a mighty battle with his publisher, he refused to write to please the million.

But like the play within the play which was caviar to the general, Pertinax's narrative "is well digested in the scenes." The reader is constantly aware that the facts are being filtered through a superior intelligence. Moreover, there are "sallets in the lines that make the matter savoury." Pertinax writes from his heart as well as from his intellect and his pen sometimes drips tears as well as ink. His style is rarely pedestrian and the fine writing never seems precious. The result is that an involved story, far from boring the reader, will always interest and not infrequently excite him. I give a few examples.

Pétain, Laval and their crowd "racked their brains to palm off shame as honor, cowardice as courage, pusillanimity and ignorance as wisdom, humiliation as virtue, and wholehearted acceptance of the German victory as moral regeneration." Gamelin's age and frailties were not enough to account for his errors: "We are forced to indict the straitened military universe he gradually imprisoned himself in, like a turtle in its shell. It was a world of three dimensions, whereas the German world had four or five." Daladier had "the bull's thick neck, but certainly not the bull's taste for rushing straight at an obstacle." Though he was weak and irresolute, events made him a dictator. "That was one of life's tricks. He was a dictator in spite of himself." And after dealing with the lies and asininities that crowded the French press, Pertinax asks: "In this tidal wave of insane words, how tell where fanaticism ends and knavery begins?"

As an example of how this historian of yesterday connects his story with events of yesteryears, I quote a fine passage which concludes an analysis of why Laval was able to exploit the moral fissure in the French soul:

"Two Frances which lost no love on each other have lived side by side for one century and a half. The seamless garment of the nation has never been thoroughly rewoven. Whatever mending was attempted never amounted to more than patchy and ill-sewn darns. Under varying battle flags — those of the king, of the Church, of the Bonaparte pretender, and even of some general on

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horseback — strong minorities always fought against the Republican idea, against parliamentary democracy, neutrality of the state in religious matters, social reform, loud in their boasts that they were going to drive the rascal politicians out and replace them with a clean, resolute and national government. . . . They were brought to ground only under the impact of the Dreyfus case (1898–1902), when they staked whatever moral and political conceptions they stood for on the guilt of a Jewish army officer who was being tried for treason, on what should have been considered merely a question of fact; when they shattered themselves against the ranks of the Republicans, whose discipline had firmer roots than their own makeshift solidarity."

So much for the sallets. But Pertinax's play is also set with modesty as well as cunning. Of the period that preceded the Bordeaux decision, he can say *quorum partem magnam vidi*. Fewer publicists have had a wider acquaintance with or easier access to statesmen. To be sure, one can write accurately and even intimately about an unfolding political drama, and rarely or even never see the principal characters. Ofttimes it may be more useful to learn from the men with whom the leading statesmen had business than to listen to the statesmen themselves. Periodic interviews with the Prime Minister or President may be less revealing than reports of apt remarks that have been made to this or that person, of antagonisms that have developed in respect of particular persons or policies or of petulances shown when in cabinet or conference policy was challenged. The French used to refer to *la cuisine de la chambre*. There was a *cuisine* of the Quai d'Orsay and there is a *cuisine* of Downing Street, of the White House and of the State Department. Anyone who has a wide circle of official acquaintances and merits a measure of confidence can quickly learn a great deal more about the truly great than if limited to occasional interviews with them. Pertinax knew the people on whom his judgments are rendered. He was also an authority on French *cuisine, politique et diplomatique*.

But during the period, say, when he had the confidence of Weygand, did Pertinax see the weaknesses which were later known to the world? When he was on terms of intimacy with Flandin (whom he saw on three successive days, for example, in October 1934), did he think that Flandin deserved his admiration or was he just using him as a source of information? Pertinax now describes Flandin as the man who "lost the Rhine" because he feared to use "rights which the Treaty of Locarno conferred on France." Opinions remained consistent in respect of the foreign policy best adapted to French interests. Have his opinions changed in respect of the intelligence, character and integrity of some of the gravediggers? This would be natural, for even the best statesmen give their admiring supporters occasional disappointments. It is difficult to believe, however, that gravediggers on whom verdicts can now be so final and for whom so few extenuating circumstances can be cited ever seemed of truly statesmanlike stature to an experienced clearheaded publicist. Reticence at the time may be put down to the natural inclination of those who seek to mould public opinion, to give some support to those in office, and to encourage them to do better. That often seems and is wiser than frankness and forthrightness on weaknesses.

It has repeatedly been pointed out that France was far less fortunate than Great Britain or the United States in her political leadership. To the support of this truth Pertinax brings ample testimony. The men who were patriots first

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and politicians second were rare, almost non-existent. The salvation of Great Britain and the United States has been that at the critical moments in their history a benign political providence has provided leaders who were not only intelligent but courageous. France's leaders were the gravediggers, and in the run-of-the-mine ministers there were few who were not either weak or corrupt, and there were many who were both. But the fault was not only of men but of a system.

For twenty years the Radical Socialists had dominated French politics and to their weaknesses Pertinax devotes several masterly pages. The two decades produced Daladier "as a tree produces its fruit." The party acted as a pendulum. "Absorbing the shock of violent pressures from both left and right, it swung to and fro but always with a tendency to return to center. It gave the nation a sense of balance. And, to vary the metaphor, it was also the crucible in which violent differences were composed through a process of compromise — and compromise is the soul of a régime based on public opinion." Compromise, however, cannot win a war.

In the two decades the party had only three Presidents: Herriot, for whom Pertinax has a great deal of respect; Chautemps who, along with Pétain and Weygand, merits being called the "father of a separate armistice;" and Daladier, whose "easygoing complacency called the tune." Everything went along on a basis of good fellowship. Cabinet followed cabinet — six of them between June 1932 and February 1934 — but these crises in government amounted to little more than "reconstructions." From ministry to ministry the same men remained in office; they were satisfied to change portfolios. It was a game of ministerial puss-in-the-corner, with many ministers getting into corners ten, twenty or even thirty times. A President of the Council would be displaced and be a humble cabinet member, or, after a political holiday, sometimes brief, he would reappear as minister or even Prime Minister. "The story of the three dirty shirts," Pertinax remarks, "is more valid in France than it is elsewhere. A tramp owns three shirts but cannot pay to have them washed. Irresistibly he thinks that the shirt he wore three days ago is cleaner than the other two." That was the view that Parliament and the country seemed to take of French ministers.

Again France suffered badly because of the lack of articulation between civil and military authorities. A similar disunion during the war of 1914–18 was disastrous and might have been fatal had not Clemenceau and Foch formed a team which got along in ways not dissimilar to those used by Lincoln and Grant. The relations between Hitler and his generals may have determined the course of this war. By 1940 Daladier knew that military matters were going from bad to worse but did not have the courage to interfere. "The weakness of democracies," he pled, "is to make immovable the general who has imposed himself on public opinion." But how did Daladier know that Gamelin had imposed himself on public opinion? He did not try to find out and he ignored Clemenceau's belief that war was too important a business to be left to the generals. He left them alone and boasted of himself as a War Minister who had husbanded French blood. Speaking in the Chamber in December 1939, he recalled that, by December 1914, more than 450,000 Frenchmen had fallen. That was staggering, and in the current war the number was "too great for our hearts to accept without sorrow." By the end of November the Army had lost 1,136 men, the Navy 256 and the Air Force 42. "I still prefer," he declared,

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"the situation as of December 1939 to that of December 1914," and the Chamber gave him loud cheers — cheers for a man who in the last war had been better than a good officer, "a fine soldier" — and who was now helping to ready France's grave.

Daladier did not lack legal authority. Parliament repeatedly granted him *pleins pouvoirs*. But there was no dynamism in his use of the authority. When Reynaud succeeded him he intrigued to cause his fall. Both men made the mistake of ignoring Parliament and not seeking its support for the measures they took. An executive to whom great power is transferred strengthens himself enormously if he invites his legislature to scrutinize his use of the power constantly and if he seems to act only as its servant. In Great Britain, Churchill has not been unmindful of this truth. Indifference during the war to the French Parliament — mediocre and in some cases venal though its personnel may have been — meant that prime ministers had no legislative support and that finally when decisions had to be taken at Bordeaux there was no really representative body to be consulted. Had the Cabinet summoned a hundred or so deputies and senators and asked for advice, the decisions taken might well have been different. Instead, Laval summoned parliamentarians of his own ilk and they helped weight the scales in favor of complete and ignominious capitulation.

In the matter of generals, as Pertinax points out, France fared even worse than she did with her politicians. The large proportion of septuagenarians was in itself a *prima facie* case of incompetence in the High Command. There were almost no outcries in Parliament and the press over the fact that Pétain, Gamelin, Weygand and the rest "enjoyed the privileges of a sort of apostolic succession and perpetuated themselves by a kind of co-optation." Promotion came not because of merit but because men were aged and safe. This army group, quarreling within itself, but united against the politicians and seldom interfered with by them, kept down all dissentients. Of these the ablest, and subsequently the best-known, was Charles de Gaulle. "The generals," Pertinax says, "left to themselves for twenty years, escaping any serious scrutiny, were capable neither of organizing an adequate defense nor of directing its operations." They furnished a triumphant demonstration of the truth of the saying that the only thing more difficult than getting a wrong idea out of a military mind is to get a right idea in. The Germans prepared for a new kind of war. The British began to prepare for it too late. When the Americans prepared they were for a period uncertain as to whether they should look to 1917 or to the future. Fortunately they did not delay their decision too long. The French prepared definitely for a war like that of 1914.

The French military collapse was so sudden, so unexpected that the multitude cried treason. But in Pertinax's story there is little that smacks of almost the only crime which, when the fate of a great and loved country is at stake, is worse than a blunder. Unintelligence, apathy and negligence were, in Pertinax's view, more important than the work of disloyal groups. The vast majority of French people were always disheartened and pessimistic. The Communists and some Socialists who did not move with Blum and were *plus pacifiste que les pacifistes* counted for little. But the forces on the Right were important: conservatives who thought that Fascism would be safe for them; financiers and millionaires who had feared the *Front Populaire* and who now feared the consequences to themselves of a prolonged war more than they did the consequences of a German victory. As always, most of the press was venal,

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and an obscurantist censorship kept information from the public. Fifth columnists existed but were relatively unimportant. Those who perhaps not technically but in reality were traitors — the Lavals, the de Brinons, the Baudoins — might have lost their misguided supporters had they been decisively dealt with. Daladier's vigor was reserved for the Communists. He never moved to squelch the enemies of the Right.

Pertinax thinks that only one élite had a clear vision of approaching dangers. Historians of the origins of the second World War will be able to treat the permanent officials of the foreign offices better than the historians of the origins of the war of 1914 treated their predecessors. Then there were legends of "*éminences grises*." Baron von Holstein, who had reigned long and disastrously in the Wilhelmstrasse, still cast his shadow and the theory was that the career men were more war-mongering than their political chiefs. The historians of the 1939 conflict seem apt to agree that the chief architects of ruin were the amateurs — Chamberlain, Sir Horace Wilson, Daladier and Bonnet — and not the professional under secretaries or ambassadors (though Sir Nevile Henderson will be remembered as an exception). The officials of Downing Street and of the Quai d'Orsay saw the interests of their countries far more clearly than did their political chiefs. They had wanted to scotch the German menace before it became so threatening. After that opportunity was missed they wanted to implement the Russian alliance which Louis Barthou had constructed and which Laval sabotaged.

The rapidity of the disaster which came was more striking than the fact of its coming. Even if the gravediggers had not worked so well, France with a population half as large as Germany's and with a far lower industrial potential might not have been able to withstand the Nazi hordes for long. Critics of France should remember that no democracy seems to be willing to prepare its armaments on a sufficient scale. They should also remember that it was the good fortune of magnificent leadership that enabled Great Britain and the United States at last to change from the defensive to the offensive.

The French people, who proved themselves 25 years ago by accepting unlimited sacrifices on the battlefields, now are proving themselves again by resistance within their country. They are showing that they are wiser today than their élites were yesterday. The crime of the élites, as M. Breandos' brilliant "Lettre aux Anglais" points out, is that having emptied the war of 1914–18 of all its content of idealism they preached in 1939 that the new war was for nothing more than to keep Germany from occupying French soil. During the occupation the French people have been self-taught. The people now know that it is not enough to get Germany out of France by agreement. National Socialism must be crushed.

The invasion which the French people calmly await will be the sixth in hardly more than that number of generations. That it will be welcome and that the invaders come as friends will not prevent it from being perhaps even more horrible than any of the previous ones. Four times Paris has fallen into the hands of the enemy. Now it is about to be relieved, but the cost will inevitably be terrible. How, in Maitland's phrase, can yesterday and today be kept from paralyzing tomorrow?

To this problem Pertinax devotes much of an eloquent epilogue. "The counterrevolutionaries of 1940 have deepened the schism of 1789. If the authors of defeat and dictatorship remain intact in any corner of the French world this

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aggravated schism will become permanent." Hence clemency cannot win the day. Unhappily the Quislings have been far more numerous and prominent in France than in Belgium or Holland. Retribution is inevitable and necessary. France's future leadership must not be tainted by any connection with the principal gravediggers or their assistants.

For a time a constitutional vacuum will exist. It would be folly to seek too soon to consult an electorate which has been denied enlightenment, which has been indoctrinated with propaganda and in which there are few who have not been hungry and ill and exiled and homeless. Any "timorous, wobbling, hastily improvised government would be much more likely to lead to Fascism than a group of men gathered around a definite plan, having set up months in advance a consultative assembly which in its methods of discussion conducts itself as a parliament of the usual pattern." By this test General de Gaulle can claim to have achieved a large measure of legitimacy. The movement which he started and which has triumphed over formidable obstacles is "the imperative action of French patriotism with the restoration of republican institutions as its aim."

People are said to have as good a government as they deserve. Judged by the gravediggers and their satellites the deserts of the French people would be exceedingly small. But it also is true that a government has no better an electorate than it deserves, because the men in the highest places have it in their power so to poison the public mind and so to misstate alternative courses of action that public opinion has difficulty in informing and expressing itself. Under the occupation the French people have demonstrated that they deserve good leaders. Finding them will be a much more difficult task than the elaboration of new constitutional laws. But until they are discovered France's future will be uncertain; and until France's future is clear there can be no real recovery for a continent whose broken pieces will not fall together quickly like bits of a jigsaw puzzle.

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THE JAPANESE ISLANDS: ANNEXATION OR TRUSTEESHIP?

By Huntington Gilchrist

IN January of this year Admiral Nimitz established a military government over the Marshall Islands, one of the wide-flung groups of Pacific islands mandated to Japan after the last war. The official text of his first proclamation, dated January 31, 1944, included the following paragraphs:

I. All powers of government and jurisdiction in the occupied territory and over inhabitants therein . . . are vested in me as Admiral, USN, commanding the United States forces of occupation, and Military Governor. . . .

II. Exercise of the powers of the Emperor of Japan shall be suspended during the period of military occupation. . . .

Similar proclamations will extend Admiral Nimitz's sway over the Caroline and Mariana Islands, also parts of the Japanese mandate, as well as over the Bonins and the other islands nearer Asia which have been owned outright by Japan for a somewhat longer period.

Although the land surface of the mandated islands, known as Micronesia, is only 836 square miles, about twice the size of New York City, they cover an extent of ocean nearly as great as the land area of the continental United States. They all lie in the southwest Pacific, on the other side of the International Date Line. The nearest of them is 4,000 miles from San Francisco. Together they form either an effective barrier to, or steppingstones for, our communications with the Philippines and China. Australia, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Portugal control islands nearby; all these nations, as well as China and the Soviet Union, are also directly interested in the future of Micronesia. So are the 50,000 native Kanakas and Chamorros. And so are the 100,000 Japanese inhabitants and their countrymen at home.

The rule of the United States Navy over the islands is "for the duration." How will the Atlantic Charter, the Cairo Declaration, and the Covenant of the League of Nations affect their permanent disposition?

II

The islands were discovered in the sixteenth century, mostly by Spaniards, but have acquired political significance only in the last 60 years. Frequent visits to them during the first half of the nineteenth century by whalers from Boston, New Bedford, and other parts of New and Old England, and during the second half of the same century by missionaries (largely from the Congregational Board in Boston), were not followed by the planting of the American flag in what has been considered the traditional fashion. Warships — Russian, French and British — came and went as they pleased. Their visits were for the purpose of making surveys, which no doubt have been keenly examined by officers of the United States Navy during many months past.

Merchants, largely British and German, meanwhile extended their trade to these regions. But again the flag did not follow until Germany hoisted hers in the Marshalls in 1878 and in the Carolines in 1885. Spain protested as regards the Carolines and referred the matter to the Pope, the first appeal to an international authority in this area. His decree of December 17, 1885, supported

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the Spanish claims in the main but prescribed rights for German warships and a large measure of economic equality for Germany.

The United States first became officially interested in the islands as an aftermath of the Spanish-American War. Guam, the largest of the Marianas, had been occupied by American troops and was obtained permanently under the Armistice as a steppingstone to the Philippines. Whitelaw Reid and other American Peace Commissioners thought it more important to acquire at least naval and cable rights in the Carolines and Marianas than possession of the southern islands in the Philippine group; but this had not been provided for in the Armistice. The United States Government toward the end of the negotiations offered $1,000,000 for Kusaie in the eastern Carolines. It was too late. Spain meanwhile had agreed by secret treaty to sell all the Carolines and the Marianas to Germany at a price later fixed at $4,500,000.[1]

The United States might have obtained possession of all the islands at that time if it had been fully alive to their strategic value. One may speculate as to whether there could have been a successful attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 if we had been clearer as to our interests in 1899 or even during World War I. At the beginning of that war, Australia intended to press on from New Guinea to take over these territories, which had not been developed to any extent under German rule. The British, however, in return for increased assistance from the Japanese Navy, requested Japan to occupy the islands. This was followed in February and March 1917 by the secret understandings according to which Britain, France and Russia agreed to support Japan's claims to Micronesia. The United States was then on the verge of entrance into the war.

III

During the Paris peace negotiations American policy ranged from an attempt to apply to the islands the Fifth of Wilson's Fourteen Points — "a free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims" — to a suggestion from the Department of State that the islands be temporarily returned to Germany and later handed over to the United States.[2] Japan said little. She was in occupation of the islands; she had her secret treaty; and her way was smoothed by the British Dominions, which were insisting vigorously on their annexation of the German islands south of the equator (opposed only by the United States). President Wilson, in conversation with one of his associates, expressed doubts as to the application of the mandate system to the islands held by Japan, and observed "that these Islands lie athwart the path from Hawaii to the Philippines and that they were nearer to Hawaii than the Pacific Coast was, and that they could be fortified and made naval bases by Japan; that indeed they were of little use for anything else and that we had no naval base except at Guam." [3]

Shortly afterward the President and Secretary Lansing expressed views in favor of the internationalization of Yap in the West Carolines, and made reservations in that regard. Nevertheless, on May 7, 1919, *all* the former German islands north of the equator were formally and unconditionally allocated under mandate to Japan. The action was taken by the Council of Four, which, of

[1] A little earlier the United States Navy had assumed possession of Wake Island.

[2] "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919: The Paris Peace Conference," v. II, p. 512–515.

[3] David Hunter Miller, "My Diary at the Conference of Paris," v. I, p. 100.

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course, included a representative of the United States; but it was not taken by the League of Nations, as is commonly believed, and as President Roosevelt recently intimated. No protest was made at the time by President Wilson. He apparently thought that the earlier statment of the American position had been accepted by the other countries, since he advised the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 19, 1919, that the question of the control of Yap had been relegated to a "general cable conference." This conference was held in Washington in the autumn of 1920, but reached no settlement of the matter. In November of the same year the Department of State reopened the whole question of the mandates system. But on December 17 the Council of the League confirmed the terms of the mandate to Japan, with the other "C" mandates as proposed by the remaining Principal Allied Powers, and declined to reopen the matter at the request of the United States.

The terms of the mandate denied Japan the right to fortify the islands or build bases there, provided that the government was to be in the interests of the natives, and placed the supervision of these matters in League hands. Economic equality for League members was not provided, because of the unwillingness of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa to agree to it in the case of their "C" mandates.

Three arrangements affecting the islands were made at the Washington Disarmament Conference: 1. A ten-year non-aggression treaty in regard to the islands in the Pacific, by which in reality a four-power agreement was substituted for the Anglo-Japanese alliance. 2. A five-power agreement to maintain the status quo with regard to fortifications and naval bases until December 31, 1936. 3. A Japanese-American treaty by which the United States agreed to the mandate, obtained for itself the same rights as a member of the League (with special emphasis on missionary rights), and full privileges in regard to the use of Yap for cable and radio installations. Japan also assured the "usual comity" to American nationals and vessels visiting the islands.

But the underlying situation had been fundamentally altered. The war had put Japan in actual possession of the islands for the first time. And though Japanese control was limited by the principle of international trusteeship, the United States did not belong to the international board of trustees — the League of Nations. The conflict between the two Powers was put off by the Washington treaties, but it was not resolved.

IV

While Japan was consolidating her rule in Micronesia in the period between the wars the islands were forgotten by the American public. Yet they cast their magic spell over the occasional westerner whom the Japanese allowed to visit them. Dr. Paul H. Clyde, who spent some weeks in the islands in 1934 at the invitation of the Japanese Government, described Truk's beauty and also spoke of its fine anchorage and its steep summits which stood "like battlements." [4] But though the islands dropped from public view, probably no part of the world of comparable size and population has ever been the object of more official attention and solicitude. The printed reports which Japan made annually to the League of Nations, of which the United States received duplicates, averaged over 150 pages. But though they included voluminous statistics, they did not explain very fully what was going on (in this they were not unlike

[4] "Japan's Pacific Mandate." New York: Macmillan, 1935, p. 11.

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certain other mandate reports). Each year, for 17 years, the Permanent Mandates Commission sat at Geneva to examine these reports. The Secretariat circulated informally to the members such information as it obtained from other sources. Japan sent its representative to answer questions. Usually the report which the Commission drew up asked the Council for more information. The Council passed these requests on to Japan, and replies came back a year or so later. It was a slow procedure. The annual report for 1933, for instance, did not reach Geneva until the autumn of 1934, and Japan's comments on the Commission's questions did not arrive until the autumn of 1935, nearly two years after the end of the period to which they referred.

The Commission consisted of colonial experts appointed for indefinite tenure, four of them nationals of Mandatory Powers and five to seven of other Powers. All served as individuals and not as representatives of their Governments. The group was able and conscientious, fully aware of the political basis on which it stood and of the limitations which this imposed. Its policy was to collaborate so far as possible with the Mandatory Powers, as being the most effective method of "promoting to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territories" and of enforcing the more specific provisions of the mandates.

From 1922 to 1938, the Commission's reports dealt with nearly a score of different subjects: health provisions, better control of the liquor traffic with the natives (according to the mandate it should have been prohibited), measures taken to protect the rights of natives in their land, etc., etc. Public finance served as a key for the Commission's studies. The reports show how carefully it scrutinized Japanese financial statements and how conscientiously it tried to hold Japan to a course of action "strictly consistent with the principle of disinterestedness which is the essential feature of the mandates system."

As Japan pushed her economic exploitation of the islands with dramatic success, financial and economic questions became more and more important. Trade was 20 times greater in 1936 than it had been in 1917. In 1936 it exceeded $22,000,000, or more than $200 per head of population.[5] In 1914, the sugar cane industry did not exist; by 1936 its export value reached $6,500,000 — approximately that of all the other products combined. The phosphate mines in Angaur and nearby islands formed the second largest industry; in 1940 they produced about 3 percent of the world's phosphate rock. The Mandates Commission devoted considerable attention to labor problems. They criticized the system of recruiting native workers employed in the phosphate mines, the unsatisfactory health record and the sharp discrepancy between substantial profits and a lack of accident compensation payments. The Japanese administration did not, however, change its practices.[6]

The sugar and fishing industries, as well as many of the others, were developed almost entirely by immigrant labor from Japan. This raised the most vital problem under the whole mandate — the population problem. The Japanese increased from perhaps 100 in 1914 to 73,000 in 1938; by 1944 there were probably 100,000 of them in the islands, or twice the number of natives. As the native population has remained practically stationary, the prospect has been that the Japanese would swamp the territory and thus possess it in fact,

[5] Figures have been converted from yen at roughly two yen to one dollar.

[6] J. A. Decker, "Labor Problems in the Pacific Mandates." New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, p. 225-6.

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regardless of what nation assumed political control. The Mandates Commission frequently pointed out the importance of arresting the marked decline of the native population in Yap; but despite various discussions it took practically no action on the larger problem of Japanese immigration.

Japan was suspected of constructing fortifications and bases in the islands. An American request that destroyers be allowed to visit six "unopen" ports, including Kwajalein and Wotje, was denied by Japan in 1929 on the ground that there were no pilots and that the harbors were dangerous. After nine months of negotiation with the United States, Japan agreed that unopen ports might be visited if Japanese officials were present to extend the usual courtesies and prevent the natives from becoming frightened. This exchange of views was not reported by the Mandatory to the League of Nations, nor did the United States Government make it public or pass it on to the Mandates Commission. The story was disclosed only in April of this year.

The Mandates Commission went into the question of fortifications, however, as the extremely frank "cross-examination" of the Japanese representative, Mr. Ito, in the meeting of the Commission of November 11, 1932, indicates. Both the Italian and Swiss members pressed Mr. Ito for a plain statement as to whether the harbor works in the islands were naval bases as rumored. M. Rappard pointed out that "the reports of the Mandatory Power had ceased to refer to the execution of the military and naval clauses of the mandate at the moment when the expenditure on harbor works had considerably increased. . . ." The Japanese representative insisted that the improvement of the harbors of the islands was undertaken only for economic purposes, citing the growing sugar trade.[7] He later confirmed this thesis in writing and the Commission officially reported to the Council the Japanese Government's denial of the rumors. Very much the same thing happened in 1934 and 1935.

The following year, 1936, the United States asked the Japanese Government to permit one of its destroyers to visit the mandated islands. Visits to the islands by foreign ships of any description had indeed been rare, averaging one a year since 1932. Our Government reminded Japan that Japanese ships had been permitted to call at "unopen" Alaskan harbors. The Department of State advised Mr. Joseph C. Grew, the American Ambassador, that

> In our view it is unfortunate that the Government of Japan so far has not adopted an attitude similarly liberal in the face of allegations that in the Japanese Mandated Islands in the Pacific improvements are being carried out which are irreconcilable with Japan's Treaty obligations not to fortify these Islands.

No reply was received to this request. This striking clue to the situation was not communicated to the League of Nations and was not published until 1943.[8]

The occasional foreign visitors to the islands from 1932 to 1935, among whom were several Americans, reported seeing no fortifications. Writing in 1943, however, Willard Price gave a detailed account of his trip in 1935 through the 60-mile natural "fleet basin," or lagoon, at Palau, and described roads, piers and airfields which had no commercial justification.[9] Obviously, also, to the degree to which Japan could keep the islands isolated, she could prevent a foreign navy from obtaining vital information on contours, currents, and so on.

Though the Mandates Commission had strong suspicions that Japan was

[7] Permanent Mandates Commission. Minutes, 22nd Session, November 21, 1932, p. 114–15.
[8] Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931–41, v. I, 1943, p. 307–9.
[9] Willard Price, "Japan's Islands of Mystery." New York: Day, 1944, p. 128–135.

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violating the terms of her mandate the evidence was largely circumstantial; and since officials of the League of Nations lacked authority to visit territories under mandate, corroborating evidence could not be obtained on the spot. On behalf of the Mandates Commission, however, it should be said that its reports revealed the good and bad features of Japanese administration and strengthened the standards set up by the League for the government of backward peoples. [10]

During the whole period between the wars the United States gave no evidence of interest in the developments taking place in the islands and did not seek to exercise any influence over them through the League of Nations. Its only moves were the requests that American warships be permitted to visit the islands and certain informal contacts between the American Embassy in Rome and the Italian Chairman of the Mandates Commission. It was handicapped by the fact that it was not a member of the League and by the absence of an American from the Mandates Commission.

V

On March 27, 1933, Japan gave notice of her withdrawal from the League, and two years later her withdrawal became effective. There was much unofficial discussion of Japan's right to continue as a Mandatory Power, but no member of the League raised the question officially. Japan's annual reports continued to arrive in Geneva for a few years more; but in 1938 she ceased to collaborate with the League. Significantly, the final report submitted (late in 1939) failed to contain the usual paragraph to the effect that Japan had not constructed fortifications or bases in the islands. After 1937 no foreign ships visited Micronesia; and after 1939 no natives were permitted to pass from the Marshalls to Kusaie, where the only American residents lived. The Japanese appropriated $367,000 for harbor works in 1940–41, and $850,000 for air routes and aircraft facilities. The latter figure compares with an expenditure of $185,000 in 1936.

The character of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor is clinching evidence that she had set up bases in the islands. Her gross violation of the terms of the mandate amply justifies its termination. But shall there be a new mandatory, shall the status of the territory be changed, and who has the power to act? These questions are extremely controversial. Many English and American authorities maintain that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, in favor of whom Germany renounced her rights in these islands and who conferred the mandates, have the power. But the mandates system was established by the Covenant of the League, which provides that tutelage of the dependent peoples inhabiting mandated territories should be exercised by certain advanced nations "as mandatories on behalf of the League"; and each mandate stipulates that "the consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification" of its terms. Many jurists, therefore, support the view that while the Principal Powers were entrusted with the transitional function of inaugurating the mandates system, they passed out of the picture once they made the territories subject to Article XXII of the Covenant and placed them under the trusteeship of the League of Nations.[11]

[10] A comprehensive report on the development of the islands during the twenty-odd years of Japanese control, with special attention to the points taken up by the Mandates Commission, should be prepared as soon as practicable by the League of Nations (or its successor) for the use of future administrators.

[11] Quincy Wright, "Mandates under the League of Nations." Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930, p. 487.

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In any event, steps will be taken to leave Japan no possible claim to the islands and their entire status as a mandated territory will probably be reconsidered. The fact is, of course, that they are rapidly being occupied by the United States. Our proclamation of military government makes no reference to the mandate or the League of Nations, but tells the inhabitants only that "your existing laws and customs remain in force." Certainly, one of the first things to be done by the new authority in the islands after the war will be to transport back to Japan, at the expense of the Japanese Government, all or almost all of the 100,000 Japanese now there, and to take over without payment and hold for the credit of the territory the industrial undertakings in the islands, almost all of which are state or quasi-state enterprises.

The United States has the best claim to these islands and the strongest interest in them. The late Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, although admitting the jurisdiction of the coming peace conference over the question, stated to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 9, 1944, that in his personal opinion "those mandated islands have become Japanese territory and as we capture them they are ours." He explained that they were not of much use except for military purposes, and that nobody in the Government opposed his view that such of them as were necessary as bases should be allotted to us. This thesis has been supported by Senator Chandler, by various publicists, and by certain correspondents with our forces in the Pacific. It represents the easiest and most conventional solution. We can claim the islands by right of conquest, on reparations account, and also on the ground that our possession of them is necessary for peace and security. We would still, however, have to meet criticisms based on the first clause in the Atlantic Charter — that we "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other" — and also on one sentence of the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, between Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek and Churchill: "The three Great Allies . . . covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion." That sentence is followed, however, by another: "It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914. . . ." It was clear that Japan was to lose the islands. But what was to be done with them?

Probably none of the Powers friendly to the United States wants them so long as there is no danger of a potential enemy getting them. It is doubtful whether any friendly country would object to outright annexation by the United States. In fact, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa would probably prefer this solution. They disliked the limitation inherent in the mandates principle and would be glad to have a good precedent for outright annexation of the territories still mandated to them.

A second solution would be direct international control and administration of these and all other small islands in the central and south Pacific areas. This would be a common-sense way of handling a regional problem involving many little islands and would provide an excellent experiment in international cooperation. Strategic control could be given to the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the United Nations, of the "Big Four," or of the Powers of the region. The United States would naturally wish to be convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that she would not again be cut off from the Philippines and China by a screen of islands dominated by a potentially hostile Power.

A third procedure which meets with the approval of many liberal students

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would be a modification of the old mandate principle. This would give the United States strategic control over Micronesia, the Bonins, and other islands in the western Pacific which were not formerly Chinese. The United States would assume responsibility for civil administration under mandate (or under some similar and better system of international trusteeship), in the interests of the territories in question and their inhabitants. The program would be worked out by the United Nations. Its effectiveness, or that of the second plan indicated above, would naturally depend on the nature of the world organization which is set up. Under the third plan the United States would decide what military, naval and air bases were necessary in the islands, and would construct and own them, subject to the general agreements worked out by the United Nations or by the "Big Four" for the joint use of sea and other bases not merely in the Pacific but elsewhere in the world. The United States should also have the right to construct and maintain civil air bases in the islands. Subject to the requirements of security, these bases should be available to the civil air fleets of all friendly countries in accordance with such laws of the air as are agreed upon after the war.

Most of the United Nations would probably accept these proposals. In particular, Australia again would have a desired precedent for the modification of her mandate and for the right to construct strategic bases in New Guinea. It does not seem improper to give all Mandatories henceforth the duty to defend their mandated territories. However, the use of the revenue of the territories and the recruiting of natives for military purposes should be subject to the approval of the Mandates Commission or its successor. The specific provisions of the old mandate for protection of the natives, including those regarding the traffic in slaves, liquor and arms, should be continued. Others should be added, some of them borrowed from the "B" Mandates for central Africa (covering, for instance, the protection of native rights in land, native participation in the industrial prosperity of the territory, control of immigration as needed to protect the natives, and economic equality for all members of the United Nations). The present Pacific mandates for New Guinea, Western Samoa and Nauru should be continued with similar modifications, and it is to be hoped that this arrangement could be applied to the Dutch and Australian parts of New Guinea and the small, undeveloped islands of France, Great Britain, Portugal and the United States in the central, southern and southwest Pacific.[12]

Such a solution would lay the foundations for the protection of the strategic interests of the United States in the Pacific area, in coöperation with friendly neighbors, great and small. The United States would have opportunities for leadership in working out specific details of the plan and in strengthening the principle of international trusteeship for dependent peoples. The action we take in regard to these islands will strongly affect the action to be taken in other backward areas of the Pacific and in Africa. It is pertinent to recall Secretary Hull's statement in his broadcast on April 9, 1944, that "we in this country have moved from a deep-seated tendency toward separate action to the knowledge and conviction that only through unity of action can there be achieved in this world the results which are essential for the continuance of free peoples."

[12] A Gallup Poll published May 23, 1944, indicated that 69 percent of the American public desire to "keep" Micronesia and also the islands owned or controlled by Britain and Australia which the United States has captured. This result is not very significant, because no alternative to annexation appears to have been given the voters.

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THE WAR PATTERN OF SWISS LIFE

By Werner Richter

AS the war in Europe reaches its climax the position of Switzerland becomes more precarious. The territory of each of the other neutrals — Spain, Eire, Turkey and Sweden — has a seacoast. Each of them — even Sweden — has a chance of direct contact with the Allies. Switzerland is completely trapped inside German-dominated Europe. So far, Hitler has not thought it to his advantage to cross the Swiss border. But if German troops are pushed out of the Po Valley or eastern or southern France they may try to continue their resistance on Swiss soil. And the German plans for the final, supreme battle on the "inner line" may include seizure of the vital Swiss network of railways which connects France with Austria and Germany with Italy.

Faced with these possibilities, the Swiss Government has called up more troops and has inducted youths of 19 for service. The Swiss Army of 500,000 men has been ordered to let no foreign soldier cross the border unless he is disarmed and on his way to an internment camp.

This determined Swiss Army is a peculiar one. It is fundamentally a militia, based on very short terms of service. But it now has been mobilized more than four years, and must be rated as a first-class standing army. In the years between 1940 and 1943 — that is, until the landing of the Allies in Italy — it was the only mobilized force on the European Continent which did not obey Hitler's orders. Every Swiss soldier is obliged by law to begin regular rifle practice when he is a schoolboy. In peacetime he keeps his army rifle at his home, with plenty of ammunition; if he belongs to a mounted unit, he keeps his own horse. The Swiss mobilization of 1939, which was proportionately the largest in Europe, comprising 40 percent of all Swiss men, was completed in two days. Besides the Army, Switzerland also has trained home guards and rifle clubs even in the remotest village. There is scarcely a Swiss citizen today who does not have an army rifle, a steel helmet and ammunition in his home.

The Swiss Army controls the most important passes across the Alps and the Jura Mountains and guards the Rhine frontier in the north. It is supported by extensive fortifications, the construction of which began a long time before the war. The mightiest of these — in the so-called "Central Massif," the giant Alps between Simplon and St. Gotthard — are believed to be impregnable. And since 1940, when the world became aware of the pattern of the blitzkrieg, almost every village in Switzerland has been turned into a stronghold of defense. In these fortifications Switzerland invested more than $175,000,000. Needless to say, the mountain railways, the main target of the aggressor, are mined and can be blown up if necessary in the first hour of an invasion.

The Swiss soldier has always been a brilliant fighter, whether in Switzerland's own wars or (after the country adopted its policy of "eternal neutrality") in foreign services. More than 750 marshals and generals of Swiss descent are said to have served in other armies. Today there are few professional Swiss army officers. The present Commander-in-Chief, General Guisan, is not one of them. It is a peculiarity of this real militia that its army corps and divisions are led by colonels who in civilian life are lawyers, bankers, industrialists, physicians. Only in times of war does the Swiss Diet elect a general. Guisan, like old Cin-

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cinnatus, came from the plow; he is a well-to-do landowner in French-speaking Switzerland. In him is incorporated Switzerland's will to resist; his popularity is immense. The picture of the small, sturdy, gray-haired man hangs in almost every home in the country.

II

For centuries Switzerland went her own way on the Continent, a small and solitary republic among powerful monarchies. To stand alone against the bulk of Europe is not a new experience for her. Nor is this the first threat of German aggression that she has had to resist. The peasants who formed the nucleus of the Swiss Federation by seceding from Hapsburg Germany more than 650 years ago were Germans by race and tongue, and today about three-quarters of the Swiss speak German (though in an unknown number of widely different dialects).

It is an axiom of German imperialism to regard the Swiss as rebels. Indeed, until the seventeenth century the word "Swiss" in Germany had the flavor of the later term "Jacobin." That is why, as a rule, German-Swiss relations grow tense as soon as imperialistic tendencies come to the surface in Germany. Whenever Germany was a federated state without great ambitions abroad the two countries have been on the best of terms. In the classic age of German literature and music the two countries formed almost a single unit in the spiritual field. With the rise of Bismarck's Reich and in the subsequent reign of William II they became estranged. Even so, the old popular ties carried over from pre-Bismarck times were still strong enough to divide Swiss sympathies during the First World War. The danger of a real split in national sentiment vanished when Hitler entered the German scene. Though this Austrian was utterly hostile to the Hapsburg dynasty he renewed the old Hapsburg claims against Switzerland, ignoring the fact that large numbers of Swiss of French and Italian origin had joined the Swiss Federation in the long interval since the Hapsburg rule. For Nazi Germany, the Swiss are still traitors against their "German blood." Nazi maps in schools and elsewhere have always shown Switzerland as a part of the "Grossdeutsches Reich."

As early as 1933 the Swiss granted 100,000,000 francs for the strengthening of their army, in this showing more foresight than most of the Great Powers. In 1936 a federal defense loan was subscribed four times over within a few days. This sort of response to the Nazi challenge was inevitable. The political and spiritual developments of the two nations during the last 80 years have laid an abyss between them. While the Reich became more and more the incarnation of imperialism, centralism, deification of the state and negation of the individual, Switzerland grew more and more firmly attached to the principles of her origin — democracy, federalism and individual freedom. The greater the risk of espousing these values becomes, the more staunch is the Swiss citizen's devotion to them.

This is not to say that the Swiss is, or considers himself to be, a superman; he would be the first to scoff at the idea. His capacity for self-criticism distinguishes him from self-adoring peoples. Like every sane and healthy human being he does not exalt death. The pathetic German slogan, "We are born to die for Germany," does not make sense to him. At the same time, he clings so fervently to his traditions, his customs and his code of decency that the way of life which Hitler's "New Order" would impose upon him seems to him no

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existence at all. And the horrible misery in all countries which were lured into the "New Order" is clear today to even the simplest Swiss peasant. Being a sensible man, then, the Swiss makes a sober calculation and decides that the risk of death is preferable to the certainty of a life which would not be worth living.

It cannot be denied, however, that in 1940, when the balance of the Great Powers around Switzerland suddenly crashed, this firm resolution momentarily faltered. Uncertainty was not apparent everywhere in the country, but it existed especially in those regions susceptible to influences from Pétain-France. There one heard and read suspicious phrases like "re-thinking" (*umdenken*), "re-learning" (*umlernen*), "re-settling" (*neuordnen*). Many people speculated about the alleged inevitability of a "New Europe" into which Switzerland had somehow to fit.

In that sultry summer, when only cornered Britain continued to struggle, and when her resistance seemed hopeless to many, it was the Swiss Army which raised the morale of the people. General Guisan summoned 650 of the highest officers to the Ruetly meadow above Lake Lucerne, the spot where in legendary times the Federation is said to have been founded. Here he issued an Order to the Army, saying plainly as "a soldier to soldiers" that the existence of Switzerland was at stake and that for the Army there could be no compromise with those Powers which in the *Bundesbrief* — the 650-year-old federal constitution — are called "the cunning of the world" (*die Arglist der Welt*). He said, further, that the new strong positions recently assigned to the Army in the "Central Massif" would enable it to enforce respect for Swiss independence upon everyone.

Guisan's success was almost magical. When no one dared contradict him, the wave of defeatism quickly vanished. Moreover, the example of the way the British took their ordeal and the successful outcome of the Battle of Britain soon made the Swiss will to defend Swiss rights firmer than ever. The Swiss Army does not have the enthusiasm of young warriors, but it has the cold determination of hardened men. An aggressor should not count on their mercy.

Switzerland's industries pay ransom for the country's independence. By means of commercial agreements with Germany, Switzerland obtains from German-dominated Europe and through German-occupied ports the goods which she needs to keep alive. She has few natural resources and her economic structure has always been based on foreign trade, with imports far exceeding exports. She now buys her coal in Germany, her ore in Sweden, her grain overseas. In exchange, she ships part of her own production abroad. Furnished with navicerts of both belligerents, she sends some of her watches, textiles, shoes, millinery, chemicals and so on to the Americas and even to Russia.

The Germans, of course, exclude from such shipments all goods which they regard as materials of war. Aiming to balance her neutrality, Switzerland tries to curb likewise the export of war materials to Germany. This is a rather hopeless task, since there is hardly a product which does not strengthen the war machine of a totalitarian country, if only by releasing workmen for more important war jobs. In practice it matters little whether the products of Switzerland's machine-tool plants, of her high-precision watch factories, of her pharmaceutical laboratories, are German war materials in the immediate sense or potentially. But Switzerland does her best to maintain the principle of neutrality and the Swiss Government reserves the right to approve all German

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orders. Sometimes it has refused them categorically, preferring to remain for months without any commercial agreement rather than to make exports which it held to be incompatible with its neutrality. Thus Switzerland declined to process German leather into soldiers' boots and agreed to work it only into children's shoes. The main line of policy which Switzerland follows in her negotiations with Germany is to pay for imports more and more with work instead of with goods, and to try to confine that work to labor on civilian commodities. She has agreed, for instance, to repair German automobiles but has declined orders for repairing tanks or army trucks.

Swiss public opinion dislikes this barter with Germany, but prefers to be silent about it, realizing that it is unavoidable. The Swiss industrialists, too, would rather export only to the Allies, if for no other reason than that they could be sure of being paid when the final reckoning comes. But everyone knows that if Switzerland had refused to agree to a limited degree of commercial coöperation with Germany she would soon have been forced by starvation into capitulation and would have become one more on the list of occupied countries, while her factories went ahead full blast under Nazi management. The Swiss Government now insists that all exporting plants be run by Swiss citizens. It has expressly forbidden them to submit to any foreign control. The area of Swiss-German barter also has been shrinking. If the recent signs of unemployment in Switzerland are a result of a decrease of German orders, this certainly is not a result of a shrinkage of German needs. Probably it results mainly from the bombing of the Ruhr, a consequent falling off in the amount of German coal which can be sent to Switzerland and the reduction, in turn, of Swiss exports. Perhaps it may also indicate a further retreat of Swiss merchants from a doomed customer.

III

In the political field, Switzerland has been steadfast under much pressure. Again and again, the Nazis have tried to use the commercial negotiations to extort political concessions. They have demanded the full demobilization of the Swiss Army. They have tried to force the Swiss to join the anti-Bolshevik bloc, to open Swiss railways to German military traffic, and to muzzle certain Swiss newspapermen. They have advanced the thesis that Swiss neutrality obligated the state to prevent any citizen from uttering any opinion unfavorable to the Axis. The Government has firmly refused all such demands.

The Nazis have flooded the country with propaganda and have circulated much anti-Swiss literature in Germany. Hitler's "Institute for the History of New Germany" published a 7,000-page volume — Christopher Steding's "The Reich and the Disease of European Culture" — to prove that Switzerland and the other small states bordering on Germany had no right to existence. The Swiss press was banned in Germany, one Swiss newspaperman after another was expelled, and Swiss residents in Germany were not permitted to listen to the Swiss radio. Allied broadcasts to Switzerland have been jammed by German interference. And time and again the Swiss frontier troops have been harangued by German loudspeakers and told that they would be massacred in the next few hours.

But the attack on Swiss self-confidence is futile. Most of the German newspapers and magazines on Swiss newsstands remain unsold. German moving pictures are shown in half-empty theaters or are greeted with catcalls and

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shouts of resentment (as happened recently in Zurich in the case of the film of the Dieppe raid). Everywhere in Switzerland are repeated the words of Zwingli, the Swiss reformer, to Luther, the German: "Yours is a different mind from ours." It is not forgotten that when the Nazis seemed likely to be victorious they announced their intention of revising the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which solemnly documented Switzerland's independence from Germany. The boastful speech which Goebbels flung in the face of Swiss journalists in 1941 is remembered — that every country in which Germany has a strategic interest loses its right of existence. And credence is given the well-founded rumor that in 1940 Hitler, Darlan and Mussolini agreed to partition the country. In brief, the Swiss know that their freedom depends entirely on the victory of the Allies. Their inner feelings were exemplified recently by the quiet and self-disciplined attitude which the country assumed on the occasion of the tragic American bombing of Schaffhausen.

This attitude, moreover, is by no means merely passive. The Swiss Government never had any illusions about the madness of trying to buy Nazi benevolence by appeasement. The few early supporters of the Nazi movement in Switzerland were sternly suppressed. Today every assault against the principles of democracy is punished as a crime against the state. Swiss law considers the advocacy of all totalitarian ideologies as synonymous with conspiracy. Spies are turned over to military courts for trial, with the clear intent to punish them as severely as possible. Sometimes they are condemned to death, though before the war this penalty had been virtually abolished. A major of the armored division *Interlaken* recently faced a firing squad.

When a German decree maintained that the property of German Jews in Switzerland was forfeited to the Reich, the Court of Appeals in Zurich — only a few minutes' flight from German bombing bases — condemned this law and declared it to "constitute an intolerable violation of our native sense of justice." And when the Gestapo seized a Jewish refugee on Swiss territory at Basel as a spy, the Swiss Government protested and stubbornly maintained its protest, regardless of risks, until the captive was returned. When one of the Gestapo kidnappers was captured he was jailed for several years.

One of the most intricate problems facing the Swiss is how to deal with the German fifth column, composed, as elsewhere, of German "tourists," commercial travellers, engineers. In reality, of course, all are spies, but since they enjoy the protection of the German Legation they cannot be expelled easily. There are, besides, the so-called "paper-Swiss," persons born in Germany and naturalized under the too liberal practices of former times. These are the people who when the war began rediscovered their "German hearts" and began doing their best to make trouble, belittling the country's powers of defense and spreading defeatism. The fifth column work is directed by a high official of the Nazi Party, brazenly called *Landesleiter Schweiz*. In 1936 the Swiss Government refused to permit any foreigner claiming such authority to enter the country. But Germany transferred an ardent Nazi diplomat from the German Legation in Prague, appointed him Counsellor of the Legation in Berne, and then when he possessed diplomatic immunity made him *Landesleiter Schweiz*. He succeeded in making the German consulates agencies of the Himmler police and in mixing up diplomacy, espionage, sabotage, Gestapo and fifth column activities in the usual Nazi manner. All Germans living in Switzerland, including those with anti-Nazi sentiments, are compelled to

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collaborate with the Nazi leaders, under penalty of loss of citizenship and confiscation of their property in Germany. The danger from such activities, however, is not really very great. These German agents are well known to the Swiss police and in the event of an invasion would be in jail within a few hours.

Switzerland's own unity of purpose remains untouched amid the alarms. Here in the center of Axis-dominated Europe she recently held democratic elections, following an electoral campaign in which freedom of speech was respected. The Social Democrats emerged from these elections as the strongest group of the Diet, with 56 seats.

IV

The most critical internal problem has been the food supply. Lately the situation has improved, though rations still remain in general considerably smaller than they are in the United States. As a result of a campaign called the "Wahlen plan," for the chief of the Federal Agricultural Institute, the area under cultivation was increased by about 140,000 acres from the spring of 1941 to the end of 1943. Today the country is almost self-sufficient in the production of potatoes, fruits and vegetables. However, about one-third of the grain consumed must still be obtained from abroad; to transport it, the new Swiss merchant marine of 150,000 tons was created. And the shortage of meat has made the Swiss almost into vegetarians. The great danger of 1939 — that the country might be forced into surrender by famine — has, however, been removed. Mr. Wahlen achieved in the economic field what General Guisan accomplished in the military sphere. Future historians may call these two men the saviors of Switzerland.

The faithfulness with which Switzerland has performed her great function as a haven of refuge and as an intermediary among the warring nations is too well known to need elaboration. The country which once sheltered John Knox and later on the Huguenots is today a haven for more than 60,000 men and women who fled from the New Order. Switzerland has given them warmhearted and practical aid, at an expenditure of more than 100,000,000 francs from federal funds. It welcomes for the duration tens of thousands of children from war-torn countries, such as France or Jugoslavia. It is the headquarters of the International Red Cross. By Swiss mediation and the unpaid work of many thousands of Swiss, wounded prisoners of war are exchanged, prison camps are inspected, and millions of human beings, driven from their homes, have been able to get in touch again, at least by mail, with their dear ones.

Switzerland recognizes on her soil but one nationality — the Swiss nationality. The laws of that nationality are independent of language, blood and race. They are accountable only to the will of the Swiss citizens. The Swiss idea has withstood humanity's bitterest ordeal. By the simple fact of its existence, the Swiss Federation speaks powerfully to Europe. Whether Europe is prepared or even able to listen to the lessons taught by that fact, either now or in the future, no wise man would prophesy. But for themselves, the Swiss know that their federation has survived by their fanatical *will* to stick together, on a basis of law and equal justice.

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APPENDIX TO
"AN AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS"

(see page 577)

PART I. Latin American actions in 1941 indicating a spontaneous feeling against the Axis.

January 1941. On the 2nd, the Colombian Government imprisoned three Nazis for propaganda activities and suspected espionage. On the 4th, Marmaduke Grove, leader of the Chilean Popular Front, suggested Chile raise an army of 200,000 men to support the United States should she enter the war. On the 7th, counterfeit Colombian and United States money, made in Germany, was uncovered in Colombia. On the 11th, Dr. Lourival Fontes, Director of the Press and Publicity Department of Brazil, announced that "Brazil considers the United States one of her best friends [and] attacks [in the press] against it will not be permitted." On the 14th, Mexican Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla said that "Aggression against any Pan American country will be considered by Mexico as against Mexico herself." On the 15th, it was reported from Quito that masked men raided and destroyed a German-operated radio station of the Transocean Wireless. On the 25th, the Cuban Cabinet passed a resolution repeating Cuba's "moral identification with . . . the statements of President Roosevelt toward the defense of America and democratic principles." On the 29th, President Fulgencio Batista banned totalitarian propaganda.

February. On the 1st, President Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua invited the United States to establish air and naval bases on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Nicaragua. On the 7th, President Getulio Vargas of Brazil suppressed all foreign-language publications, and on the same day Chile and Peru signed a pact in Lima providing for joint defense of their Pacific coastline. On the 8th, President Vargas decreed that only the American nations will not require export licenses for Brazilian "raw materials." On the 14th, Uruguay closed three German schools. On the 15th, Chile took over three Danish ships. On the 21st, Honduras cancelled German visas. On the 26th, Mexican labor declared that an Axis victory in Europe would constitute "a grave threat to the whole world."

March. On the 5th, the Popular Socialist Vanguard (Nazi Party) of Chile disbanded. On the 13th, Brazil ratified the "Act of Havana" providing for immediate consultations in case any European possession in this hemisphere were menaced. On the 14th, Christian Zinsser, German Chargé d'Affaires, was declared to be *persona non grata* by the Honduran Government. On the 15th, Oswaldo Aranha, Brazilian Foreign Minister, declared that Brazil would stand firm in defense of American territorial integrity and would maintain her obligations assumed at Lima, Havana and Panama. On the same day the President of Uruguay pledged his country's coöperation in defense of "the liberty and security of American life," and Peru seized a Danish ship in Callao. On the 28th, the German-subsidized paper *Diario de la Guerra* in Mexico City was suspended.

April. On the 1st, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador seized 23 Axis merchant ships in their harbors; and on the same day Peru banned the German-controlled Transocean News. On the 3rd, Brazil seized three Axis ships. On the 5th, Uruguay also seized the German ships in its harbors. On the 8th, Mexico expropriated her seized Axis ships. On the 9th, Brazil fined the Italian Aviation company *Ala Litoria* for an unauthorized flight and warned it of expulsion. On the 20th, all Central American Governments were reported to have refused to accept the German Chargé d'Affaires expelled from Honduras. On the 29th, Costa Rica expelled Karl Bayer, head of the Nazi propaganda organization.

May. On the 1st, there were pro-democratic and pro-Axis parades in Buenos Aires; in Vera Cruz, Mexico, the swastika flag was torn from the German Consulate and burned at a labor mass meeting. On the 4th, a Bolivian "spokesman" announced that Government's rejection of the Japanese offer to buy tungsten. On the 9th, Brazil refused to permit Air France to resume service; and Bolivia moved to control the German airline *Lloyd Aereo Boliviano*. On the 10th, Nicaragua deported Paul Ernest Strobelt, Nazi Gestapo agent. On the 11th, Costa Rica deported Humbert Adrians, Nazi seaman. On the 15th, it was announced that English would be made compulsory in all grade schools in Nicaragua. Also on that date Bolivia seized *Lloyd Aereo Boliviano*. On the 23rd, Accion Argentina, an association with 800,000 members, urged severe measures against the fifth column danger.

June. On the 5th, Ecuador expelled Count Heinrich von Matusha for being a "Nazi agitator." On the 11th, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies passed a resolution 73 to 16 urging action against the German news agency, Transocean News, and fifth column activities. On the 15th, El Salvador seized a secret Nazi radio. On the 20th, former President Hevia of Cuba urged a break of diplomatic relations with Germany. On

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the 28th, Honduras closed the Axis consulates.

July. On the 1st, the Argentine Senate approved the Havana plan for control and administration of European possessions in this hemisphere subject to European aggression. On the 2nd, the United States declared its support of Uruguay's proposal that any American republic engaged in a foreign war be regarded as a non-belligerent. On the 3rd, Costa Rica declared its non-belligerency. On the 4th, Bolivia followed Uruguay's proposal, the same day that the Foreign Minister of Chile declared that "Chile will rush her aid to the common effort in accordance with her traditions of inter-American solidarity," if any American nation is threatened. On the 10th, Cuba seized Spanish Falangist propaganda and medals; the same day Mexico announced its support of Uruguay's proposal. On the 20th, former Finance Minister Victor Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia was arrested, charged with plotting a "Nazi putsch," and on the same day President Eduardo Santos of Colombia pledged that the Panama Canal would never be attacked "from our territory." On the 21st, "Germany's ace director of aviation expansion for Spanish America" was forced to leave Colombia. On the 24th, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies unanimously ratified the Havana Convention. On the 25th, Brazilian Government action suspended the Italian newspaper *Corrieri Degli Italiani* in São Paulo for a cartoon attacking Mrs. Roosevelt, and students wrecked the paper's editorial room.

August. On the 2nd, Peru informed the German Legation that diplomatic pouches would be subject to customs registry. On the 6th, German propagandists were arrested in Cuba. On the 14th, Cuba closed the German Consulate in Santiago. On the 15th, five German consular officials and the Italian Consul General were ordered to leave Cuba. On the same day *Voz Obrera*, pro-Nazi newspaper in Ecuador, was suspended. On the 16th, speakers at a rally of 40,000 trade unionists denounced the Axis and urged that Argentina join the Anglo-American-Russian front. On the 20th, Peru suspended *Unidad*, the Spanish Falange publication, and *Nuova*, an Italian weekly. On the 22nd, Mexico ordered all German consulates closed.

September. On the 1st, Ecuador suspended the German airline, and in Mexico President Avila Camacho pledged full coöperation in defense of the western hemisphere. On the 6th, Nicaragua closed the Nazi consulates. On the 8th, Haiti froze Axis funds. On the 13th, Pan American-Grace Airways announced that German-controlled airlines had been "effectively eliminated" from western South America.

October. On the 10th, President Guardia of Panama pledged "the most absolute collaboration in the defense of the continent." On the 25th, Costa Rica barred the *Epoca* from the mails and threatened the expulsion of those spreading anti-democratic principles. On the 30th, Bolivia announced that she would not renew the contract with the Italian military mission.

November. On the 5th, Chile announced that 11 Latin American nations had agreed to a joint protest to Germany against the execution of hostages in occupied countries. On the 6th, Panama banned all Japanese commercial establishments. On the 10th, President Vargas declared that Brazil is "ready to act in the common defense." On the same day the Spanish Minister was declared to be *persona non grata* in Panama. On the 14th, there was an anti-Nazi riot in Rosario, Argentina. On the 20th, German newspapers from abroad were prohibited in Brazil. On the 23rd, President Batista of Cuba predicted that the United States would be at war by next spring and that "Cuba will be the first nation to enter the war on her side."

PART II. Political action taken by Latin American countries in 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1944 against the Axis and in support of the United States.

December 1941. On the 7th, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala declared war on Japan; Mexico announced its support of the United States and ordered defense measures; Panama interned Japanese residents. On the 8th, Honduras, El Salvador, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Panama declared war; Mexico and Colombia broke off relations with Japan; Panama arrested Germans. On the 9th, Cuba declared war against Japan; Argentina and Chile granted non-belligerency status to the United States. On the 10th, Brazil froze Axis funds; Argentina froze Japanese funds; Panama interned 773 aliens including Japanese, Germans, Italians, Austrians, Czechs, Rumanians, Hungarians, Poles and Norwegians; Cuba barred the entry of Europeans. On the 11th, Cuba, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic declared war on Germany and Italy; Mexico broke relations with Germany and Italy and froze Axis funds; El Salvador did likewise. On the 12th, Panama, Honduras, Haiti and El Salvador declared war on Germany and Italy; Cuba passed draft for all men between 20 and 25 and confiscated Axis holdings and interned Axis nationals; police broke up pro-United States demonstrations in Buenos Aires; Uruguay froze Axis funds and declared non-belligerency for American nations; Venezuela froze Axis funds; Ecuador banned Nazi agencies and pro-Axis papers. On the 13th, Brazil placed the Nazi Transocean and Italian Stefani news agencies under special censorship and closed Italian and Japanese papers. On the 14th, Mexican labor offered to form a popular army to uphold anti-Axis policy; Brazil suspended the Nazi airline Condor. On the 17th, Argentina banned a tribute to President Roosevelt.

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On the 19th, Nicaragua declared war on Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria; Colombia severed relations with Germany and Italy. On the 20th, Cuba interned all Japanese in Cuba, numbering 767. On the 23rd, Mexico severed relations with Bulgaria. On the 24th, Bolivia banned German Transocean News; Brazil closed the Japanese newspaper *Brasil Asahi* and a German publication in São Paulo and another in Santa Catharina. On the 29th, Mexico banned Japanese fishing. On the 30th, 137 German "assault troops" were arrested in Brazil in the State of Rio Grande do Sul. On the 31st, Venezuela broke off relations with Germany, Italy and Japan.

January 1942. On the 4th, Cuba ordered the internment of 4,084 German aliens. On the 5th, Costa Rica arrested 50 Germans on charges of espionage and subversive activities. On the 6th, Brazil took over the German-controlled Condor airline. On the 15th, at the Rio Conference President Vargas said, ". . . we shall not permit either our land or our seaboard to serve the purpose of a base for attack against any of our sister nations. Mexican Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla declared that "The attack by Japan was not on the United States, but on America. . . . We are going to defend America." On the 16th, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela in a resolution at the Rio Conference called on all of the American republics to break off all relations with the Axis. On the 21st, delegates of the 21 republics agreed unanimously to sever diplomatic relations with the Axis. This resolution was weakened by Argentina's insistence that it be done " . . . in accordance with their constitutional institutions and powers, provided that these are in accord. . . ." On the 22nd, Brazil placed German, Italian and Japanese societies under surveillance. On the 23rd, after a new compromise to satisfy Argentina, breaking of relations by 21 republics was recommended "in accordance with the procedure established by their own laws." Ezequiel Padilla of Mexico said that "The force of the American people behind this measure will transform it in reality into the original . . . resolution without the change of so much as a comma." On the 24th, Peru and Uruguay broke with the Axis. On the 25th, Paraguay and Bolivia broke with the Axis. On the 28th, Brazil broke with the Axis; the Conference adopted resolutions covering severance of financial and commercial relations, control of subversive activities, communications and aviation, creation of an inter-American military committee, and adherence to the Atlantic Charter. On the 29th, Peru and Ecuador signed a pact ending their 125-year-old boundary conflict; Ecuador broke relations with Axis powers. On the 30th, Peru arrested 150 Germans.

February. On the 4th, Brazil banned Transocean and D.N.B. German news agencies and the Italian Stefani news service. On the 7th, Paraguay closed the German, Italian and Japanese news agencies.

March. On the 12th, German, Italian and Japanese establishments were wrecked by angry mobs in Rio, and President Vargas confiscated 30 percent of Axis funds in the country for sinking of Brazilian ships. On the 17th, in an anti-Axis riot in Santiago, Chile, windows of Axis firms were smashed. On the 18th, President Juan Antonio Rios of Chile promised "frank and open coöperation with all the American nations, especially the United States."

April. On the 7th, Brazil reported that the Government had decided to arm all merchant ships. On the 29th, Cuba recognized Free French control of the Pacific Islands.

May. On the 1st, President Vargas said "Our solidarity with the United States was an imperative obligation based on continental solidarity." On the 8th, President Prado of Peru said the Navies of the United States and Peru "are united in the defense of the liberties handed down by our forefathers." On the 16th, Venezuela announced that Humboldt College, a center for totalitarian propaganda, was to be closed. On the 18th, Mexican labor formally petitioned President Camacho to declare war on the Axis powers. On the 21st, President Rios of Chile reaffirmed the declaration that Chile would not permit its territory or territorial waters to be used against any American country.

June. On the 1st, President Camacho signed a declaration of war against Axis powers after it had been unanimously passed by House and Senate. On the 12th, all Axis property in Mexico was ordered confiscated. On the 15th, Brazil took over the Italian cable between Brazil and Argentina.

July. On the 2nd, Mexico announced the dissolution of the Falangista Party in the republic. On the 5th, 60 persons were injured and Axis establishments were wrecked in Costa Rica. On the 12th, Peru ordered all aliens to register. On the 17th, the Spanish Embassy and Consulate in Cuba were prohibited from using code. On the 27th, former Spanish Minister to Panama, Count Carlos de Bailen, was expelled from Cuba. On the 28th, all Brazilian shipping, about 300,000 tons, it was announced, would be placed under the jurisdiction of the Allied Shipping Control Board.

August. On the 12th the Chilean Government ordered all communications with the Axis nations placed under censorship because they might "endanger the security of American States." On the 13th, dollar flow between Mexico and the United States was curbed by Mexico to control Axis funds. On the 20th, President Vargas of Brazil ordered the Brazilian Navy to convoy Brazilian merchant ships "in coöperation with the United States Navy and Air Force" and prohibited Germans from leaving the country, cancelling the departure of diplomatic exchange ships. On the 22nd, Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy; the Uruguayan Foreign Minister announced that Uruguay "is absolutely accompanying Brazil." On the 24th, Brazil confiscated one Italian and two

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German banks. On the 25th, Brazil cancelled its debt to Germany.

September. On the 10th, the national committee of the Radical Party in Argentina, with the majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies, voted 20 to 1 to support a demand for a break with the Axis. On the 11th, Argentine police battled with a pro-Ally crowd in Buenos Aires and 97 rioters were arrested. On the 19th, 10,000 persons in Buenos Aires at a pro-Ally meeting heard demands for war.

November. On the 13th, Brazil, Panama and Honduras broke relations with Vichy. On the 25th, President del Rio of Ecuador spoke of "a forthright effort to coöperate with the United States in the struggle for victory for democracy."

December. On the 9th, Cuban President Batista pledged Cuba's coöperation so that "continental solidarity may be a perpetual reality."

January 1943. On the 20th, President Rios of Chile signed a decree breaking diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy and Japan. On the 27th, a crowd of 100,000 celebrated the break in Santiago. On the 28th, Chile prohibited the use of codes and broadcasting of weather reports.

February. On the 6th, Brazil declared its adherence to the United Nations pact and to the Atlantic Charter. On the 7th, Peru announced its adherence to the Atlantic Charter.

March. On the 28th, in Santiago, Chile, 80,000 persons heard Vice President Wallace.

April. On the 6th, Bolivia declared war on the Axis. On the 11th, the Peruvian Government expropriated all business firms controlled by Axis nationals.

May. On the 1st, Bolivia joined the United Nations. On the 12th, Uruguay broke off relations with Vichy.

October. On the 3rd, 34 German firms were liquidated in Brazil. On the 28th, Brazil liquidated Axis properties including one capitalized at $100,000,000. On the 30th, Guatemala seized the German-owned Gerapaz Railway.

November. On the 11th, President Ramirez of the Argentine said that the people of Argentina "firmly desire victory for the countries fighting for democracy." On the 27th, Colombia declared a state of belligerency with Germany.

December. On the 1st, the Colombian Government asked all Colombians to make donations of blood plasma. On the 4th, Bolivia announced adherence to the Atlantic Charter. On the 25th, Ecuador ousted Axis subjects. On the 26th, Bolivia announced its decision to nationalize Axis firms.

January 1944. On the 17th, Colombia joined the United Nations. On the 23rd, Peru announced it would liquidate Axis property. On the 26th, Argentina broke with the Axis.

February. On the 4th, Argentina broke with Bulgaria, Vichy France, Rumania and Hungary.

March. On the 2nd, President Farrell of Argentina said that he would work closely with other American nations.

Part III. Military action taken by Latin American countries in 1941, 1942 and 1943 against the Axis and in support of the United States.

February 1941. On the 16th, the Uruguayan Government named military missions to purchase arms, airplanes, warships and minelayers in the United States.

March. On the 5th, President Arnulfo Arias of Panama announced that the United States had been given permission to establish air and anti-aircraft bases on Panamanian soil. On the 7th, the Mexican Foreign Minister said that Mexico would "not hesitate to sign a military pact with the United States." On the 15th, Costa Rica congratulated the United States on the passage of the lend-lease bill. On the 24th, the Cuban Senate said the lend-lease legislation is "indispensable for the existence of our democratic institutions, now threatened by anti-democratic countries." The United States signed an agreement to send a six-man naval mission to Venezuela. On the 29th, El Salvador approved a contract with Colonel Robert L. Christian of the United States Army, making him supervisor of the Salvador Military Academy.

April. On the 4th, Mexico ratified a pact with the United States permitting reciprocal use of airfields. On the 16th, Nicaraguan President Somoza announced that the new airport would be the largest in Central America. On the 23rd, Argentina authorized 646,000,000 pesos for national defense. On the 24th, the Mexican paper *Excelsior* reported that the Government approved $14,000,000 for improving the harbors in four different ports.

May. On the 9th, a new military school for high army officers was established in Guatemala with the assistance of Brigadier-General Edward L. N. Glass of the United States Army. On the 19th, Captain William M. Quigley of the United States Navy was appointed Chief of Staff of the Peruvian Navy. On the 25th, a Cuban draft bill was approved by the Military Affairs Committee of the Cuban House of Representatives. On the 31st, President Camacho said that "it would be a mistake to think that . . . the destiny of one of the American nations could remain isolated indefinitely from the destiny of the rest."

June. On the 5th, reports from San José, Costa Rica, indicated that a considerable quantity of modern arms had been received from the United States. An American military mission was to train the Costa Rican Army in the use of the new weapons. On the 7th, President Baldonier said Uruguay was prepared to offer bases for the defense of the western hemisphere. On the 16th, a Brazilian Embassy official in Washington reported negotia-

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tions with the United States for the construction of air bases. On the 18th, all exports of military raw materials from Brazil, including industrial diamonds, quartz, crystal, and mica, were allowed only to the United States. On the 21st, Nicaragua announced it would develop an army of 25,000.

July. On the 16th a four-year military mission was to be sent to Costa Rica from the United States under an agreement signed by both countries.

August. On the 6th, Argentina voted 50,000,000 pesos for increased arms production. On the 7th, Argentina voted 714,000,000 pesos for naval rearmament. On the 25th, the Under Secretary of State said that the United States would supply "in increasing volume" arms materials to Latin America. On the 30th, private shipyards were placed under naval control in Cuba.

October. On the 1st, Secretary Hull and Brazilian Ambassador Carlos Martins signed an agreement for lend-lease.

November. On the 7th, an unspecified amount of lend-lease aid was sent to Cuba. On the 12th, the High Commissioner of Nicaragua said 10,000 men were ready to aid the United States if this country becomes involved in war.

December. On the 6th, Bolivia signed a lend-lease pact for a reported ten to fifteen million dollars. On the 10th, Mexican troops crossed United States territory on the way to Lower California to strengthen coastal defenses. On the 24th, Mexico opened all ports and territory to the armed forces of any American republic at war with the Axis.

January 1942. On the 11th, Mexico announced the organization of a special police force to control fifth column activities. On the 13th, an agreement was signed in Washington under which Uruguay would obtain United States military and naval supplies under the lend-lease act. On the 16th, a $550,000 lend-lease agreement was signed for Costa Rica's army.

February. On the 2nd, El Salvador was understood to be getting $1,100,000 under lend-lease. On the 4th, Argentina announced that the army would be increased to 100,000 men. On the 5th, it was announced that Uruguay would receive United States naval vessels for patrol of the Plate estuary. On the 10th, Brazil announced that the island of Fernando de Noronha was to be a naval defense base. On the 19th, Mexico placed civil defense under army control. On the 21st, Sumner Welles announced that certain American republics were aiding in convoying in inter-American trade.

March. On the 2nd, the President of Ecuador announced that the United States was establishing a naval base at Salinas at the entrance to Guayaquil Bay. On the 18th, Venezuela signed an agreement for ten to sixteen million dollars in lend-lease. On the 19th, Guatemala disclosed the establishment there by the United States of an air base to protect Central America and the Panama Canal. On the 22nd, Peru announced the arrival of United States war material and a military training mission. On the 27th, Mexico reported it would receive 200 planes, anti-aircraft guns, trucks and 30 locomotives under lend-lease.

April. On the 8th, the Brazilian Army was authorized to train reserves to a number that may exceed 1,000,000. On April 13th, Haiti signed agreements with the United States for artillery, airplanes, and a patrol boat.

May. On the 29th, agreements for a four-year military mission to Colombia and a naval mission to Brazil were signed by these countries and the United States.

June. On the 16th, Brazil called army reserves and ordered the classes of 1919, 1920 and 1921 into active service. On the 19th, Cuba granted the United States anti-submarine facilities and an air training center. On the 31st, Colonel Frederick T. Cruse of the United States Army was made director of the Nicaraguan Military Academy.

July. On the 8th, it was reported that Cuba was training 100,000 men.

August. On the 23rd, 44 United States Army training planes were flown to Brazil from California. On the 27th, the Cuban Navy and air forces were reported coöperating in convoy duty.

September. On the 7th, United States troops were reported at bases near Guayaquil and in the Galapagos Islands with the approval of the Ecuadorean Government; a reciprocal military and naval agreement was signed by the United States and Cuba. On the 16th, Brazil ordered complete mobilization.

October. On the 13th, Secretary of the Navy Knox said that Brazilian coöperation was "of the 100 percent variety" and that Brazilian naval vessels were under direction of United States Admiral Jonas H. Ingram.

November. On the 12th, Argentina approved the United States African campaign. On the 26th, it was revealed in Chile that a pact existed whereby the United States agreed to aid Chile in case of attack.

January 1943. On the 9th, Brazil extended conscription to include 18-year-olds. On the 15th, Cuba announced that 250,000 had registered under the Compulsory Military Service Law.

March. On the 27th, Rio reported Brazil would send 500 aviators to train in the United States.

May. On the 28th, President Camacho in a radio broadcast declared that Mexico was ready to send troops to fight overseas if necessary.

July. On the 23rd, President Morinigo of Paraguay spoke of the United States war effort as "fabulous."

August. On the 21st, the Brazilian Ambassador to Great Britain said that Brazil had 300,000 troops, including a force which "awaits orders from the Allied High Command to proceed to the battle-front."

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September. On the 13th, the Brazilian War Minister declared that Brazil's active participation in the war in Europe was "only a question of preparation and more equipment from the United States."

November. On the 25th, Costa Rica announced that Costa Ricans might enlist in the United States armed forces.

December. On the 12th, it was announced in Algiers that an "advance reconnaissance party" of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force had arrived in North Africa.

PART IV. Items in the program of economic aid and coöperation between the United States and Latin American countries in 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1944.

February 1941. On the 21st, a United States-Mexico rubber pact was entered into.

March. On the 23rd, a $2,000,000 loan from the United States to Nicaragua for road construction was announced.

June. On the 20th, the United States Federal Loan Administration extended $660,000 to Bolivia to develop the former German-owned *Lloyd Aereo Boliviano* airline.

July. On the 7th, dispatches from Rio indicated that the United States had concluded a contract with Brazil to buy Brazil's entire surplus of certain strategic materials for two years.

October. On the 22nd, a $30,000,000 credit to Mexico for road improvement and construction was announced.

November. On the 27th, it was announced that the United States would buy all of Argentina's production of tungsten for three years.

January 1942. On the 16th, the Public Works Administration approved a $20,000,000 loan to Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Rica to help build the Pan American Highway. On the 28th, it was announced at the Rio Conference that the Export-Import Bank would supply $10,000,000 to Bolivia.

February. On the 27th, the United States Treasury extended $5,000,000 to Ecuador as a loan to stabilize the Ecuadorean sucre.

March. On the 3rd, four agreements were concluded between the United States and Brazil for $100,000,000 credit from the Export-Import Bank for production of strategic materials, for development of the Itabarra iron mines and raw rubber production.

April. On the 7th, the United States and Mexico agreed to develop Mexican industry including steel and tin-plate rolling mills, and to construct a high-octane gasoline plant. On the 23rd, the United States and Peruvian Governments reached agreements for a $1,125,000 credit for rubber production, a $25,000,000 credit for public works, and for the purchase of all rubber surplus for five years and surplus Peruvian cotton for the duration of the war. On the 25th, the United States agreed to extend $500,000 credit to the Nicaraguan Bank. On the 29th, the United States Metals Reserve Company agreed to buy copper, lead and zinc from Mexico.

June. On the 13th, the Commodity Credit Corporation agreed to buy the whole Peruvian cotton crop for $44,000,000.

July. On the 12th, the United States and Bolivia signed an agreement for the purchase of Bolivia's entire rubber crop by the United States and extension of a $2,125,000 loan to Bolivia. On the 21st, the United States agreed to buy the entire rubber crop from Ecuador. On the 22nd, Uruguay received a $12,000,000 credit from the Export-Import Bank for a hydroelectric plant.

August. On the 1st, the United States and Brazil signed a pact for the purchase of six Brazilian products for one to four years at an estimated cost of $32,490,000 for the first year.

September. On the 25th, the United States and Brazil signed a pact for a $14,000,000 credit to Brazil for railway construction.

October. On the 5th, the Colombian War Minister announced that the first of 20 landing fields being built in the jungles with the coöperation of the United States Rubber Reserve Corporation was completed. On the 16th, the United States announced a rubber pact with Venezuela.

November. On the 18th, the United States announced it would aid repair of Mexican railways to facilitate transportation of war materials.

July 1943. On the 1st, the United States entered monetary stabilization pacts with Cuba and Ecuador. On the 7th, Colombia announced a public works loan from the United States of $18,000,000. On the 20th, Brazil estimated 1943 rubber production at 35,000 tons.

October. On the 23rd, the Uruguayan Government announced a $500,000 gift from the Office of the Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs for sanitation and health programs.

February 1944. On the 8th, the United States discontinued activities in developing Brazilian rubber and left the financing of the operation to Brazil, in return for a 33⅓ percent advance over current prices.

March. On the 2nd, Mexico announced receipt of a $10,000,000 loan from the United States Petroleum Reserves Corporation. On the 15th, a Brazilian newspaper announced a $150,000,000 credit from the United States Export-Import Bank for mining and railroad electrification.

April. On the 1st, the Office of the Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs granted $300,000 to Nicaragua for public health.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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HOW NEW WILL THE BETTER WORLD BE? By CARL L. BECKER. New York: Knopf, 1944, 246 p. $2.50.

Professor Becker, one of America's most respected historians, has managed within the covers of this modest book to compress a vast amount of good common sense. His erudition and his capacity for lucid and arresting expression have enabled him to set forth clearly in these pages the proper historical background against which any realistic "peace planning" must be projected. He deflates much current wishful thinking and starry-eyed Utopianism, but without surrendering to pessimism or defeatism.

THE IDEA OF NATIONALISM. By HANS KOHN. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 735 p. $7.50.

Professor Kohn is already the author of several treatises and collections of essays which deal with various phases of the history and current problems of nationalism. In this fundamental work, he has traced the idea of nationalism from ancient Hebrew and Greek times down to the present.

POWER POLITICS. By GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER. London: Cape, 1941, 448 p. 21/.

This "introduction to the study of international relations and postwar planning" is a work of wide scope and deep learning. The author has digested a vast amount of literature and has sought to give his sociological analysis of the fundamental forces in international politics a somewhat metaphysical basis.

CITIZEN, PLAN FOR PEACE! By MERRILL E. BUSH AND OTHERS. New York: Harper, 1944, 201 p. $2.50.

Suggestions for organizing popular discussion and action, made at the Temple University Institute for Postwar Planning.

FEDERATION: THE COMING STRUCTURE OF WORLD GOVERNMENT. EDITED BY HOWARD O. EATON. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1944, 234 p. $3.00.

Some fifteen experts and political figures, both American and foreign, express their views on the problem of international federation. In the appendix is a draft constitution prepared by Professor Eaton.

CHAOS OR PEACE. By LESLIE BALOGH BAIN. New York: Mill, 1943, 150 p. $2.00.

Pungent and discerning chapters wherein the author admonishes us not to expect too much from the coming peace, particularly if we drop our guard against the reactionaries and Fascists — whom he finds to be indigenous everywhere. He dedicates his little volume "to the tired liberals who always get hanged first."

OUT OF THE CLOUDS. By ROBERT KAZMAYER. Philadelphia: Macrae-Smith, 1944, 255 p. $2.50.

The author reviews various representative "peace plans," finds them largely lacking in relevancy to what he feels will be the actual situation after the war, and then bestows his blessing on a system of power in which the powerful will take and exercise general responsibility.

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AN ADVENTURE IN WORLD ORDER. By Philip Curtis Nash. Boston: Beacon Press, 1944, 139 p. $1.50.

A former national executive director of the League of Nations Association presents a reasoned and apparently well-articulated framework, or "constitution," for international coöperation on a world-wide scale.

LA CONQUÊTE DE LA PAIX. By Pierre Ricour. Montreal: Variétés, 1944, 214 p. $1.25.

Proceeding from the premise that wars are not inevitable, the author seeks their causes as well as a way out.

VICTORY BEGINS AT HOME: A PROGRAMME OF MINIMUM WAR AIMS. By G. H. Gretton. New York: Norton (London: Allen and Unwin), 1944, 183 p. $2.50.

A statement of war and peace aims — on both the national and international levels — within the framework of a Christian society.

GLOBAL POLITICS. Edited by Russell H. Fitzgibbon. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1944, 189 p. $2.50.

Lectures on various current world problems, delivered at Los Angeles by some dozen scholars — American and foreign — for the Institute of Political Geography.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE PEACE. By Nicholas John Spykman. New York: Harcourt, 1944, 66 p. $2.75.

This slender volume, in large format, appears posthumously, having been edited by Professor Spykman's assistant, Helen R. Nicholl. Its thesis is that already stated in the author's "America's Strategy in World Politics." What is new here is the large number of schematic maps and the direct application of the geopolitical method to the postwar settlement. The net result is to demonstrate once again that geopolitics, in so far as it is valid, is merely common sense disguised in a new technical jargon.

HOUR OF TRIUMPH. By George Fielding Eliot. New York: Reynal, 1944, 214 p. $2.50.

A noted military commentator maps the paths which he believes the Allies must tread if their victory is to have meaning: a functioning council among the United Nations must be created; the resolve to enforce "unconditional surrender" on the Germans and Japanese must be given effect; an international police force should be set up; Japan must be de-industrialized, etc. On the whole, this is a hardheaded book, though its author cannot hope for universal agreement to all his suggestions.

NEW WORLD THEME. By Henry A. Wallace and Others. Stanford University: J. L. Delkin, 1943, 33 p. $10.00.

This beautifully printed book, which appears in a limited edition of two hundred copies, contains Vice-President Wallace's address "The Price of Free World Victory" (May 8, 1942), a statement by Lewis Mumford on "The Task of Tomorrow," and "a comment" by Jay Allen.

DEMOCRACY: SHOULD IT SURVIVE? Milwaukee: Bruce, 1943, 159 p. $2.00.

Essays by some thirteen writers, both Catholic and non-Catholic, prepared under the auspices of the William J. Kerby Foundation. Among the contributors are the Rev. John A. Ryan, Jacques Maritain, Walter Lippmann and Don Luigi Sturzo.

VICTORY WITHOUT PEACE. By Roger Burlingame and Alden Stevens. New York: Harcourt, 1944, 335 p. $2.75.

A reëvocation of the circumstances under which "peace" was made following World War I, intended as a warning to peacemakers today.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS. By Stephen Bonsal. Garden City: Doubleday, 1944, 313 p. $3.00.

Before the First World War the author had, as a newspaperman, acquired an intimate knowledge of European affairs, notably along the Danube and in the Balkans. The American delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, where he was particularly close to

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Colonel House, gave Bonsal several important and complicated assignments. This book, consisting of extracts from his diary, will be of great interest to students of the period, though they will regret that the chronology of events is somewhat obscure.

ARCTIC MANUAL. By Vilhjalmur Stefansson. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 556 p. $3.00.

This handbook was originally prepared for the United States Army Air Corps by the noted Arctic explorer. Students of international affairs will find a valuable fund of information about the Arctic regions in the opening sections. There are a number of interesting illustrations.

THE FUTURE OF COLONIAL PEOPLES. By Lord Hailey. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944, 62 p. $1.00.

This succinct but comprehensive review of the colonial problem grew out of lectures delivered last year at Princeton University by the author of the monumental work "An African Survey." Lord Hailey takes a conservative but by no means reactionary or "imperialist" view of the responsibilities of the Powers toward their colonial peoples. In the end his program for making haste slowly may well prove to be the more progressive way.

RETROUVER LA FOI. By Jules Romains. New York: Maison Française, 1944, 167 p. $1.50.

Essays on the ills of our era, by the author of "The Seven Mysteries of Europe."

REVOLUTION COMES OF AGE: THE USE OF WAR. By Asher Brynes. New York: Farrar, 1944, 271 p. $2.50.

This somewhat baffling book shows flashes of real insight into the shape of the world today and to come, notably in the fields of high strategy and political organization. Unhappily, it lacks coherence and in many places its style defies ready comprehension.

WAR AND THE LAW. Edited by Ernst W. Puttkammer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944, 205 p. $2.00.

These lectures, delivered on the Walgreen Foundation by several authorities, deal with some of the effects of this war on law, both domestic and international.

General: Economic and Social

MAN THE MEASURE: A NEW APPROACH TO HISTORY. By Erich Kahler. New York: Pantheon Books, 1943, 700 p. $5.00.

A reinterpretation of human history, in which the author is concerned with ethical and spiritual trends as well as with economics and political institutions.

POSTWAR GOALS AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION. Edited by Arnold J. Zurcher and Richmond Page. New York: New York University, Institute on Postwar Reconstruction, 1944, 304 p. $3.50.

Speeches delivered at the Institute's second series of conferences.

FROM VICTORY TO PEACE. By Paul Hutchinson. Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1943, 226 p. $1.50.

An editor of the American review, the *Christian Century*, seeks to show that a peace founded on Christian principles is not only politically possible but indispensable.

EMPIRE OF THE AIR. By Matthew Josephson. New York: Harcourt, 1944, 236 p. $3.00.

The dramatic story of the remarkable expansion of Pan American Airways told in the form of a biography of its enterprising head, Juan Trippe.

POPULATION PROBLEMS: A CULTURAL INTERPRETATION. By Paul H. Landis. New York: American Book, 1943, 500 p. $3.75.

A comprehensive and up-to-date treatise.

GAUGING PUBLIC OPINION. By Hadley Cantril and Others. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944, 318 p. $3.75.

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Several practitioners of the art of surveying public opinion explain how it is done and how its results may be employed by the other social scientists.

THE RACE QUESTION AND THE NEGRO. By John La Farge. New York: Longmans, 1943, 315 p. $2.50.

One of America's most important problems considered in the light of Catholic doctrine by the editor of *America*, a Jesuit review.

THE EPIC OF A PEOPLE. By A. Addleson. New York: Bloch, 1943, 359 p. $3.50.

A popular history of the Jewish people, in Palestine and in the Diaspora, from antiquity to the present day.

EUROPE'S CHILDREN 1939 TO 1943. By Thérèse Bonney. New York: Rhode (distributed by Duell), 1943, 138 p. $3.00.

The tragedy of the new generation outlined in telling pictures.

The Second World War

FOUR YEARS. By Adrian Van Sinderen. New York: Coward-McCann, 1944, 205 p. $2.75.

An amateur's chronology of the war up through September 1943.

LA GUERRE DES CINQ CONTINENTS. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1943, 304 p. 3/6.

Chapters on various phases of the strategy and conduct of the war on all fronts, by the military expert of *La France Libre*, a review published in London.

BLITZKRIEG AND BLUFF: THE LEGEND OF NAZI INVINCIBILITY. By Major Erwin Lessner. New York: Putnam, 1943, 246 p. $2.75.

A review of the record of the German Army in this war, in which the author shows that its early successes were due in no small part to its outbluffing the enemy — tactics it was not able to repeat in Russia.

SEVENTY THOUSAND MILES OF WAR. By W. W. Chaplin. New York: Appleton-Century, 1943, 287 p. $3.00.

A correspondent for the International News Service and the National Broadcasting Company visits several countries at war and sees something of the fighting, though only on Russia does he say anything really important.

THEY SHALL NOT SLEEP. By Leland Stowe. New York: Knopf, 1944, 399 p. $3.00.

In this sequel to "No Other Road to Freedom" one of America's most forthright and liberal-minded journalists includes many passages which wartime censorship kept out of his cabled dispatches — notably from China, Burma, India and Russia. He found much to deplore wherever he went, and in this book he gives wide play to his likes and dislikes.

THE LONG BALKAN NIGHT. By Leigh White. New York: Scribner, 1944, 473 p. $3.50.

The author of this interesting volume went to southeastern Europe in the early spring of 1940 to report to the Overseas News Agency on conditions among the Jewish population of that area. He left Belgrade after the Nazi invasion in company with several other correspondents, including Robert St. John, who has described their flight graphically in his "From the Land of Silent People." White's account, of which only half concerns the tragic month of April 1941, contains more on general Balkan conditions than his colleague's did, and also is angrier and more depressing. His concluding remarks on Jugoslav affairs will be subject to the usual discount by those who hold to Tito and his Partisans.

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TARGET: GERMANY. New York: Simon and Schuster in coöperation with *Life*, 1943, 121 p. $2.00.

The official story of the organization and activities of the Eighth Bomber Command of the United States Air Force during the first year of its operations from bases in Great Britain. As told here, it is eminently human and colorful, and it succeeds admirably in creating a cumulative impression of the time, effort, expense and unsung heroism required to carry on a large-scale aërial campaign.

PIPELINE TO BATTLE. By Major Peter W. Rainier. New York: Random House, 1943, 302 p. $2.50.

This is one of the better war books. The author, an engineer by profession but a writer by avocation, participated in the Libyan campaigns of Wavell and Montgomery. Among other things he laid and operated the pipeline which, by supplying fresh water to the British forces, helped defeat Rommel at the gates of Egypt.

ROAD TO TUNIS. By David Rame. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 296 p. $2.50.

Colorful reporting on the North African campaign, particularly in western Tunisia, by a South African writer, some of whose novels have appeared under his real name — A. D. Divine.

D DAY. By John Gunther. New York: Harper, 1944, 276 p. $3.00.

Gunther was the only American correspondent attached to General Eisenhower's headquarters at the start of the invasion of Sicily. His report — in diary form — on this campaign and on his subsequent visits to Turkey and North Africa provides some of the most interesting reading to come out of the war.

TWELVE MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD. By Larry Lesueur. New York: Knopf, 1943, 345 p. $3.00.

The author was the Columbia Broadcasting System's correspondent in Russia from November 1941 to November 1942. In this journal he has recorded his day-to-day reactions and observations, from which one gathers that he was greatly impressed with the discipline, determination and capacity for endurance of the Russian people.

LAST FLIGHT FROM SINGAPORE. By Arthur G. Donahue. New York: Macmillan, 1943, 168 p. $2.50.

An American flyer in the R.A.F. gives his personal story of the last phases of the Singapore campaign.

BATAAN: THE JUDGMENT SEAT. By Lieutenant Colonel Allison Ind. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 395 p. $3.50.

In spite of its scrappy, episodic construction, this book carries a powerful punch. The author was an Air Intelligence Officer in the Philippines before and during the Japanese attack. What he has to say about the incompetency and complacency prevailing in American military circles there is important and enlightening.

TEN ESCAPE FROM TOJO. By Commander Melvyn H. McCoy and Lieutenant-Colonel S. M. Mellnik. New York: Farrar, 1944, 106 p. $1.00.

Three American officers describe briefly but most graphically their escape from the horrors of Japanese prison camps in the Philippine Islands.

TARAWA. By Robert Sherrod. New York: Duell, 1944, 183 p. $2.00.

The story of the capture of Tarawa, told in gripping detail by the *Time* correspondent who participated in it.

CONDITION RED: DESTROYER ACTION IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC. By Captain Frederick J. Bell. New York: Longmans, 1944, 274 p. $3.00.

The adventures of an American destroyer during the early days of the South Pacific campaign, as related by her commander.

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WHY SEA POWER WILL WIN THE WAR. By Rear Admiral Yates Stirling, Jr. New York: Fell, 1944, 319 p. $3.00.

A retired American naval officer of the war at sea up to the invasion of Sicily. He has little patience with the air-will-win-the-war school of thought.

THE ENEMIES' FIGHTING SHIPS. By Jay Launer. New York: Sheridan, 1944, 222 p. $3.75.

Information, so far as it is available to civilians, about the navies of Germany and Japan, especially the latter.

LIFELINE. By Robert Carse. New York: Morrow, 1943, 189 p. $2.75.

The story of the ships and the men that are maintaining American lifelines to the many fronts all over the world, told by a journalist turned merchant marine officer.

THEY SENT ME TO ICELAND. By Jane Goodell. New York: Ives Washburn' 1943, 248 p. $2.75.

An American Red Cross recreation worker recounts her adventures while setting up centers for the United States forces in Iceland.

TOMORROW ALWAYS COMES. By Vernon Bartlett. New York: Knopf, 1944' 159 p. $2.00.

Mr. Bartlett is a British commentator and political figure. In this imaginary "diary" he seeks to foresee the pattern of events as German resistance collapses.

THE UNITED NATIONS TODAY AND TOMORROW. Edited by Violet Anderson. Boston: Humphries, 1943, 166 p. $1.75.

Addresses on the rôle of the United Nations, delivered at the Canadian Institute on Public Affairs in August 1943, by about a dozen authorities.

UNITED NATIONS AGREEMENTS. Edited by M. B. Schnapper. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1944, 376 p. $3.75.

The story of inter-Allied coöperation as revealed by the relevant documents.

The United States

INTERNATIONAL BEARINGS OF AMERICAN POLICY. By Albert Shaw. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1943, 492 p. $3.50.

Dr. Albert Shaw, for nearly a half century the editor of the *Review of Reviews*, has been well known to two generations of Americans as the author of many works on political and allied problems. In the present volume he has distilled the essence of his learning and wide experience in the field of American diplomatic history, ranging far afield in both time and place.

A MODERN FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES. By Joseph M. Jones. New York: Macmillan, 1944, 94 p. $1.35.

After serving the State Department for several years in various capacities, the author resigned in 1943 to write this searchingly critical analysis of our foreign policy and of the shortcomings of the men and machinery through which that policy operates.

WHILE AMERICA SLEPT. By D. F. Fleming. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1944, 87 p. $2.00.

The collected scripts of radio talks delivered over WSM (Nashville) between May 1940 and December 1941 by an intelligent and outspoken commentator, a professor of international relations at Vanderbilt University.

THE ROAD TO TEHERAN. By Foster Rhea Dulles. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944, 279 p. $2.50.

This review and appraisal of Russo-American diplomatic relations since the days of Catherine the Great fills a long-felt need. It is concise, well-written and authoritative.

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THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION. By Edward S. Corwin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944, 64 p. $1.00.

An outstanding authority on the American Constitution shows that this document, and the practice which has grown up around it, do not inhibit the American people from entering whatever sort of international organization they may wish.

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN ACTION. By Richard W. Van Alstyne. Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1944, 760 p. $5.00.

Case studies arranged by topic.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. VOLUME V. JULY 1942–JUNE 1943. Edited by Leland M. Goodrich and Marie J. Carroll. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1944, 735 p. $3.75.

The latest addition to an indispensable series.

AMERICAN INTERCESSION ON BEHALF OF JEWS IN THE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1840–1938. By Cyrus Adler and Aaron M. Margalith. New York: The American Jewish Historical Society, 1943, 419 p. $4.00.

In this monograph the subject matter is organized by countries: the Near East and Morocco, Rumania and Poland, Russia and Central Europe. The text consists of documents, largely official, woven together with interpretative comment.

ASSIGNMENT: U. S. A. By Selden Menefee. New York: Reynal, 1943, 301 p. $3.00.

A panorama of what wartime America is doing and thinking, by a trained reporter sent out to cover the country by Princeton's Office of Public Opinion Research.

A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. By John D. Hicks. Boston: Houghton, 1943, 859 p. $5.50.

A comprehensive text in which political, economic and social developments are skilfully interwoven.

HISTORICAL ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES. By Clifford L. and Elizabeth H. Lord. New York: Holt, 1944, 253 p. $3.00.

Over 300 maps (plus appendices) stressing economic developments.

WARTIME GOVERNMENT IN OPERATION. By William H. Nicholls and John A. Vieg. Philadelphia: Blakiston, 1943, 109 p. $1.50.

A critical analysis of current American experience, stressing farm and labor problems.

GOVERNMENTAL ADJUSTMENT OF LABOR DISPUTES. By Howard S. Kaltenborn. Chicago: Foundation Press, 1943, 327 p. $3.50.

An objective analysis and evaluation, particularly of American practice.

CENTRAL BANKING FUNCTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TREASURY, 1789–1941. By Esther Rogoff Taus. New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, 313 p. $3.50.

A scholarly treatise, which both reviews and appraises American experience with federal banking control.

THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF WOODROW WILSON. By William Diamond. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1943, 210 p. $2.50.

A thorough analysis of the origins and nature of Wilson's ideas on economic problems.

ALASKA AND THE CANADIAN NORTHWEST: OUR NEW FRONTIER. By Harold Griffin. New York: Norton, 1944, 211 p. $2.75.

A breezy, illustrated account of recent developments and future potentialities.

AS WE GO MARCHING. By John T. Flynn. Garden City: Doubleday, 1944, 272 p. $2.00.

Mr. Flynn, a particularly vocal Roosevelt-hater, decides that deficit-spending is a one-way street to Fascism. He arrives at this decision after examining the histories of

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Italy and Germany in recent decades. According to the author's reasoning the United States is headed for Fascism if not already there.

WHAT IS OUR DESTINY. By Norman Thomas. Garden City: Doubleday, 1944, 192 p. $2.00.

As in his previous pronouncements, the Socialist leader is on much safer ground when he deals with domestic rather than international issues.

FACTS AND FASCISM. By George and Helen Seldes. New York: In Fact, 1943, 286 p. $1.50.

The authors do not mince words or avoid naming names in their effort to expose the various brands of native Fascism flourishing in the United States.

MOBILIZING FOR ABUNDANCE. By Robert R. Nathan. New York: Whittlesey, 1944, 228 p. $2.00.

How the United States can maintain a level of employment and production during the postwar era, set forth by a former chairman of the Planning Committee of the War Production Board. He believes in following the spending route to prosperity.

AMERICA UNLIMITED. By Eric Johnston. Garden City: Doubleday, 1944, 254 p. $2.50.

The up-and-coming President of the United States Chamber of Commerce expatiates optimistically on the future which he believes is beckoning to American capitalism — on condition that it modernizes its thinking and sheds such undesirable things as trusts, irresponsible labor unions and other interferences with the free play of competition.

WOODROW WILSON STILL LIVES — HIS WORLD IDEALS TRIUMPHANT. By J. Eugene Harley. Los Angeles: Center for International Understanding, 1944, 193 p. $2.00.

Tributes to Woodrow Wilson — *in extenso* by the author and in brief statements by some thirty figures in political, business and academic life. In the appendix are the texts of several recent documents of international importance.

Western Europe

GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM, 1918–1939. By W. M. Jordan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, 235 p. $4.50.

The author has made a sincere effort, on the basis of a painstaking examination of the documents, to unravel the main threads of "Anglo-French relations in the making and maintenance of the Versailles settlement." This book is published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

TRENDS IN EUROPEAN SOCIAL LEGISLATION BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS. By Alexander Lorch. New York: Maison Française, 1943, 148 p. $2.00.

A comparative study of the labor legislation of the Weimar Republic and of the social reforms of the *Front Populaire* in France, published for the Institute of Comparative Law of the École Libre des Hautes Études in New York.

REQUISITION IN FRANCE AND ITALY. By Maurice K. Wise. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944, 207 p. $2.75.

A comparative legal study.

A SHORT HISTORY OF FRANCE. By Sir J. A. R. Marriott. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 291 p. $2.75.

This history of France since the days of Julius Caesar is exclusively political in content and conventional in approach.

TRIUMPH OF TREASON. By Pierre Cot. Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1944, 432 p. $3.50.

Undoubtedly the next few years are going to see the publication of a wide array of books in which French personalities, of all stripes and grades of importance, will explain

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and seek to justify their behavior before and during the dark days of France's eclipse. In this volume the former Popular Front Minister of Aviation supplies an abundance of data, statistical and otherwise, to prove the case for himself and against the others.

COMBAT DE L'EXIL. By Henri Laugier. Montreal: Éditions de L'Arbre, 1944, 192 p. $1.50.

Collected articles and addresses — primarily on affairs in France, French Africa, and among French refugees abroad — by the Rector of the University of Algiers.

DES PRISONS DE LA GESTAPO À L'EXIL. By André Maroselli. Montreal: Éditions de L'Arbre, 1944, 134 p. $1.50.

A French Senator recounts the story of his imprisonment in fallen France and his eventual escape. In conclusion, there are the texts of several of his addresses and "messages" delivered in America.

THE FRENCH COLONIES: PAST AND FUTURE. By Jacques Stern. New York: Didier, 1944, 331 p. $3.00.

Colonial history in the imperialist tradition, by a French Minister of Colonies.

BELGIUM IN BONDAGE. By Jan-Albert Goris. New York: L. B. Fischer, 1943, 259 p. $2.75.

The major portion of this little book describes the unhappy fate of the Belgian people under Nazi rule, with a few pages on the "Belgian Congo's Fight."

THE LION RAMPANT. By L. de Jong and Joseph W. F. Stoppelmann. New York: Querido, 1943, 386 p. $3.00.

A comprehensive, authoritative account of the Nazi conquest and oppression of the Dutch people and of their resistance, by two Dutch journalists.

SWEDEN: A WARTIME SURVEY. New York: Bonnier, 1943, 250 p. $2.00.

This officially-inspired coöperative work, by some two dozen Swedish authorities, covers a wide range of activities in wartime Sweden.

GERMANY WILL TRY IT AGAIN. By Sigrid Schultz. New York: Reynal, 1944, 238 p. $2.50.

This book has an important message meriting wide attention despite the awkwardness with which it has been composed and presented. The author served as Berlin correspondent of the *Chicago Tribune* from 1914 to 1941 and can justly claim to know the German people well. On the basis of this long observation, she is convinced that a German comeback — in World War III — is only a question of how long it takes Germany to divide her present enemies and lull them once again into complacency.

BEHIND THE STEEL WALL. By Arvid Fredborg. New York: Viking, 1944, 305 p. $3.00.

This book by a young Swedish journalist lifts the curtain on events and conditions in Germany since Pearl Harbor. After the war he would like to see a moderate peace and a general revival of the institution of constitutional monarchy.

GERMANY: A SELF PORTRAIT. Edited by Harlan R. Crippen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 477 p. $3.75.

A composite picture based on excerpts from the writings of forty German authors of the last three decades. Some will not consider it really representative.

NAZIS IN THE WOODPILE. By Egon Glesinger. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1942, 262 p. $2.00.

The fascinating story of how the Nazis have, with the help of a variety of chemical processes, used wood to keep their industrial and war machines going.

CONTEMPORARY ITALY: ITS INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL ORIGINS. By Count Carlo Sforza. New York: Dutton, 1944, 430 p. $3.50.

Lovers of Italy will value this warm, and in many places personal, appreciation of the country's cultural and political history. Count Sforza is living proof that humanism and liberalism have deep roots in the Italian way of life, and his book will provide ample

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documentation for those who believe that, despite the degradation of 22 years of Fascist rule, a free and decent Italy can rise again.

THE VATICAN AND THE WAR. By Camille M. Cianfarra. New York: Dutton, 1944, 344 p. $3.00.

On the whole this is a well-informed, temperate review of recent papal policy as well as of events in Italy, which the writer observed for a number of years as Rome correspondent for the *New York Times*.

THE HERITAGE OF SPAIN. By Nicholson B. Adams. New York: Holt, 1943, 331 p. $4.00.

A vastly informative narrative of the development of Spanish culture. There are numerous well-chosen illustrations and a selective bibliography.

Eastern Europe

INTERVENTION AT ARCHANGEL. By Leonid I. Strakhovsky. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944, 336 p. $3.00.

This documented history of the Allied intervention and the Russian counterrevolution in northern Russia is a sequel to the author's "The Origins of American Intervention in North Russia, 1918."

RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES. By Pitirim A. Sorokin. New York: Dutton, 1944, 253 p. $3.00.

A Russian-born professor of sociology at Harvard compares and contrasts the peoples of the two countries in their culture, philosophy, and social and political institutions. His primary interest is to explain the Russians to Americans in the hope of breaking down prejudices and facilitating collaboration for peace.

WHAT RUSSIA WANTS. By Joachim Joesten. New York: Duell, 1944, 214 p. $2.50.

The author, an exile from his native Germany, is an assistant editor of *Newsweek*. When he sets forth Russia's rather extensive territorial and political desiderata in eastern and central Europe, he is probably not far wide of the mark. It is when he discusses domestic affairs in Russia that he ceases to be a realist and becomes an apologist.

THE RUSSIAN ARMY. By Walter Kerr. New York: Knopf, 1944, 250 p. $2.75.

How the Red Army is organized and how it fights as exemplified in the Battles of Moscow and Stalingrad. The author of this useful book was Moscow correspondent for the *New York Herald Tribune* from November 1941 until early in 1943.

THE RED AIR FORCE. By John Stroud. London: Pilot Press, 1943, 48 p. 5/.

This profusely illustrated, quarto booklet reveals something, but by no means all, of what outsiders would like to know about Soviet military aviation.

SOVIET PLANNING AND LABOUR IN PEACE AND WAR. By Maurice Dobb. New York: International Publishers, 1943, 124 p. $1.00.

A concise survey of economic planning, the financial system, labor problems, and the economic effects of war in the Soviet Union, by an economist of Leftist sympathies.

MANAGEMENT IN RUSSIAN INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE. By Gregory Bienstock and Others. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944, 198 p. $3.00.

This work of coöperative scholarship is the first in a series to appear under the auspices of the Institute of World Affairs at the New School for Social Research.

VLADIMIR I. LENIN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY. New York: International Publishers, 1943, 288 p. $2.50.

An orthodox Communist biography of the founder of the Soviet state.

MOUDROST STARÝCHČECHŮ. By Roman Jakobson. New York: Československy Kulturní Kroužek, 1943, 231 p. $1.25.

A study documenting the age-old hostility of Czechs and Germans and the deep roots of Germany's plans to conquer the Slavs.

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BALKAN JOURNAL. By Laird Archer. New York: Norton, 1944, 254 p. $3.50.
The informative and readable diary of an American who lived in the Balkans and Near East for over twenty years, thirteen of them as Foreign Director of the Near East Foundation. The period covered here is from 1934 to 1941.

KING CAROL, HITLER AND LUPESCU. By Alexander L. Easterman. London: Gollancz, 1942, 272 p. 12/6.
A British journalist's account of Rumanian politics and foreign relations since 1937. His interviews with King Carol and with Codreanu are revealing.

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A professor of international law at the National Wuhan University looks at postwar plans and offers suggestions on how to achieve security in the Orient. This book is published in coöperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations.

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A masterpiece of lucid historical narrative and interpretation. The first half of the book gives the geographic and ethnic background and brings the story down to the nineteenth century; the second half covers the more modern period.

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The author, for many years a British consular officer in China, later served as Adviser on Far Eastern Affairs to the Foreign Office. In this historical review of China's foreign relations he seeks to correct what he thinks are misconceptions about certain incidents, such as Anglo-American responsibilities in the Manchurian crisis of 1931–32.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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

C Coal regions
1. Assam field
2. Central Provinces field
3. Wardha Godavan field
4. North Bihar field
5. Raniganj field
6. Johilla field
7. Karanpura field
8. Jharia field
9. Bokaro field
10. Bikaner field
11. Jammu field
12. Mianwali field
13. Quetta field
14. Dando field

Pe Petroleum regions
1. Digboi
2. Badarpur
3. Khaur
4. Dhulian-Chharar

Fe Iron ore regions
1. Mysore
2. Chanda
3. Singhbhum-Keonjhar

Mn Manganese ore regions
1. Nagpur
2. Garha
3. Vizapatam
4. Goa
5. Bihar

Cr Chromium ore regions
1. Mysore
2. Nanjangud

Au Gold regions
1. Kolar

B Bauxite regions
1. Jammu
2. Katni
3. Balaghat
4. Mamuni
5. Lohardaga
6. Kolhapur
7. Belgaum

Cu Copper regions
1. Singhbhum

Mg Magnesite regions
1. Salem
2. Mysore

Mi Mica regions
1. Champaran
2. Nellore

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